Manchoukuo, founded in 1932 as a Japanese puppet-state, was a compound-national state, in which it was difficult to enforce nationality law and family registration (koseki) law. ‘Nation registration’ (minseki) was enforced in 1940 as an alternative institution. The governments of Japan and Manchoukuo were faced with the difficulty of how to deal with the koseki of ‘Japanese subjects’, including Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese, and how to treat their identities in Manchoukuo–this problem was exacerbated by the increase in the population of ‘Japanese subjects’ in Manchoukuo caused by Japan’s immigration policy. Japanese colonial rule required the Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese inhabitants of Manchoukuo to have separate registered domiciles (honseki), which reflected their respective ethnicities. Changes in this status were not generally permitted. The Japanese government implemented the policy of requiring ‘Japanese subjects’ who had registered according to minseki also to register their koseki for the purposes of convenience. Consequently ‘Japanese subjects’ in Manchoukuo had dual registered domiciles, koseki and minseki. Although Japanese and Koreans had dual identities, ‘Japanese subjects’ and ‘Manchoukuo nationals’, the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo adopted the policy that ‘Japanese subjects’ had priority over ‘Manchoukuo nationals’. Consequently, minseki were subordinate to Japanese koseki. The majority of Koreans in Manchoukuo had been omitted from Korean koseki. In 1939, The Japanese Governor-General of Korea coerced them into applying for registration. Japanese government decided to adopt conscription in Korea in 1944, and a Korean resident registration law (Chosen kiryu-rei) was enacted to register the persons who had not resided in honseki in Korean koseki. In Japan, the resident registration (kiryu) law had been in force in 1917 to register the Japanese who had resided in places other than honseki. In Manchoukuo, therefore, the honseki of ‘Manchoukuo nationals’ recorded in minseki did not match their actual places of residences. In 1943, the Manchoukuo government also enacted the kiryu law so that they could obtain the actual addresses of ‘Manchoukuo nationals’. ‘Japanese subjects’ in Manchoukuo were bound by a system of triple registration. Under Japanese colonial rule, the koseki system had played an important part as a ‘safety device’ to distinguish the Japanese from the Koreans or the Taiwanese. However, the system also had the effect of determining the honseki of registrants. Consequently, the kiryu system was indispensable as a complement to the above-mentioned functions of the koseki system in the Japanese empire.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify how the Chinese government promotes and displays the Mu Palace as a tourist spot. The palace is located in the old town of Lijiang, which has been registered as a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site. Section I examines the situation after the Ming period when the Mu Palace was constructed, and clarifies the historical transition occurring during this period by using such historical sources as the Qianlong Lijiang Fu Zhi Lue (乾隆『麗江府志略』) and the Guangxu Lijiang Fu Zhi Gao (光緒『麗江府志稿』), the records of some surveys conducted in the modern period, and related documents. In section Ⅱ, I analyze perceptions recorded by Huang Naizhen(黄乃鎮), who was the contemporary chief of the Lijiang prefecture cultural department and supervised the reconstruction of the Mu Palace from the planning stage to its eventual completion. I show what conceptions he had for the reconstruction. Moreover, I compare the historical fact that Mu native chieftains expanded their influence during the Ming period with the results of my on-site surveys in July 2009 and Ming sources such as the Mushi Huangpu (『木氏宦譜』) and the Huang Ming Enlun Lu (『皇明恩綸録』), in order to analyze how the present Mu Palace was reconstructed. Section 3 examines how the government displays the present Mu Palace to tourists through an analysis of the descriptions in academic papers, the People’s Daily Online and other government websites. From the above, it is clear that the rebuilding of the Mu Palace cannot be regarded as the reconstruction of a historical heritage site. In my opinion, the reconstruction can be considered as a ‘theme park’, which shows affinity with Chinese dynasties and demonstrates the historical legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China rule in this region. I cannot verify the proposition that the Naxi people, including the Mu native officials, had any affinity with Chinese dynasties. However, what I found was a strong desire on the part of the government to portray the Mu chieftains as being close to the Chinese dynasties. The reason for the Chinese government taking such an arbitrary attitude is that many elements of the history of the Mu family in the Ming period and the background to the construction of the Mu Palace do not demonstrate any affinity with a Chinese dynasty.This cannot necessarily be regarded as the ‘formula’ of the native official. From the viewpoint of China’s policy on minorities, however, I think that it is much more natural to develop Han cultural heritages that already exist in Lijiang rather than to undertake ‘creation’ projects such as the one outlined above. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of developing the tourist industry, the cultures of minority people are valuable resources, and their development can contribute to local development. That is to say, this case illustrates the competition between nation-state building and market economy principles as regards cultural heritage sites in China.
Economic reform and the introduction of a market economy have enabled China to achieve a high rate of economic growth. On the other hand, this growth has increased urban–rural, cross-region and cross-race income differentials in China. There has been large-scale migration of labor from rural to urban regions, and from interior to coastal regions, where economies have been well developed. After China and Korea established official relations with each other in 1992, Jilin Province became the second province in terms of international migration, after Fujian Province. It is important to examine the reasons why migration patterns may differ among various races and the factors determining the migration process. This paper reveals which factors determining migration are more important to minority peoples, compared with the Han population. Interregional labor migration in China has been the subject of much research. However, only a few studies have focused on labor migration by race in labor supply regions in China. The purpose of this paper is to examine the mechanism of labor migration by race, based on data from a questionnaire survey. According to the empirical results, we observed an obvious difference in labor migration by race. The important factors determining labor migration are race, individual characteristics, a family remittance, the existence of a network of friends and relatives, and not differentials in desired income. The effects of those factors may differ among races.
Nine years after the collapse of the Taliban regime, the hope and optimism that the Afghan people held prior to the presidential election in 2004 seem to have declined. The deteriorating security situation has demanded the reconstruction and expansion of the security sector (national army and police) as the top priority. In fact, some measures, such as increasing the number of army and police staff members, have been taken, but the improvement in the quality is at a standstill. Accordingly, the dependence of the security sector of Afghanistan on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has been increasing. Even though there has been no distinct change in the fragile fiscal structures, which historically rely greatly on external assistance, a policy of upgrading the facilities, equipment, training, and salary levels in the security sector will create further pressure. Moreover, questions will be raised about the sustainability. In order to achieve successful state-building, restoring security and confidence in the government is crucial. In addition, it is necessary to establish a self-reliant fiscal structure. Nevertheless, things have not progressed well due to the worsening security situation in Afghanistan.
However, because of increasing casualities and fiscal pressure, scepticism about assistance to Afghanistan has grown among the countries that have provided considerable inputs to Afghanistan. As a result, the governments of Canada and the Netherlands have announced timelines for withdrawal of their military units. Moreover, even the US declared its intention to start withdrawal of its military presence in the summer of 2011 in exchange for a short-term additional dispatch and further assistance to the Afghan security sector. Such a strengthening of assistance in the Afghan security sector would be a ‘localization’ of the security affairs and an ‘exit strategy’ for foreign stakeholders. However, this strategy cannot be achieved in a short period of time. Eventually, dependency on external resources will continue. Such dependency will result in an unstable situation in Afghanistan because external assistance tends to fluctuate due to political and economic reasons. Therefore, drawing a blueprint for Afghanistan’s future is a difficult task. However, stabilization in Afghanistan will contribute to regional stabilization in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Appealing to external stakeholders to share the burden and accept long-term involvement with Afghanistan is the key to success in Afghan state-building.