In this paper, I considered the features of the enterprise boom in local area and its carrier focused on the case in Fukuoka prefecture. Considerations in this paper includes only corporations and the period is by 1899. The facts clarified by the considerations in this paper are briefly mentioned as follows. In Fukuoka prefecture, first of all, it started from establishments of financial companies. In the late 1880s, industrial infrastructure, such as railway companies or harbour construction companies, and spinning companies were risen. After the mid of 1890s, number of establishments of companies were increasing and it didn't occurred only in limited area, but also did at several areas. Number of establishment of companies from 1893 to 1899 reached 196 and it peaked in 1897. Seeing the details of the number of companies regarding to their categories, the highest was 86 in banking business, followed by 54 in manufacturing industry, 39 in commerce, 8 in transportation business, 6 in mining industry, 3 fisheries. The capital of railway business, as transportation, was prominantly large. However, 153 companies, 78.1% of 196 of them in total, were medium and small enterprises whose capital was not more than 100,000 yen. Number of directors at 196 companies mentioned above was 929 in total and 744 at actual number. Most of them were local wealth holders in Fukuoka prefecture and to possess a certain amount of wealth was important factor to form entrepreneurs. Considering the relations between establishment of companies and origins of entrepreneurs, landowners were enthusiastic to found banks and local merchants were enthusiastic to set up companies had wide varieties.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the features of subcontracting in the automobile industry during the high growth period, using Toyo Kogyo as an example. Toyo Kogyo reallocated its management resources from three-wheeled to four-wheeled vehicles in the era of high growth, and was number three in production of four-wheeled vehicles after 1960. From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, Toyo Kogyo expanded its use of subcontractors. The subcontractors were small firms located in Hiroshima. They had high sales dependence on Toyo Kogyo, and performed processing after receiving drawings and materials from Toyo Kogyo. In the process of expanding its use of subcontractors, Toyo Kogyo developed a department to manage subcontractors, and built an institution for adjusting order quantities to suit the management efforts of subcontractors. In addition, in transactions between Toyo Kogyo and its subcontractors, the ownership of dies and tools reverted to Toyo Kogyo. Toyo Kogyo selected governance mechanisms to promote ex post competition. After 1960, the wage differentials between automobile manufacturers and subcontractors exhibited a sharply declining trend. This reduction in wage differentials was brought about by a relative increase in wages at small subcontractors. One cause of this payment of wages was the realization of efficient management at subcontractors. As indicated by Shinei Kogyo (treated in this paper), there were also subcontractors who booked a higher return on total assets than Toyo Kogyo because they increased total asset turnover by using machines efficiently. Part of the development of the Japanese automobile industry was achieved by the automobile manufacturers developing diverse institutions to inhibit opportunistic behavior, and suppliers deploying efficient management over a broad range.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of technical innovation on marketing channels and the Yamaha Music School under the mature Japanese piano market since the 1980s. The dilemma of the piano industry (e.g., the low diffusion rate, about 25%) drastically changed due to digital technology. In this new competitive environment, Yamaha carried out the three strategic changes: releasing low cost digital instruments, recasting sales channels, and reconsidering the Yamaha Music School's management policy. In the early 1980s, newcomer Casio began producing and selling the Casiotone, a low cost digital instrument. Although Yamaha did not want to release cheap keyboard instruments which might decrease the demand for their leading products (the piano and electronic organ), in the late 1980s they launched Portasound (a Yamaha-made cheap keyboard) to compete against the Casio product. Moreover, Yamaha distributed this new product through the same mass retailers which dealt in Casiotones. Recasting their sales channel this way caused the old channel, the traditional exclusive distributor system, to struggle. However, it was important for Yamaha to maintain the traditional system, because exclusive distributors were skillful at selling expensive goods (pianos etc.) through consulting sales. Therefore, Yamaha reinforced the exclusive distributors by changing their form of profit-earning music schools from one in which the schools supported Yamaha through sales, to one in which Yamaha supported the schools through licensing. These schools became an important source of income in the face of reduced piano demand from 1980. Yamaha maintained their position as market leader through these three strategic changes in spite of the technological paradigm shift in which they lost the first mover advantage. Although the double structure of their sales channel (comprising exclusive distributors and mass retailers) resulted in lower sales capacity for their exclusive distributors, the exclusive distributors were able to change their primary focus to the music education business. Yamaha's unique sales channel, with educational facilities, continues to transform while developing new keyboard instrument businesses.