Based on a study of private entrepreneurs in the Chinese Yangtze delta area, this article analyzes the major factors influencing the growth of Chinese private firms. The article also explores the influence of these factors on the growth path and business development of private firms. It is found that Chinese private firms typically follow two types of growth path. One is to start from scratch, accumulate business and thus achieve a rolling development. The other is to utilize a variety of social relations to obtain such monopolistic resources as land, franchise rights on the market, etc., all of which are then transformed into capital to develop the firm. Therefore, the basic factors influencing the growth of Chinese private firms are land resources, labor costs, financial capital, and the growth of market demand. Nevertheless, the key factor playing a decisive role in the development of a firm is often the policy support of the government, social networking, etc. Although there is a general lack of basic resources for Chinese private firms, the overall transaction cost of entrepreneurship is not high. Some firms are able to grow rapidly by acquiring key resources. The growth process of private firms, however, is limited by both resource scarcity and growing transaction costs, which restrains the growth of these firms.
Emerging countries, especially China and India, have been increasingly expected to play a leading role in the world economy since banking crisis precipitated by the Lehman Brothers failure. Both countries have maintained high rates of economic growth, whereas Europe and the USA have been experiencing serious recession. However, the patterns of industrialization in China and India do not seem to be the same, particularly from the viewpoint of their economic impact on the East Asian region. Here is a provisional conclusion. What this paper argues is that India’s economic growth differs in certain respects from the growth of East Asian countries, including China. For India, domestic demand on economic development is relatively stronger than that of East Asia; however, international trade and the division of labor inside the East Asian region is more active than in India. That is the reason why there is a notable difference between China and India with respect to the ratio in the trade of machinery and mechanical appliances: these are the two main items of intraregional trade in East Asia. New markets in East Asia have been created due to the international division of labor in IT-related products since the 2000s, while China has been gaining power. By gaining access to this market, East Asian countries and China have enjoyed the multiplier effect of intraregional trade; therefore their economies have helped each other grow. In what way will these economic structures in East Asia change in the future? Or will India join the division of labor in East Asia in IT-related products; will the division of labor begin to cover India as well? These are points to which we should henceforth pay attention.
Much research has been published on the subject of rural villages in north China, which describes a village as a non-community, borderless group. Because previous works have mostly been interested in the traditional village, they did not fully analyze the transitions that these villages underwent in the 1950s. In particular, these works are mainly interested in whether or not north China villages are closed communities, but are not interested in the requirements of villagers, and their sense for village land. However, these are issues that must be analyzed before considering whether or not north China villages are closed communities. In section 1 I briefly marshal the views on north China given in previous works, and in section 2 I analyze the problem of village land. It has been proven that north China villagers did have a definite border-consciousness concerning land reform. I have also undertaken some analysis of crop-watching practice, traditionally called kanqing, in section 3. Because village borders in north China are generally considered to be same as the borders of crop watching, any changes in the village border imply changes in crop watching. In section 4, I analyze the requirements for being a villager and the peasants’ sense or awareness as villagers. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) executed land reform in rural villages, specific distinctions were drawn between insiders and outsiders. Such distinctions had some influence on the distribution of land and properties. Although such distinctions were strengthened when the CCP executed land reform, during the time of collectivization such distinctions weakened because land ownership had lost its significance. This sense of village did not help the CCP to promote the execution of its policies such as land reform and collectivization, but rather hampered this process. At the time of higher-level collectivization, because every village had its own village consciousness, it was not easy to form a higher-level co-op. These difficulties reduced higher-level co-ops to smaller entities of similar size to primary level co-ops.