This article discusses how Pakistani society has clearly distanced itself from terrorism. On 6th January 2015, the 21st Amendment Bill passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan has officially changed the constitutional definition of “Muslim terrorist(s)” into “terrorist(s) using the name of religion”. Pakistan has been called a hub of terrorists ever since several active terrorist groups are known to be based in Pakistan – such as the Sunni extremists Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement, TTP) or Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Some of these groups are said to be supported by the Pakistani military and claim they will establish an Islamic order in society. However, Pakistani society itself has been suffering from terror and has been mobilized in the war on terror. This paper shows the transformation of Pakistani society concerning the concept of “Islamic-ness”. Pakistan has been a frontline state in conflicts such as, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or the war on terror after 9/11. During the anti-Soviet war, Pakistan received huge financial and military assistance from both Western and Islamic countries. The Western countries supported Pakistan in the Cold War proxy war against the USSR, and Islamic countries provided assistance in the name of jihad against the Communists. In the 1980s, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s military regime promoted Islamization of society, a process which was never criticized by the international community which needed the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation in the war. Needless to say, Islam is the national religion of Pakistan and 95% of the total population of Pakistan belongs to Islam. Although the peoples of Pakistan may have different religious practices in their everyday life, all of them are attached to a firmly based monotheistic faith, and regard Muhammad as the last Prophet. However, there has generally been widespread reluctance to criticize Islamization or even Islamic extremists who kill in the name of religion. Also, terrorists often expressed their disapproval of the Pakistani government as not being “Islamic” or being a “puppet of the US”. As a result, Pakistani society has often been confused concerning the “Islamic-ness” of its own governments. This may be one of the reasons why there was not much criticism of the extremists even if they killed in the name of Allah. Since the tragic attack on a Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani society has evolved radically on that issue. Even Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who originally supported the idea of negotiating with the terrorists, has now approved an amendment to the Constitution establishing special military courts which are to be active for a two-year period only and designed to be rapidly dealing with crimes related to terrorism. The amendment states that Pakistan is willing to permanently wipe out and eradicate terrorism from the country. This decision shows not only the firm intention of the government on its war on terror, but also the decisive break with the terrorists who monopolize the cause of religion in Pakistani society. For Pakistan, it could be said that the consequence of voting such an amendment represents the greatest social transformation ever experimented since the Islamization of the 1980s.
After the end of the Cold War, many countries reviewed and reconsidered their public diplomacy (PD), recognizing the increasing importance of engagement with foreign nations and international opinion. With the rapid rise of China, public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao) became a very important concept in China’s national strategy and foreign policy during earlier periods of the 21st century. Recently, scholars within and outside China are paying attention to the purpose and features of China’s PD, due to the expanding presence of China’s PD and its soft power. However, questions such as “what are the factors that drive China to pursue PD?” or “how have the concept of China’s PD changed?” remain unanswered. This article analyzed the discourses of Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts through the perspectives of realism, constructivism, and neo-classical realism. As many scholars have mentioned, PD has been recognized as an important asset to enhance soft power and influence for China in the competition with “rivals” such as the US and Japan. The concept of PD, however, did not exist in official documents nor foreign strategy discourses until the early 2000s. This suggests that the appearance and development of China’s PD cannot be described only in the context of balance of power. It is also difficult to explain the developments of China’s PD as a process of complex learning through the view of constructivism. It is clear that Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts are learning about PD and even the concept of “new PD” developed in developed countries, which emphasizes that the role and autonomy of non-governmental actors are essential to the effectiveness and credibility of PD in the era of globalization, and they already have full understanding of the implications of PD from the discourses outside China. Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts, however, refrain from allowing the autonomy of non-governmental actors despite their important role in China’s current PD. Therefore, the process of change in China’s concept of PD should be explained as “simple learning” rather than “complex learning.” This article argues that the view of neo-classical realism is the most effective to comprehend China’s PD. Chinese elites’ perceptions of the international and domestic environment are the essential factor that has changed the concept of China’s PD.
In the study of modern Chinese history, there are very few discussions on the history of child care. This paper examines the changing pattern of child care in China at the time of Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). As the war created a large amount of displaced children, the Chongqing Nationalist Government played an active role in providing nursery services and leading the relief activities for displaced children. In addition, the Government promoted the establishment of modern nurseries, offering child care services to ordinary children. Focusing on these important changes, the paper shows that child care became an integral part of social welfare services in modern China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. More specifically, the paper makes extensive use of the Chongqing Government’s official reports, ordinances, social surveys, and published periodicals, and identifies three major changes of child care in China. First, instead of relying on private charity activities, the state directly led the relief activities for displaced children in the war. Second, the modern nurseries that allowed parents to work grew in number, further enhancing the social welfare function of child care facilities. Third, wartime child care facilities began to cultivate ‘little citizens’ who should possess a healthy body, develop national consciousness, have a work ethic, and follow collective rules and order. However, it is worth noting that, while modern child care facilities were established, they did not spread across China. Cultivating ‘little citizens’ also faced many difficulties. As a whole, the wartime child care facilities were limited. Most children still depended on family-based rather than collectively organized child care services.
The main actors in creating international production networks in East Asia are foreign-invested companies. With recent rise in labor wages and political risks in China and Thailand, foreign-invested companies in these countries have started relocating their factories to neighboring countries. This study has analyzed the structure of the production networks created through foreign direct investments across East Asian countries with different factor endowments. It has focused on the division of labor between countries with ample labor force and low wages, such as Vietnam, Cambodia. and Lao PDR, and countries with higher wages, namely China and Thailand. It hypothesizes that a “horizontal” division of labor will emerge in final goods trade—in which labor-abundant countries specialize in low value-added items and capital-abundant countries specialize in high value-added items, while a “vertical” division of labor will emerge in parts and component trade—in which labor-abundant countries specialize in the labor-intensive part of the supply chain and capital-abundant countries specialize in its capital-intensive part. The most important items traded between China and Vietnam in the category of electric machinery are “integrated circuits,” “communication equipment,” “video equipment,” and “wire harnesses.” This study has shown that trade patterns in most items support our hypothesis, but there are also a few items that do not follow the pattern suggested by the hypothesis. While the basic trade pattern is determined by the factor endowment structure of both countries, in some items Vietnam exports capital-intensive products and China exports labor-intensive products to each other. Such deviations from the basic pattern are explained by the economy of scale achieved by large-scale production in foreign-invested companies. The electric machinery trade between Cambodia and Thailand, and Lao PDR and Thailand still remains at a small scale, and it follows the pattern suggested by our hypothesis. Therefore, the trade pattern can be explained by the differences in factor endowments in these countries.