Descartes’s letter of February 9, 1645, presumably addressed to Mesland （“Mesland Letter”），is considered vital because it seems to provide an explanation of freedom that differs from that found in the Meditations. On this basis, some scholars insist that Descartes changed his view of freedom after the Meditations. 　Did Descartes change his view? Admittedly, it seems that another kind of indifference was introduced in this letter. In the Meditations, indifference was described as the state in which the will is placed when no evident reason inclines it to do anything. Conversely, in the Mesland letter, Descartes introduced another indifference that can be defined as the positive faculty of the will to determine itself. This new version of indifference seems to be the basis of a new concept of freedom. In the Meditations, it is said that when evident reasons entirely incline us to do something, we cannot but do it; for example, we cannot but give assent to something when we perceive it clearly and distinctly. The novel formulation of indifference in the Mesland letter, however, implies that in a given situation we can do nothing or do the opposite; for example, even when we perceive something clearly and distinctly, we can withhold assent to it or suppose it to be false. 　Did Descartes thus change his view of freedom? It seems questionable. First, indifference appears in the Meditations too as a positive faculty of the will, although it may not be called “indifference.” Moreover, this work also admits that we have the ability to withhold assent to what we perceive clearly and distinctly or to suppose it to be false. Surely, according to the Meditations, it is possible to do so not at the exact moment when evident reasons incline us, but only after we distract ourselves from them. A strict consideration shows, however, that the same thing is said in the Mesland letter. 　From the above, it cannot be demonstrated from the Mesland letter alone that Descartes changed his view of freedom.

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　L’influence stoïcienne sur la philosophie de Descartes est notée chez les plusieurs commentateurs. Elle se borne pourtant dans la plupart de cas, à notre connaissance, à la morale ou à l’unité de sciences; d’où l’interprétation selon laquelle « suivant la nature » équivaut à « obéir à l’ordre des choses », ce qui est la principale sagesse. Mais, malgré un certain nombre de points communs avec la philosophie stoïcienne, le concept cartésien de la nature se limite-t-il à la sphère éthique ou à l’épistémologie ? 　Les stoïciens étudient, aussi bien que Descartes, la nature au sens physique, bien évidemment. Et l’un des objectifs ultimes de cette recherche est également chez les deux de contempler la grandeur de Dieu. Quoique la recherche stoïcienne de la nature se renferme dans cette contemplation ou dans la réflexion intérieure, la recherche cartésienne de la nature inclut aussi bien le côté actif de l’art humain que le côté passif de la contemplation, de sorte que la technique est une science inséparable, de même que l’éthique qui en provient, de la considération sur la nature. Étant donné les sens multiples de nature chez Descartes, « l’institution de la nature » pourrait donner aussi plusieurs résultats. 　Cet article a pour but de présenter, en envisageant ce que la nature peut nous instituer, que trois manières de répondre à l’institution de la nature résident dans trois connaissances pratiques, à savoir, la morale envers la nature de l’homme, la médecine envers la nature individuelle du corps et la technique physique envers la nature en général, et que la philosophie naturelle chez Descartes présente bien, au-delà de l’aspect passif de la recherche stoïcienne, la méthode active et pratique, au moyen de notre libre arbitre en tant que cause efficiente visà- vis de la nature, non seulement pour étudier la nature, mais aussi pour la compléter et la changer.

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　Although Kant repeatedly states that religion is an inevitable consequence of morality, few people take this seriously. Traditionally, it has been maintained that his ethical system and his theory of religion are theoretically disconnected and that the latter is merely an addendum from outside of his critical philosophy. However, if it is shown that the ethical system involves a teleological conception that necessarily presupposes religious notions such as God, church, and grace, the suggested disconnection cannot be accepted any longer. In this paper, I examine the inner connection between the ethical system and religious notions from such a teleological perspective. In the first section, I outline four possible variants of a teleological conception. In order to get a criterion for discussing which conception best fits Kant’s ethical system, I show that the final end of the system is the highest good in section 2. Based on this result, I indicate that for the sake of the realization of the highest good, it is necessary that I have two beliefs whenever I act towards this end in section 3; the first is the belief that no obstacles can fundamentally prevent the realizability of the highest good, and secondly, the belief that it is possible for a person to make progress towards the highest good. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I give an answer to the title question: a strong teleological conception is required for Kant’s ethical system. Throughout this paper, I shall conclude not only that Kant’s ethical system is internally connected to the theory of religion, but also that an acknowledgement of this inner connection is necessary for our everyday moral behavior.

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　In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz soll erörtert werden, wie sich Nietzsche mit der Frage der Autonomie auseinandersetzt. Nietzsche geht es stets darum, wie man der bisherigen Moral und den öffentlichen Meinungen kritisch gegenüberstehen kann, um sich selbst Gesetze zu geben und ein neues Wertemaß zu setzen. In der bisher veröffentlichten Literatur gibt es zwei umstrittene Punkte bezüglich Nietzsches Autonomie: 　1. Wie soll man den Widerspruch zwischen Nietzsches Verneinung der Freiheit des Willens und sein Verlangen nach Autonomie behandeln? 　2. Was ist die eigentliche Beschaffenheit seiner Autonomie? 　Während Nietzsche in seiner mittleren Periode die Freiheit des Willens aufgrund des Determinismus verneint, hält der späte Nietzsche es für eine wichtige Aufgabe, neue Werte zu setzen. Obwohl manche Forscher die zwei widersprüchlichen Behauptungen als Nietzsches naturalistischen Kompatibilismus auszulegen versuchen, handelt es sich meiner Meinung nach um den Unterschied zweier Verantwortlichkeiten: Bei der Kritik über die Freiheit des Willens greift Nietzsche die moralische Verantwortlichkeit an, die die Leute mit dem Gefühl der ungeheuren Schuld beladet und sie dadurch immer weiter leiden lässt. Wenn dagegen Nietzsche das Ideal der Autonomie darstellt, setzt er eine andere Verantwortlichkeit voraus, bei der man mit andern eine Versprechung macht und die Folgen verantwortet. 　Bei der Erörterung von der Beschaffenheit Nietzsches Autonomie ist es hilfreich, sich auf die der Autonomie selbst inhärenten Aporie zu beziehen: Wenn man sich gesetzlos, d.h. ohne Grund, ein Gesetz gibt, gerät man nur in Willkür; wenn man sich jedoch aufgrund eines Grundes ein Gesetz gibt, ist die eigene Gesetzgebung von außen schon bestimmt und darum heteronom. Bei bisherigen Auslegungen wird Nietzsches Autonomie entweder oft als eine willkürliche und individuelle Ethik oder als eine vom Willen zur Macht beherrschte Heteronomie vorgestellt. Meiner Auffassung nach versucht Nietzsche seine Autonomie gegen die Willkür der Annahme, dass sich die Menschen durch Züchtung in der Geschichte gesellschaftliche Normen verinnerlicht haben, zu verteidigen. Um Heteronomie vom Willen zur Macht zu vermeiden, spielt der „Freigeist“, der unbedingte Begründung ablehnt und nur kontingente Gründe annimmt, eine große Rolle.

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　Emmanuel Levinas emphatically reiterates his caustic critique of historiography in Totality and Infinity（1961）. For Levinas, “［historiography］rests on the usurpation carried out by the conquerors, that is by the survivors,” and to him, it is a violence of totality that ignores the particularities of the individual and reduces them into a narrative convenient to the victors. 　In this paper, we first take up the text of Totality and Infinity, where Levinas most explicitly declares his critique of history, and lay out why history is the violence of totality. In doing so, we demonstrate that both ethics and fecundity are deployed as resistance to the violence of history. Secondly, we analyze how Levinas addresses the difficulties that the theory of history in Totality and Infinit faced, in his later works including Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence（ 1974）. We summarize our engagement with the other found in the dimension of “trace,” focusing especially on discussions of “survival” and “books.” We then analyze the path of change in Levinas’s strict attitude toward history and the other in the past. 　The outcome of this series of readings that this paper gains is, first, to show that for Levinas, history and its violence were not just an example of totality to be critiqued, but an important concern closely linked to ethics. Secondly, by analyzing his later writings, this paper illustrates that wary of the violence of historiography, Levinas was seeking a positive relationship with the past and history and that he was once again grappling with the difficulties of the debate faced in Totality and Infinity.

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　The theory of life form, which is mainly proposed by Phillipa Foot and Michael Thompson, claims that each individual human being is evaluated according to natural historical knowledge of human life form. If the claim is true, we can make a moral judgment objectively, but there is a big problem about its normativity: because of the gap between human goods and rationality in general and those of individual persons, theory of life form has to explain that there are necessary reasons for everyone to obey or act in concordance with human life form. 　In order to tackle the problem, this paper proposes three suggestions. First, if we think of the theory of human life form sincerely, we should regard moral judgments or moral evaluation as a part of a proceeding moral activity; a pure moral judgment completely independent of other activities cannot be meaningful in human life. Second, moral judgment is made by a historical person, which is not a merely abstract concept of an agent but was born in a preceding social normative system. Third, when a historical person makes a set of moral activity, she does it in accordance with natural historical knowledge on the personal level of human life form, that means, a life form fully understands and acted on by oneself. On this level of life form, every person seems to obtain a reason for action for oneself in each situation, not just understanding it. Here, we can see a solution about the problem of normativity in the theory of life form, and the theory can get more compelling.

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　Although Rawls never addressed the issue of affirmative action in his writings, remedying the discrimination-related disadvantages that influence people’s life chances will also likely fall within the purview of justice. This paper discusses the implications of his theory for affirmative action, its justification, and the extent to which it is justified in the framework of justice as fairness. 　Rawls mainly focuses on ideal theory. He works out the principles of justice under the assumption that people comply with the demands of justice and that favorable circumstances hold, while affirmative action is a problem for a nonideal society. In the framework of justice as fairness, affirmative action is addressed under the principle of equality of opportunity（EO）. Formal EO and fair EO together require that people develop their talents regardless of the social circumstances to which they are born. They compete for offices and positions under fair conditions, and motivated, qualified individuals acquire the positions. However, under nonideal circumstances, there are entrenched injustices that hinder the realization of such an ideal. Under nonideal circumstances, principles of ideal theory serve as a guide to a fully just society. It is often claimed that affirmative action is incompatible with fair EO, as it requires differential treatment based on group membership, while fair EO focuses on the qualifications of individuals. By discussing criticisms of affirmative action, I will argue that affirmative action in the form of preferential treatment is justified as a transitional measure to remedy systematic group disadvantages and realize the fair EO ideal. As Rawls’s democratic equality aims not for a meritocratic society but for one in which people can relate as equals, the criticism that affirmative action policies stigmatize the targets of affirmative action can also be answered.

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　This paper will examine the influence of Aristotle in Miki Kiyoshi. In his philosophical essay ‘About Traveling’（in Notes on the Human Life），Miki says, “the travel is essentially theoretical” and “we will be purely theoretical in our travels.” What does Miki mean by these expressions, and what is its philosophical/ ethical significance? 　In the first part of the essay, Miki argues（i）the travel is a process（it is not the starting point nor the end point）, that（ii）the travel is theoretical and that （iii）we feel the emotion of wonder in our travels. It seems that all of these points derive from his reading of Aristotle’s works. For, Aristotle argues in his Physics that the movement（kinēsis）is ‘the entelecheia of the being potentially X as such’ which means the movement is a process. And he thinks in the Nicomachean Ethics that the ultimate happiness for human beings is the theoretical activity（theōria），and he insists in his Metaphysics that the wondering（thaumazein） makes people do philosophy. 　Although Aristotle’s influence in ‘About Traveling’ is apparent, Miki’s thought is very original. While Aristotle’s arguments tend to prefer ‘end’ （telos）to ‘process’（genesis），Miki intentionally focuses on the process of the movement. This must be because Miki thinks that the life is a process like the travel and that both has the same structure. 　There is another difference between Miki and Aristotle. Aristotle praises the theoretical life as the best human happiness, but Miki doesn’t so. Considering the position in The Logic of Imagination which emphasizes the importance of ‘poiēsis,’ Miki should be negative about ‘theōria.’ But at least in ‘About Traveling,’ there is no critical attitude toward ‘theōria,’ and Miki’s position seems to be neutral. From the Aristotle’s description about the wondering and philosophy, Miki may use the word ‘theoretical’ as meaning ‘leading to the philosophy.’ Further, according to Aristotle’s conception of ‘the divine theōria,’ theoretical activity offers the extraordinary pleasure. Unlike the eternal god, human beings can enjoy this divine contemplation, only in the course of our travels, i.e., in our lifetimes.

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