This paper discusses the semantic and pragmatic characteristics of“factual
may”(e.g.,
He may be a professor, but he sure is dumb). After examining Sweetser's (1990) and Papafragou's (2000) analyses, I first argue that factual
may occurs before unexpected clauses and the two clauses are linked by“concessives, ”such as
but or
however and that its occurrence is further restricted with respect to the preceding context. Then, I argue (against Sweetser and Papafragou) that this
may is neither an extension of deontic
may nor the same as epistemic
may; I present an alternative analysis based on Papafragou's basic meaning of
may, in which factual
may concerns not only the speaker's beliefs but also the addressee's beliefs. Finally, I argue that factual
may has a“procedural” function in discourse.
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