The purpose of this paper is to clarify the ownership patterns and management characteristics of the Indian zaibatsu from the standpoint of the types of the zaibatsu families; a) the joint family type (the Walchands, the Singhanias, the Bajajs), b) the split type (the Goenkas, the Birlas), and c) other types (small family type; the Mahindras, alien type; the Tatas).Some of the concluding observations are as follows : 1) On the whole, inter-corporate investment and multiple directorship as the instrument of control play the significant role in all the zaibatsu, though the pattern varies widely among the groups. Generally it can be said that the larger the joint family is, the stronger tends to be the zaibatsu families' holds over both ownership and management. 2) In the case of the split type, both ownership and management are retained independently by each sub-group of the zaibatsu family. To be noted is the case of the ownership of the R.P. Goenkas, one of the three subgroups of the Goenkas, where a number of investment companies that are subsidiaries of the four main companies of the group play the decisive role in the shareholdings of the group companies. 3) In the Mahindras, the small family type, the main family members hold the ultimate decision making power of the nuclear (holding) company, thereby controling quite a few of their group companies.
The amount of deposits of Mitsui Bank increased rapidly after 1886, leading to a corresponding increase in the amount of loans by the bank. In spite of these favorable circumstances, the bank had held a lot of bad loans because it lacked the ability to review requests effectively. T. Masuda, president of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, was anxious about the state of Mitsui Bank. He asked K. Inoue, the former Minister of Finance, for help and advised T. Nishimura, vice-president of Mitsui Bank, to place more effort at loan collection. But Nishimura didn't translate Masuda's advice into action, as he was a man of indecision. Consequently, Mitsui Bank lost the confidence of bankers and the amount of nongovernmental deposits decreased from 17, 117 thousand yen to 12, 612 thousand yen in the first half of 1891. Masuda complained to Inoue that Nishimura could not cope with the crisis of Mitsui Bank. Then Inoue asked H. Nakamigawa, president of Sanyo Railway Company, to enter Mitsui Bank and institute reforms. Nakamigawa entered Mitsui Bank in August 1891. He collected outstanding loans to Higashi-Honganji and recieved collateral from other borrowers. But I think it must be emphasized that Mitsui Bank had already been recieving collateral prior to Nakamigawa's entry and that he wrote off bad loans by reducing reserve fund which had been maintained since the bank's establishment in 1876. (It had several kinds of voluntary reserve accounts because its financial status in 1876 was very bad.) He was able to pay back the bank's borrowings from the Bank of Japan by the end of 1892 because the bank's deposits had increased and the amount of governmental bonds which it held decresed.