This paper investigates Rawls’s program of socializing Kant’s ethics developed in his theory of justice and ascertains the limitations of its will-oriented approach to freedom by focusing on the difference between Rawls’s and Sen’s interpretation of freedom. In addition, this paper thereby evaluates the significance of Sen’s critique of Rawls’s theory of justice.
Rawls socializes Kant’s ethics by transforming Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative into intersubjective procedures in the original position. However, he inherits Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom without making any changes to it; in other words, the “inner freedom” that solely determines a rational being’s will and has no commitment to the physical process to achieve the will. Sen criticizes this interpretation of freedom as being based on a fetishism of goods, introducing the idea of capability to compensate for this lacuna in Rawls’s theory of justice. One feature of Sen’s interpretation of freedom is found in the theoretical accent that he places on the practical aspect of freedom; in other words, the freedom to achieve, which varies according to the diversity of people’s “utilization functions” converting goods into effective functions.
Despite this criticism of the Kantian concept of freedom, Sen’s idea can also be seen as being based on Kant’s philosophy. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant attempts to bridge the gulf between freedom and nature（the physical world）derived from his own transcendental conception. We direct our attention particularly to Kant’s argument about rational being’s aptitude（Tauglichkeit）to have a purpose and achieve it because the argument shows a possible correspondence between Kant’s concept of culture and Sen’s concept of development concerning the practical aspect of freedom.
On the basis of these arguments, we can understand the limitations of the will-oriented approach to freedom indicated in Rawls’s theory of justice and the significance of Sen’s critique, which not only clarifies such limitations but also proposes another possible way to inherit Kant’s philosophy of freedom.
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon（1809─1865）a présenté une théorie qui s’appelle l’« antithéisme » dans Système des contradictions économiques. Accusant l’athéisme humanitaire d’outre-Rhin de faire Dieu de l’humanité, il a proposé de chasser l’idée de Dieu d’esprit et conscience de l’homme. Le but de cet article est de préciser trois éthiques qui sont révélées relatif à l’« antithéisme » et transformation sociale.
Dans la première section, nous envisageons le but de l’ « hypothèse de Dieu » qui a été mis par Proudhon dans le Prologue de ce livre. Cette hypothèse est un « instrument dialectique nécessaire », mais la réception de la nécessité par l’homme collectif est faite toujours avec la faculté de réflexion. Nous l’appelons la « première éthique » de transformation sociale.
Ensuite, dans la deuxième section, après avoir précisé la logique de nécessité de la série des antinomies, nous remarquons qu’il y a une autre route pour socialiser virtuellement dans des antinomies. Le travail étant organisé, il apparaîtra une « autre nécessité ». On peut voir que l’homme collectif est capable de se mettre aussi dans cette nécessité. Nous appelons cette faculté la « deuxième éthique ».
Finalement, dans la troisième section, nous envisageons la théorie de l’«antithéisme ». Dans cette théorie, la nature humaine se trouve contre Divinité. C’est pour cela que la « troisième éthique » consiste à chasser l’idée de Dieu. Nous précisons que cette logique soutient l’éthique d’une « autre nécessité ».
Edmund Husserl（1859─1938）conceived a theory of communication in Logical Investigations（1900/01）. According to his conception, to initiate communication, one must express his/her wish to communicate, and another must receive this expression. Husserl calls such a function to express mental acts ‘indication（Kundgabe）’. Therefore, the main topics of his theory of communication should be ‘indication’ and ‘reception of indication（Kundnahme）’. Because of his interest in logic, however, this theory was scarcely dealt with in Logical Investigations. However, Husserl began to re-examine it when he planned his new systematic and comprehensive book in 1921. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explain how Husserl’s theory of communication was developed since 1921. Because his plan for the new book was only partially realized, we use mainly manuscripts which were included in Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity II and III.
We will clarify the process of this development as follows. First, we will explore
Husserl’s manuscripts from 1921 and show that he regarded the ‘body’ and
the ‘open world’ as the conditions of possibility to experience others. Second, we
will examine further his manuscripts from 1924 and present his view that the
experience of others can be classified into ‘empathy’ and ‘communication’. In empathy,
the mental acts of another are indicated without his/her intention, while
they are indicated intentionally in communication. Husserl tried to characterize
communication by intentional indication and the reception thereof. Finally, we
will deal with the theory of community in Cartesian Meditations（1931）and
manuscripts written in the 1930s. According to this theory, the community of
empathy can proceed to the community of communication if members thereof
indicate their wish to communicate intentionally and receive it from each other.
Then, they satisfy the conditions of possibility to experience others in a higher
order; they regard other bodies as bodies for intentional indication and live in
the cultural and social world, which is open to the community of communication.
We can therefore present this theory of community from the 1930s as a developed
form of the theory of communication of Logical Investigations.
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations（hereafter PI）is known for
its dialectic style. Wittgenstein, as a therapist, makes his interlocutor reflect on
his own wording. Several studies have been conducted regarding Wittgenstein’s
interactive style. However, little attention has been given to a conflict between
Wittgenstein and his interlocutor. They often talk past each other. Wittgenstein
gets irritated at his interlocutor’s reaction. The interlocutor complains that
Wittgenstein’s advice is irrelevant. The question why Wittgenstein describes the
conflict in a positive way remains unanswered.
The key to solving the problem is to consider the interlocutor’s perspec
tive. I will answer the question through an examination of the interlocutor’s reaction
towards Wittgenstein’s advice. First, I will examine in detail the therapy
of PI §§191─195. In these sections, Wittgenstein not only points out that the interlocutor’s
expressions lack a concrete example and context in which we could
use them, but also offers objects of comparison in which Wittgenstein makes his
interlocutor reflect on his own wording. However, the interlocutor does not receive
Wittgenstein’s offering in a straightforward manner. Second, I will investigate
the interlocutor’s reaction in PI §195. I suggest that the interlocutor seems
to realize the analogies between objects of comparison and his own expressions
but refuses to admit such analogies are tenable. If my explanation is true, the
question why Wittgenstein describes the conflict in a positive way can be answered.
Finally, I will reconsider the reason why Wittgenstein positively describes
the conflict by focusing on the readers’ point of view. I assert that Wittgenstein
encourages us to scrutinize our foundations of thought.
This study elucidates the argument which Martin Heidegger developed
in his Being and Time（Sein und Zeit）about responsibility. His interest is focused
on how far we have to take responsibility for our actions. To forecast this
problem, one might think that, rationality or rational deliberation defines its
scope. But Heidegger didn’t think that “rationality” provides us a final solution
to the problem about responsibility. Heidegger’s evaluation is concerned with
the famous distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, so this study
interprets Heidegger’s argument about this distinction as one about responsibility.
Heidegger identifies inauthenticity with “the They”（das Man）as our
everyday mode of being and analyses our concept of responsibility and our
judgments about our actions in terms of this concept. Heidegger introduces the
concept of “the They” as “the-one”, who nobody is but everyone is. And according
to Heidegger, “the They” defines what we have to do and what we must not
do. So we can say that this concept represents the rationality in a society. Actually,
we can blame someone, saying “one ordinarily doesn’t do so” or “rational
agent should do this.” In doing so, we resort to “the They” or anonymous ratio
nality. But following this way of thinking, one cannot blame the other’s action
which even unintentionally hurt someone heavily, if only he/she deliberates rationally
as a mature agent would do. Heidegger considers this conclusion odd.
In contrast to an inauthentic person, authentic person is an agent who
is very responsible, Heidegger says. To be become authentic, one must become
aware of one’s own weaknesses. These weaknesses which he refers to as our
“lacking” concern our omissions. We can never do something unless at the same
time we forgo something else. Heidegger’s responsible agent is aware of his/her
own weakness, and doing so, he/she is prepared for regretting own actions and
for thinking that he/she should have taken the other action he/she never knew.
Most importantly, this regret should go beyond the scope of rational deliberation.
Responsible agent is prepared to take responsibility which “the They” rationally
doesn’t require. This is Heidegger’s conclusion.
Hannah Arendts letztes Buch, »Vom Leben des Geistes«, behandelt das
Problem der »reinsten Tätigkeit, die dem Menschen fähig ist«: die Fähigkeit des
Denkens. »Was tun wir, wenn wir nichts anderes tun als denken?«, fragte Arendt
dort. Unser Aufsatz versucht, diese Frage zu beantworten. Zuerst trennen
wir die drei Momenten des Denkens voneinander:（1）dessen Tätigkeit an sich,
（2）dessen Gegenstand（den Sinn）, und（3）dessen nachfolgenden Effekt（Hindernis
des Bösen）. Unter den drei Momenten beachtet man vor allem den zweiten
und den dritten（z.B. bei Richard Bernstein）, der erste Moment aber ist bis
heute außer Acht geblieben. Um jedoch den Gegenstand und den Effekt des Denkens
zu verstehen, ist es nötig, den Mechanismus der Tätigkeit des Denkens im
Detail zu verstehen.
Dieser Aufsatz handelt im ersten Abschnitt vom »Rückzug« des denkenden
Ichs aus der Erscheinungswelt. Dieser Rückzug aus der Welt ist nicht der in so
etwas wie eine »geistige Welt«, sondern der Vorbehalt von Beziehungen mit
weltlichen Dingen oder anderen Menschen. Dies ist aber eine negative Seite des
Denkens und es ist uns wichtig, dessen positiven Gehalt zu zeigen. Wie der
zweite Abschnitt zeigt, charakterisiert Arendt das Denken nicht abstrakt,
sondern konkret als »Dialog mit sich selbst« von »Zwei-in-einem«. Das denkende
Ich wird kraft dieses Dialogs »einsam«, enthoben aus der Welt. Es ist dann un
sere letzte Aufgabe im dritten Abschnitt zu verdeutlichen, was diesen Dialog ermöglicht.
Arendts Antwort lautet: Zeit. Das Menschsein kann sich, ohne räumlich
zu handeln, rein in der Zeit bewegen: das heißt, sich in der Zeit spalten in
»Fragenden und Antwortenden«, aber die Einheit des Ichs erhalten kraft der
Sprache. Durch diese drei Paragraphen legen wir Struktur und Entstehungsmechanismus
des Denkens dar.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the moral responsibility for actions
from ignorance. For example, a man may behave violently toward women because
he mistakenly believes that men are morally superior to women and are,
therefore, permitted to treat women as instruments of man’s will. If we assume
that such a man acts from a kind of ignorance, how can we hold him responsible
for his action?
To consider this problem, I look at the Strawsonian theory of moral responsibility
and the concept of insult as an object of resentment. According to Peter
Frederick Strawson’s famous lecture “Freedom and Resentment,” responsibility
can be understood in the context of “reactive attitudes,” such as resentment. Focusing
on insult as an object of resentment, Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton
argue that we resent injuries done to us because such injuries involve insulting
messages about our dignity or moral status. The wrongdoer is saying, “I can
use you for my purposes and you are not worth better treatment”; in these circumstances,
resentment is the defensive reactive emotion against an action involving
such an insult.
Based on these ideas, we propose the following hypothesis: a person, who injures
someone but mistakenly believes that his action is permitted and acts from
ignorance, can be held responsible for his action if the victim appropriately feels
resentment toward his action, as it involved an insulting message about the victim’s
moral status. To validate this hypothesis, I will begin by critically reviewing
previous studies on the moral responsibility for actions from ignorance. Following
this discussion, I will explain the distinctive character of the insulting
action from ignorance about someone’s moral status. Finally, I will demonstrate
that an insulting action from ignorance about the victim’s moral status inevitably
causes resentment by attacking the victim’s self-respect, and that ignorance
never excuses the wrongdoer from their responsibility.
In his essay “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”, John McDowell argues
that the extensions and applications of such thick terms and concepts as courageous
or selfish cannot be determined without the understanding of a particular
perspective based on such noncognitive states as evaluative attitudes or emotions.
This distinctive feature of thick terms─it is called ‘shapelessness’─is often
thought as a challenge to moral noncognitivism, according to which moral
values or judgments can be explained by noncognitive states of mind with regard
to their corresponding natural properties. The reason is that it seems follow
from the shapelessness of thick terms that the two components of their concepts,
i.e. descriptive and evaluative components, are ‘entangling’, but
noncognitivists, including Simon Blackburn as their representative, try to disentangle
My aim in this essay is twofold. First, I organize and reconstruct McDowell’s
‘anti-disentangling argument’ and Blackburn’s response to it for simplicity’s
sake. I then argue that McDowell fails in refuting noncognitivism in general because
his argument restricts it unduly, while Blackburn’s pragmatic or semantics-
free explanation of the shapelessness is also insufficient because it cannot
ensure the default evaluative component of thick terms. Second, I argue that the
feature of shapelessness can be explained as a semantic phenomenon in term of
the nonindexical context-sensitivity of thick terms, in virtue of which such evaluative
terms have the same content in any contexts, while their extensions are
sensitive with regard to moral standards from ethical sensibilities of the context.
By the use of this interpretation of shapelessness, noncognitivists can successfully
disentangle the components of thick concepts into two entirely separate
ones fulfilling different semantic roles. Thus the nonindexical
contextualism I advocate not only makes clear the nature of thick terms and
concepts but also offers a new and different semantic ground for noncognitivism
from the traditional model.