It is a new tendency of international relations to focus on sea and oceans, attracting a keen attention not only from policy specialists but also from the general public. Therefore, we could often come across the names of old disciplines such as Maritime Studies or Ocean Studies in these days. It was the 19^th century and early 20^th century when European major powers needed to study sea and oceans scientifically in order to scramble for the new lands in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Interestingly, this area of knowledge is taken out from the reservoir of library to encounter the contemporary challenges at the time of globalization. Global market economy, new security threats, energy resources, immigrants and refugees, environment and ecology, natural disasters and wide-spread accidents by human errors and so on, we could name it. It means that nation states, together with international society, have been struggling with those issues in the maritime domain as well as on the surface of the earth.

There is a certain difference, however, between international relations on the land and international relations around the sea. The former represents the international order almost completed in the 19^th century Europe, demarcating the land by national boundaries guarded by the armed forces of the states, the system of which was eventually brought into Africa, Asia and the Pacific at the imperial age. In other words, the idea of sovereign states with clearly defined territories was implanted in non-European countries by colonial states or indigenous modern states like Japan or Thailand. Still, a vast space of sea and oceans have been kept as a frontier, a space not possessed by any states or an international domain of freedom of movements, although states have been always trying to encircle the coastal areas and continental shelves for more private usage.

So, we live at the time of rising an interest in the study of sea and oceans. Simultaneously the wide open area of the Indian Ocean in the linkage with the Pacific Region via South East Asia and Australia is under the intellectual spotlight. In this issue, Rupakjyoti Borah and Vindu Mai Chotani, young scholars from India with the knowledge of International Relations, Japan Studies and Asian Studies, contribute their ambitious articles for the further discussion in this emerging field. This issue itself embodies the intellectual collaboration of Asian Studies in the Indo-Pacific Region of the 21^st century.

In the hoary days, Indian influence spread by the sea route to countries far and wide, including in Southeast Asia, East Asia, East Africa and many other parts of the world. The maritime domain has been key to the spread of Indian culture and influence and also to the upswing in the economic health of the country ever since the launch of India’s liberalisation programme in the early 1990’s. In addition, the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean region have been key for the success of India’s ‘Act-East Policy’ which aims at re-invigorating New Delhi’s historical and cultural links with the countries in Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania.

China’s tremendous economic and military growth has emboldened its leadership to undertake many new initiatives. One such initiative is the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) through which it has been trying to increase its presence in the wider Indo-Pacific region of which the Indian Ocean region is a key constituent. However, New Delhi has traditionally considered the Indian Ocean region as its “strategic backyard” and this has result in a dilemma for India.

This article will approach the issue of China’s Maritime Security Road (MSR) initiative and India’s response to the same from a realist perspective. First, it will assess why India needs to approach this offer from China (to be a part of the OBOR) with extreme caution and explain China’s Indian Ocean strategy. Second, it will elucidate India’s major interests in its immediate neighbourhood, especially in the maritime domain. Finally, it will set forth how India should respond to China’s increasing forays into the Indian Ocean region.

Forming a bridge between Asia and Europe, the Indian Ocean is fast becoming a maritime hub and an economic growth centre. Indeed, the region is now characterized by growing economic and strategic competition involving both external powers—the U.S., Japan, China, France, Australia—as well as littoral states. Though India has always considered the Indian Ocean as its “own lake” in the South Asian sphere of influence, India is finding its position and the existing balance of power challenged by the increasing Chinese forays in the Indian Ocean. Further the relative U.S. retrenchment in Asia, the uncertainties that are arising in the India-U.S. relationship since Trump came into power, and the bonhomie growing between China and Pakistan all add to New Delhi’s growing concerns. Against this background, this paper argues that if India is to counter and balance these two key trends in the Indian Ocean—China’s rise and the relative U.S. decline—as well as deal with the other threats in the region such as transnational terrorism or the presence of failing or fragile states, it has to deepen its relations with like-minded democracies. While New Delhi finds its best ally in Tokyo, with both countries recognizing that there is a case for their partnership to lead the region, there is a fine line to achieving this. Albeit progress being made, India’s growing cooperation with Japan is moving slowly and tentatively, and thus this paper goes on to explore avenues for increasing cooperation between India and Japan.

This study is intended to answer the following questions: what caused some of the Filipino masses to collaborate with the Japanese?; and why did their collaboration for the Japanese bring about severe violence?

Over seventy years or so since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in Asia, numerous academic works have been discussing so far the subject matters on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. However, only a few of them have discussed the issues of the collaboration with the perspectives from “below.” Even though there have been published numerous studies on the Filipino popular history, very few historians have examined the nature of collaborationism transpired in the local setting of the Philippines with such perspectives.

This paper aims to shed light on rampant severe violence frequently happened among the masses or locals in Leyte Island of the Philippines, one of the rural areas of the country, during the Japanese occupation, that have not yet been thoroughly examined in Philippine historiography. Applying theoretical frameworks of Ranajit Guha (2007) dealing with the historical study on the mass movement in India, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of the mass violence by focusing on the actuations of a number of actors, most of whom belonged to low middle class including some local governmental officials (municipal mayors, treasurers, or chieftains of small villages in the province), local small merchants or landless peasants with a scant educational background. These kind of people tended to be treated as minor actors in “periphery” in the Philippine society when describing the history of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some of them were said to be involved in severe violence during the time of their organizing some paramilitary groups for the Japanese such as the Home Guard in Ormoc or Jutai in Abuyog. Being minor one in Philippine historiography, the significance of mass violence have had been ignored, and these violent incidents were considered nothing but black side of patriotic movements against the Japanese initiated by the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Therefore, their involvement in the local history have been forgotten on the minds of locals and local historians as well.

Discussing several cases presented in this paper, the author tries to posit that such minor actors in “periphery” of the Philippine society tried to delineate themselves in the elite-dominated society like Leyte Province by collaborating with the Japanese. Unfortunately, their activities were too sporadic to unite other minor elements toward the unified movement as the Sakdal Movement or Hukbalahap Movement in Luzon Island did during that time.