倫理学年報
Online ISSN : 2434-4699
最新号
選択された号の論文の7件中1~7を表示しています
  • キュニコス派における着衣の問題をめぐって
    長尾 柾輝
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 97-110
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The subject of clothing, often overlooked throughout the history of Western philosophy, assumes a significant role within the realm of Cynicism. Bitterly mocking contemporary scholars who confined their philosophical inquiries to abstract concepts, the Cynics rooted their pursuits in the visible and the tangible, including the clothes they wore. This paper aims to elucidate the ethical and practical implications of the Cynic approach to clothing, especially the tribōn (“threadbare coat”). The Cynics consistently preferred wearing this garment over finer attire and nudity. Hence, our central examination revolves around the rationale behind the Cynics’ adoption of clothing and their exclusive preference for the tribōn.
    In Section 1, I critically assess five prior hypotheses: 1) the Coincidence Theory, which contends that the use of the tribōn was merely happenstance; 2) the Protecting Theory, which posits that a tribōn served as a protection against the winter cold; 3) the Nomic Conformity Theory, which argues that the Cynic clothing adhered to prevailing Greek customs against nudity; 4) the Vanity Theory, which asserts that the Cynics’ unique fashion was motivated solely by ostentation; 5) the Selective Isolation Theory, which contends that the Cynics donned unkempt clothing to distinguish themselves from the refined but foolish masses.
    I then introduce a sixth hypothesis in Section 2: the Symbolic Strategy Theory. This theory posits that the tribōn functioned as a shared symbol between the Cynics and various other figures, such as Socrates, Spartans, Odysseus, and beggars in general. By adopting this symbolic garb, the Cynics assumed the role of actors, not only to draw attention but also to create an improvisational platform within the everyday world. This theatrical space momentarily suspends socially accepted norms, unveiling the populace’s self-deception, which eludes the arguments of scholastic philosophy. Consequently, this paper advocates for a reassessment of the practical importance of the Cynic tribōn.
  • 北川 源之
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 111-124
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
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    This study explores the function of Bernard Mandeville’s “self-liking” and “self-love,” thereby elucidating their roles and linkages in his ethical thought. To date, Mandeville’s ethical thought has been criticized, primarily by claiming that he views people as being merely selfish. According to this view, people become virtuous with the skillful management of politicians. Recently, Christian Maurer has reinterpreted the “selfish” view in consideration of the possibility that people can spontaneously become virtuous through “self-liking.” His interpretation, however, does not fully elaborate on the function of other passions existing in human nature (e.g., self-love, pride, fear, shame). Hence, this study attempts to clarify how people become virtuous through self-liking and self-love.
    The first section is devoted to outlining existing research concerning self-liking and self-love, posing a research question inquiring how self-liking and selflove work (respectively) and how they are connected to the process of people becoming virtuous. Section 2 presents the basic workings of these two passions. The investigation clarifies that self-liking ─ which is dubbed as “pride” when it is excessive ─ leads people to evaluate themselves highly, display the value they put on themselves to others, and to acquire others’ good opinion of themselves. Moreover, self-love makes people preserve themselves and expedites the discovery of the causes of any mischief. In addition, the in-depth consideration of the interpretation of self-liking indicates that it is not an acquired passion but an innate one, unlike prior research which links the concept to that of Rousseau’s “amour-propre.” Section 3 reveals the role, and connection, of self-liking and self-love in Mandeville’s ethical thought. The study concludes that self-love and fear ─ which reinforces the workings of self-love ─ generate apprehension for self-liking. This apprehension produces shame, which is grounded on reflections of their self-evaluation. Ultimately, this reflection makes self-liking moderate, so that moderated self-liking evokes the love of praise. As such, the study clarifies on the idea that people can become virtuous with the help of self-liking and self-love.
  • 小畑 敦嗣
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 125-139
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
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    Hobbesian necessitarian compatibilist in general prevails in the eighteenthcentury free-will debate. Necessitarianism typically advocates that the concept of agency can be reduced to a more basic concept of event causation such as belief and desire. Thomas Reid, a defender of incompatibilism agent-causal theory, rejects such a reductionist turn about the agency and argues that all our actions are caused by agents, not by some other things. Necessitarians consider the springs of action as a matter of weighing up motives, while Reid claims that motives may influence action, but they do not act. According to Reid, motives are not causes, and it is the people themselves who are the cause of choice and actions.
    Reid introduces the two-way powers theory and argues that the power to produce any effect implies that power does not produce it. However, Reid says that if the mind were always in a state of perfect indifference without motives, our active power having no end to pursue, no rule to direct its exertions, would be given in vain. Some commentator points out that Reid presupposes actions are produced by multiple causes, i.e., the agents themselves and their motives. Then, Reidian agents act partially from the exertion of one-way power, which is inconsistent with Reid’s sayings.
    To avoid this puzzle, this paper examines Reid’s understanding of motives and focuses on his concept of ’self-government’. The competition of contrary motives is in fact between the animal motives and the rational motives. There are different tests of the strength of motives, namely, animal and rational tests. According to the latter, people make the effort of ’self-government’ to resist the strongest animal motive. Rational principles of action play an important role in ’regulating human conduct’. Therefore, this paper aims to clarify and defend the structure of Reid’s concept of moral agency in rational control over the will.
  • 大槻 晃右
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 141-154
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
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    According to David Hume (1711–76), moral evaluations are not judgments by reason but sentiments that arise when we consider the objects of evaluation “in general, without reference to our particular interest.” To make considerations this way, he also says, we need to put ourselves on a shareable standpoint, which he calls a “general point of view.” Why, however, do we adopt such a point of view? His answer is that, otherwise, we would experience intolerable conflicts of opinions and feelings between each other in society and conversation.
    Based on these statements, some commentators, such as John Mackie, argue that according to Hume’s theory, all moral evaluations have as their basis an “artificial” element in the same sense in which Humean “artificial virtues” originate from human conventions. I think this interpretation is on the right track, but its details remain to be clarified. For example, Mackie and others have not explained what social conditions demand people to seek and take a general point of view.
    Therefore, in this paper, relying on A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), I clarify the specific process by which people invent morality according to their social conditions. First, I review Hume’s conception of “morality” and distinguish different aspects of moral practice, such as the recognition of virtue and the motivation to pursue it (Section 1). Next, I show that a general point of view is established by a human convention to eliminate inconveniences that arise in the social interaction of people (Section 2). I then find out at which stage of society people must deal with such inconveniences in such a manner (Section 3). Finally, I answer a possible objection based on Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues (Section 4).
    Through these arguments, this study shows that it is only after the establishment of a society maintained by the rules of justice that we can evaluate and act from a moral point of view.
  • 共感の時代におけるニーチェの他者論
    梅田 孝太
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 155-166
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The modern era is known as the age of empathy. In recent years, empathy theory has been subject to criticism from rationalists. If empathy is the “other of reason,” a kind of tendency, then we should not judge according to it. The tradition of autonomism influences this response from rationalism. Autonomy is the giving of law to oneself; heteronomy is that by others. However, can we completely distinguish between the self and the other? The nature of the relationship between the self and the other is what is truly at issue in autonomy.
    The 19th century German philosopher Nietzsche is generally regarded as an irrationalist or immoral philosopher who aimed at restoring the body and emotions against the dominance of reason. However, owing to his emphasis on autonomy and self-mastery, he is sometimes treated as a rationalist.
    This paper emphasizes that Nietzsche’s theory of self-mastery and self-control necessarily presupposes a relationship between self and others. Previous studies take Nietzsche’s autonomy as self-relational. However, Nietzsche insisted that autonomy is only possible when it is based on relationships with others. For Nietzsche, autonomy is closely linked to the prohibition of one’s own sympathy for others. In other words, it can be argued that for Nietzsche, autonomy is opposed to sympathy, and the former could only be discussed in the context of the critique of the latter.
    This study ensures one point of critique of contemporary theories of empathy. Nietzsche criticizes that when empathy means a one-sided empathy for the suffering of others, the otherness of the other could be erased. And, against the anti-empathy argument, it can be argued that autonomy may presuppose a relationship with the other.
  • 責務の関係的理解の観点から
    宮本 雅也, 押谷 健
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 167-180
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The aim of this paper is to propose a “relational model” of the normative grounds of obligations of care, with a view to clarifying how caring relations can be theoretically prevented from becoming normatively problematic. The provision of “care” plays an important and indispensable role in various aspects of our daily lives, from childcare and the caring of the sick and injured, to care for the elderly. This fact is reflected in the recent rise of the position known as the “ethics of care” or “care ethics” in normative ethics and political philosophy.
    At the same time, however, there are worries about the value of care when viewed from a liberal perspective. For emphasizing the value of caring may lead us to place excessive demands on those who provide care. This worry leads us to the following question: how can we understand the obligations that standing in caring relations place on us, in a way that avoids making such obligations excessively demanding for those who provide care?
    This paper takes up the question of how to understand the nature of obligations of care by focusing on the work of Eva Feder Kittay, a representative theorist of the ethics of care. Kittay rejects what she calls the “voluntaristic model” of obligations of care and endorses a qualified version of a “vulnerability model”: however, we argue that Kittay’s own vulnerability model fails to avoid the problem of overdemandingness. Next, we propose a novel account of the obligations of care, called the “relational model,” which views obligations as grounded in a particular relation that we stand in with others. Finally, we argue that this relational account of the obligations of care can avoid the problems faced by both the voluntarist and vulnerability models.
  • 石橋 賢太
    2024 年 73 巻 p. 181-194
    発行日: 2024/03/31
    公開日: 2024/06/25
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    “Suido” is a word that means land and geographic. In early-modern Japan, references to “Suido” increased. Kumazawa Banzan discusses the differences between Japan, China, India, and Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism in his theory of “Suido”. However, if Banzan, a Confucian scholar, describes the difference between the three countries in that way, the relationship between that difference and the universality of Confucian morality must be clarified. Since previous studies have not sufficiently examined this point, this paper compares Banzan and Nishikawa Jōken’s theory of “Suido”, which criticized Banzan, in order to elucidate the relationship between “Suido” and universality.
    Sections 1 and 2 dealt with Banzan’s argument and Joken’s criticism of it. Banzan argues that Buddhism, which was originally not compatible with Japan and China, which had different “Suido”, became established in both countries, based on the idea of “Kiunhisoku” in which the situation of the times gradually deteriorated. Banzan’s theory of “Suido” has the characteristic of explaining why Confucianism should be studied in Japan by making Buddhism different from Japan, out of Confucianism and Buddhism, both of which are foreign. On the other hand, Joken, who lived in Nagasaki, completely denied Banzan’s theory based on the overseas situation he saw and heard.
    In Sections 3 and 4, we examined the significance of both discussions. Joken’s theory develops linear logic starting from facts and is very persuasive. On the other hand, Banzan says that Buddhism is suitable for India’s “Suido”, and he does not deny the existence value of Buddhism. Although Banzan believes in the universality of Confucian morality, he does not believe that the diversity that exists in reality should be ignored. Here, Banzan’s view of the world has a duality of individuality and universality, and Joken, who can only think linearly, could not understand this duality.
    In previous research, “Suido” was often discussed from the perspective of the history of East Asian thought. However, “Suido” also has an important meaning in terms of ethics, and it seems that further research is necessary.
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