In 1915, Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) returned to India after his eight-year-long satyāgraha (non-violent struggle) in South Africa. As he initiated satyāgraha in India for the first time, he soon realized that the idea of ‘non-violence’ was misunderstood among his fellow countrymen; it was considered a practice followed by cowards and the weak. In order to eliminate this misconception, Gandhi argued that non-violence was by no means practiced by cowards but by manly and courageous Indian kṣatriyo (warriors). Having highlighted Gandhi’s muscular discourse on satyāgraha, Erikson (1969) termed the concept ‘militant non-violence’.This muscular and militant interpretation of Gandhi’s non-violence significantly influenced later Gandhian scholarship. Contrary to established views, in this paper I show that towards the end of his life Gandhi developed a new interpretation of non-violence that was neither muscular nor cowardly but based on his unique ideas on vyaktitva (personality). In order to demonstrate this, I examine Gandhi’s concept of brahmacarya (sexual celibacy) in relation to his political discourse on non-violence. Gandhi first took a vow of brahmacarya in 1906 during his sojourn in South Africa. During this period, his ideas of brahmacarya were rigorously austere and puritanical. However, after the late1920s, his views on brahmacarya gradually changed. More often than not, Gandhi stayed physically close to his female entourage not only in his āśram but also in public areas. At the end of his life, he even started to sleep naked with naked women under a banner of ‘the experiment’ with brahmacarya. Although this experiment caused controversy all over India, it has never been seriously examined philosophically in past scholarly works. Using original diaries written in Gujarati by Manubhen, a core participant of ‘the experiment’, I reveal three fundamental philosophical features of ‘the experiment’ in relation to tantra sādhanā.(1) Gandhi tried to become sthitaprajña, a man whose wisdom is never affected by organoleptic impulse. (2) Gandhi tried to realize his inner strī (woman) so that he could gain hidden śakti (spiritual power) that was thought to be essential in bringing permanent peace to communal conflict. (3) Through the yogic practice of vīryanigraha (semen retention), Gandhi aimed to realize his inner napuṃsaktva (impotecy) and become ūrdhvaretā (a man whose semen is sublimated) in which male and female sexual boundaries are transcended. This last experiment pointed toward Gandhi’s spiritual project of swarāj in the deepest sense—namely an epistemological emancipation from colonial domination.
China’s national defense expenditure has shown a steady double-digit rate of increase since 1989, while at the same time has consistently lacked transparency. However, there has been little discussion of the standards by which this (lack of) transparency is being measured. Details of the scope and the breakdown of China’s national defense expenditure have not been clarified. Moreover, it is difficult not only to evaluate whether China’s increase in defense expenditure is ‘moderate’, as the Chinese government insists, but also to reach an objective judgment on whether it is ‘proper and reasonable’.
Although it has been pointed out that ‘there is a lack of transparency and credibility’, why does the Chinese government keep denying this and insist that China’s officially published national defense expenditure figures are ‘proper and reasonable’? It may be because China’s definition of ‘national defense expenditure’ is in itself different from the definition used by the global community.
The present study aims to show that two different concepts, namely ‘national defense expenditure’ and ‘military expenditure’, exist in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s accounting system, based on data related to the financial affairs of China’s armed forces, and to specify the definition and scope of both concepts.
First, the definition and scope of ‘military expenditure’ is compared with that provided by international organizations, research institutions, and previous studies. Second, this study aims to provide a clear definition and scope of China’s national defense expenditure based on previous studies. I also use these studies to confirm the Chinese government’s official definition and scope of ‘national defense expenditure’. Third, the definition of ‘national defense expenditure’ and ‘military expenditure’ is clarified from the accounting system used by the PLA to manage its military financial matters.
As a result, the following three points become clear. (1) In the classification of expenses in the military financial affairs accounting system, two different concepts exist: ‘national defense expenditure’ and ‘military expenditure’. ‘Military expenditure’ is a concept created for subsuming ‘national defense expenditure’. (2) ‘Military expenditure’ is composed of not only ‘military forces budget expenditure’ but also items such as ‘national defense department research and experimentation expenses’, ‘armed police force budget expenditure’, and ‘off-budget expenditure’. (3) If we wish to compare China’s military expenditure with that of other countries, we should use the term ‘military expenditure’ to cover expenses that are incurred on such items as armed police budgetary funds and non-budgetary funds, etc., which are not included in the published ‘national defense expenditure’ figures.