Fascism is a totalitarian movement, which, through power centralization by a dictatorial party and a charismatic leader, aims to achieve state unity and a revival of nationhood. In order to study the ‘Sinicization’ of fascism, this paper discusses the appearance and development of an informal elitist organization, the Blue Shirts, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in the1930s. Three levels of power politics are used to analyze the overall appearance of Chinese fascism: (1) party faction politics, (2) domestic military politics, and (3) international power politics.
First, with regard to party faction politics, an informal organization appeared and its movement spread. After the Manchurian incident, crisis-conscious young men from the Whampoa Military Academy, in imitation of the Italian Black Shirts, established a core organization, the Lixingshe, within the party. This secret organization abided by the Kuomintang’s (KMT) organizational rule (democratic centralism) and pledged loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek—this pledge can be seen as a form of Führerprinzip. The purpose of this military fascist movement was to spur the undisciplined KMT to improve its core function as well as to elevate Chiang Kai-shek to the status of charismatic leader. Second, in the process of becoming a domestic military power, the KMT regime changed from a Soviet-style party-ruling regime to a fascist dictatorial regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. In addition to vigorously expanding informal elitist organizational movements, Chang established the Pieh-tung-tui, modeled on the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA), under the Military Committee, and started the New Life Movement, which took its inspiration from the Italian and German movements to revive nationhood. Through these steps, Chang wanted to institutionalize fascist ideology, i.e. militarization, the Führerprinzip, and the revival of tradition. Third, Chang aimed to achieve a Hitler-style dictatorship and revival of nationhood by linking domestic fascist policies and international power politics.Though ostensibly compromising with the Japanese, Chang had drawn a plan to wage a war of long-term resistance against the Japanese centered on Sichuan Province as suggested by General von Falkenhausen after the Agreement of He-Mei in August 1935. Chang also approached Hitler via General von Seeckt to carry out diplomatic strategies of allying with Germany to combat Japan. Chang’s purpose for drawing on Nazi Germany was not to fulfill a racial revolution or to mount an invasion, but to gain access to the latest German weapons and industrialized defense techniques through trade exchanges, and to tackle the Chinese communists and the Japanese total war regime by acquiring the Nazis’ highly centralized ruling skills. Therefore, Chang established a unique dictatorial ruling regime by combining informal organizational movements and the Military Committee to replace the KMT’s party-ruling regime, which became a mere formality. Because Fascism lacks clear logic and theory, the results of its“ Sinicization” were, first, the augmentation of Bolshevik methods of revolution (democratic centralism, party dictatorship, and the anti-imperialist struggle), which were integral parts of the KMT regime; and second, the manifestation of nationalism, i.e. anti-communism and resistance against the Japanese. Though the informal elitist organizational movement did not successfully set up a fascist regime, Chang excluded resistant elites from the policymaking process through the autonomous dictatorial system, and he benefited politically and militarily when competing with local warlords and the Communist Party.
Public wholesale marketplaces, which work as agricultural wholesale channels handling urban Indonesia’s changing demands, still retain the characteristics of the traditional marketplace—the ‘bazaar’—where intimate buyer–seller relationships underlie transactions. Generally, in developing countries, conducting optimal transactions necessitates third-party enforcement by legal institutions. A number of theoretical researches on this governance utilize transaction cost analysis as the primary concept. However, experimental field research does not sufficiently clarify the trading mechanisms in agricultural wholesale marketplaces, where efficiency is necessary for the increased number of repeated transactions. Through the testing of theoretical models, this paper aims to explain quantitatively the relationship structure forged by merchants in agricultural wholesale marketplaces and the self-enforcement system of their transactions. On the basis of field interviews and previous findings, I proposed ten theoretical hypotheses about the interactions between three dimensions: indirect factors in transactional relationships, vertical relationships, and transaction performance. I then tested these hypotheses using structural equation modeling on 206 sample cases obtained during fieldwork at the Kramat Jati central agricultural wholesale market in Jakarta. This paper clarified two causal connections between buyer–seller relationships at the market and their opposite effects on the self-enforcement of the transaction. In one part of the causal connections, sellers acquired prior information about the buyers, e. g. their reputation, in order to ensure good trade, thus increasing trust levels and business performance. Moreover, self-enforcement is supported by the trust. Other aspects, e. g. environmental uncertainty, increase the level of transaction-specific investments and, thus, vertical relationships. Contrary to previous findings, this causality makes the self-enforcement nonfunctional because, incidentally, it causes hold-up problems even though the effect for self-enforcement is smaller than that in the empirical model. Further, this paper revealed that the business network among sellers strengthens the link with their vertical relationships and complements the market’s capabilities of setting the right price for fresh produce. Although the business network also plays the role of mutual aid—social capital—hindering the proper functions of the marketplace in order to construct efficient channels is not considered suitable. Finally, this article presents the fundamental information required to discuss the trading potential between merchants using traditional marketing channels and supermarkets—modern-marketing channels. By focusing on the differences between dealers in vegetables and fruits, it is suggested that dealers in fruits have a greater possibility of transactions with modern traders owing to their strong rationality.
Under China’s open-door policy, its southern regions, including the province of Guangdong and the city of Hong Kong, have been playing a crucial role as a gateway to the market economies in the West on one hand and China’s abundant resources on the other. The most notable rationale behind the development of southern China is the fact that Guangdong and Hong Kong are politically, economically, and socially different entities. The two can cooperate but never be integrated. However, the relationship seems to have changed since 1997, when the United Kingdom returned Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China, and globalization has now altered the power balance between capitalism and socialism, and center and region. The relationship between Guangdong and Hong Kong has become much more reciprocal, and even total integration of the two seems to be in sight. This paper aims to illustrate the background of and rationale behind such change, and refers to this as the formation of the ‘Southern China policy.’
The Southern China policy, formalized in the ‘The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020)’ and adopted at the Standing Committee of the State Council in December 2008, is considered to have been formulated through the merger of three policy streams. The first is Beijing’s physical and moral support for the Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region), which was, together with Guangdong, hit severely by the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The second is the policy to construct a harmonious society, newly initiated by Hu Jintao, Chinese Communist Party general secretary, who took office at the end of 2002. And the third is Guangdong’s attempt to upgrade its industries and restructure its economic and social structure, which started afresh in 2004, three years after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. The rationale behind the formation of the Southern China policy or ‘The Outline’ is considered to be a similar to that termed ‘neo-liberalism’ or‘ neo-conservatism’ initiated a few decades ago in some Western countries in the face of globalization. This rationale calls for the restoration of a strong nation based on a strong society. This is a complete reversal of the role that southern China has been playing since 1978. What China is aiming for with its Southern China policy is ‘to utilize to counter’, rather than ‘to utilize to catch up with’, as used to be the case, the outside world in order to make the country more stable and resilient politically, economically, and socially.