The 50th anniversary of the establishment of the ECSC was held in the year 2000. I heard that in Europe a large scale celebration was held to commemorate the establishment of the ECSC, which had marked a starting point of the European Integration and the European Union. In this sense European integration movement owes very much to the ECSC. I do not deny this appraisal at all. In Japan some (and not a few) writers argue that the ECSC had made a great success since its establishment, making a common market of coal and steel (including iron ore), achieving high rate of increase in steel production, and made a base for heavy industry in Europe. Those spectacular achievement and success led to the establishment of an overall economic community including both industry and agriculture. In my report delivered at the 21th EUSA-JAPAN general meeting, I reexamined the above-mentioned appraisal. Summary of my argument is as follows. 1) ECSC established a spiritual prop and institutional base for the European Community. This must be highly appreciated. 2) At the time when Spaak Report was drawn up, ECSC was still in a transitional period, and commom market was not yet fully realized. Especially in the case of coal and iron ore, their import from abroad increased remakabaly. The rate of growth in steel production was heigher than other countries, but it decreased compared with the period preceding the establishment of the ECSC. 3) In 1954 the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community was rejected by the French parliament. This marked a turning point of sector approach method of integration. ECSC was standing alone with no other communities following behind. To find a way out of this difficulties, Messina Conference was held and this opened the way to the establishment of the European Economic Community.
The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 launched the process of the integration of Europe. It puts forward the following: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.…The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, …” In order to clarify the edifice of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) which was formally established in 1952 as Europe's first organization that involved the yielding by member states of some sovereignty to a supranational authority, we will focus on two matters. Firstly, the creation of the common market in the transitional period and secondly, the common steel policy in the period of the steel crisis. The ECSC started to construct the common markets for coal, scrap, iron ore and steel in 1953 and built them over the five-year transitional period. First We will examine especially the construction of the common market for coal, because it concists of a lot of important achievements for the establishment of the basis for the Community. The ECSC created the common market, in which the movement of goods between Member States was not hindered by their crossing national frontiers. However it was very difficult for coal and steel enterprises to keep completely free movement of goods at the first stage. The High Authority decreed maximum prices of coal, the cessation of price alinement in the new price system and implementation of zonal prices. The High Authority allowed Member States to give subsidies and assistance to their coal industries. It tried to adjust interests of member countries to establish the common market and succeeded in doing so. The steel industry had favorably developed until the middle of the 1970s, but after that the business recession began to deepen. The ECSC implemented the Simonet Plan against the steel crisis in April 1977 and published indicative minimum prices. In May 1977 it took a stronger line on steel policy. It resulted in the creation of the Davignon Plan, which set mandatory minimum prices for concrete bars and protection against imports which constitute or threaten to constitute a serious danger to production in the common market of similar or directly competitive products. The Davignon Plan was reinforced in January 1978. However prices of steel continued to go down and the steel market fell in confusion. The EC Commission established a system of mandatory production quotas for undertakings in the iron and steel industry in October 1980 under Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty, which provides that in the event of a decline in demand, if the High Authority considers that the Community is confronted with a period of manifest crisis and that the means of action provided for in Article 57 are not sufficient to deal with this, it shall establish a system of production quotas. The EC Commission played a supranational leading part in the steel crisis. Mr. Narjes from Germany took over the common steel policy in 1985. He finished the system of production quotas in June 1988, because the crisis had ended. The ECSC succeeded in creating the basis for European integration, and contributed greatly to the progress of the European coal and steel industry and to the establishment of a United Europe.
Since 1980s, “European integration history”, which has been developed mainly by the European Community Liason Committee of Historians with using newly opend archives, has revealed many new historical evidences. Research on the relations between the Schuman Plan and Britain is one of the biggest issues of that development. However, the study on the “Eden Plan” has been rarely mentioned in the hitherto studies. The study on the Schuman Plan has been usually explained with the development of the Franco-German reconciliation. In this article, it was argued that the relationship between Britain and France was the most important aspect of the beginning of the European integration between 1948 and 1950. The Schuman Plan can be best understood by seeing the Anglo-Franco cooperation and conflict in the period. The year 1948 was marked by several important events such as the establishment of the Brussels Treaty, the Congress of Europe at The Hague, and Georges Bidault's plan on the “European Assembly”. Then in this avricle, the “Eden Plan” was discussed. The “Eden Plan” tells us many important aspects of the relations between the Schuman Plan and Britain in the early 1950s. First, it can be said that Anthony Eden was much more constructive and supportive towards the Schuman Plan than Winston S. Churchill or Harold Macmillan, who were usually regarded as the eminent “Pro-European” Conservatives. Anthony Eden tried to save the Schuman Plan, while finding the best answer to link the British Commonwealth to the Schuman Plan. Eden's approach could be the best possible British plan to join the European integration movement planned by Monnet. However, because of the suspicion of Jean Monnet towards British Government's intention, Monnet refused this possible important contribution by British Foreign Secretary. With the failure of the two Monnet's plans of political integration, the European Defence Community and European Political Community, in 1954, Monnet faced the stalemate of his own approach without having Britain inside. Thus, it is important to see the history of the relations between Britain and France from 1948 to 1954 to understand the beginning of European integration. Too narrow approach to study the Schuman Plan often ignores the origins of the Schuman Plan and the possible Britain's close relation to the plan. If Monnet showed a little more tolerance to Britain's approach, and if Britain showed a little bolder advancement to the integration, the later history of European integration should have been developed through the Anglo-France cooperation.
Italian European policy is often described as “federalistic”. Recent studies, however, have endeavored to explain the reason of the double language of Italian Europeanism; its federalist rhetoric and its pursuit of own national interest. These studies reveal how pragmatically the Italian government has used European Integration as an instrument of nation-building. The priorities of Italian foreign policy after the Second World War were to regain an equal status among other western European states and to resolve its domestic socio-economic problems at the European level. Postwar Italy was, however, compelled to confront the Cold War with scarce diplomatic resources. Military involvement was severely limited by the socalled “punitive” peace treaty and by domestic tendencies towards neutralism. The project of a comprehensive European political community by De Gasperi in the early years of the 1950s was an effort to incorporate the EDC into a more peaceful grand design rather than a military alliance. This coincided with another Italian insistence on the reinforcement of the OEEC with a hope for a resolution of its economic problems, such as unemployment and emigration. In both cases, Italy used the American support for European integration as a leverage to cover its unique and weak position. The exceptional treatments for fragile Italian steel industry under the ECSC were guaranteed mainly by France. Generally, Member states were so reluctant to accept other Italian demands, such as the subsidies for the Italian steel and the improvement of the working conditions of Italian miners in Belgium, that Italy needed the intervention of the High Authority. Italy's preference for a supranational community can be well explained by the fact. In the domestic process, the role of the technocrats of the Bank of Italy and the IRI and the influence of some leading figures of secular parties (PLI, PSDI, PRI) were decisive. This “centrist” era is highly marked as an age of technocrats, which has revived forty years later in the formation of “technocratic” governments of the 1990s.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the European integration policy of the so-called Benelux countries: Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. In the first part, the author summarizes each of the three countries' European policy as follows: Belgium has tried to safeguard her economy, to create a wider market, to avoid Franco-German rivalry and to keep her political influence through European integration; the Netherlands also pursues her economic interests, but she is more Atlanticist and federalist; Luxembourg has been trying to keep her position as a State among the EU and to find a compromise, especially for the time when she takes presidency of the EU. In the second part, the author outlines the historical development of Belgium's European policy from the end of the Second World War until now. One can observe that Belgium has had a consensus among her citizens to build a federal Europe since the establishment of the EEC although a few confrontations were seen in some circles in the 1950s. Belgium's European policy has had a tendency to shift between orthodox European federalism and a realist attitude: in the 1960s, Belgium fought against General De Gaulle to keep her orthodoxy; from the 1970s, a more realistic approach appeared in her European policy, but she did not forget to pursue her federalist goal. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the only thing different for Belgium was that she had no more enemies in Eastern Europe. But her desire to build a federal Europe is even more imperative than before now that the EU is enlarging to the east and south and the number of EU member countries may reach more than thirty in the foreseeable future. Because of this new situation, Belgium confronted against France at the Nice European Council, which was held in December 2000, to advocate a more federalist approach and to avoid the supremacy of the big four States in the EU. Belgium is, in a sense, in a paradoxical position between her orthodoxy as a federalist and her realism in accepting the intergovernmental approach in European politics. Finally, the author argues that the framework of Benelux has become already obsolete in economic terms as economic integration within the EU has progressed considerably. However, Benelux may be still useful for the three small States as a political consultative framework in the enlarging EU despite the Nice European Council having decoupled Netherlands and Belgium for their number of votes in the Council.
The lecture analysed the nature of the earliest historical research on post-war European integration, explaining its defects. It then passed on to a consideration of various political theories on which both political scientists and historians attempted to construct longer-run studies, sometimes predictive or teleological, of the development of the European Communities. Most of this work had been demolished by historical research into national and community archves. What had emerged from historical research was a detailed account of the primacy of national policies and of the national stategies of the member-states in the construction of the European Communities. In this picture the role of foreign trade and of national commercial interests meant that the Common Market of the EEC and its Common Agricultural Policy were securely anchored in agreements from which all EEC member-states benefited. Historical research into archives being only rarely possible for any date after 1970, the question therefore arose whether the later development of the Communities into the European Union could be plausibly analysed in the same way. The lecture then analysed developments up to the Treaty of Maastricht, setting out various possibilities of explanation and theory without deciding in favour of any particular one. Finally, the lecture passed on to a consideration of the EU's future in the light of its history, discussing the threats that history seems to reveal both to the European Monetary Union and, to a lesser degree, to the eastward expansion. No threat appears to the common commercial policy of the EU, however. The lecture concluded with the hope that the EU would endure in spite of foreseeable difficulties.
This paper focuses on the following five problems regarding the governance of the European Union: Firstly, the continual revisions of the EU's founding Treaties and their impact on the political structure of the European governance, hence being the cause of Dutch European law professor, Matijsen's “continual” frustration; secondly, the traps in the arguments of the so-called “sharing of sovereignty”; thirdly, the supremacy of the High Authority in the ECSC; fourthly, the prevailing trend of the European Parlimament over the European Commission; and lastly, the future structure of the European Governance-presidential system or parliamentary system? Ironically enough, the “democratic deficit” has intensified in accordance with the success of European integration. This affects the long established relationship between the European Commission and the European Parliament. My analysis of the present European integration is that by the continual revisions of the EU's founding Treaties, European integration is now requesting massive surrender of the sovereign rights from their member states, in spite of the remarks by the political leaders and researchers proclaiming “sharing of sovereignty.” The European Union is leaning toward a federal entity in essence, far beyond the Japanese translated phrase of “Oushu Rengo” which has been used to indicate the EU by the Commission delegation to Tokyo, meaning “a mere association or at most confederation”. However, that translated phrase had been asked to suspend its use and to use “Oushu Domei” through the official written question (E-0138/96) by Glyn Ford (PSE), who was in charge of the relationship with Japan in 1996 by the reasons of its inadequacy and faults. In my conclusion, the original elitism in the way of promoting European integration shown in the Monnet Method has substantially shifted towards a much more parliamentary controlled style. The question on the future European governance will solely depend on how the European people see the way of reducing the “democratic deficit”. There seems to be two alternatives. One is by the shift towards much more parliamentary controlled administration. The other is with a more independent European Commisson which is directly or indirectly elected by the European citizens as was shown in the Benelux Memorandum. As indicated by the present scandals of the Commission and the resignation of the Santer's Commission in March 1999, the recent trends between the European Parliament and the Commission in European governance seemingly show us that a parliamentary oriented system at the sacrifice of the roles of the European Commission could prevail in the coming future.
European Integration is somewhat like a great patchwork and it is not so easy for the specialists to explain the outcome of the Integration as a whole. So many theorists of European Integration have much devoted their attention to the process of Integration, but now we should turn our eyes to the outcome of Integration, i. e., how is the EU governed. The EU is, of course, not the sovereign state, but now the EU successfully provides and maintains the political, economic and social order almost the same as the sovereign state. It is impossible to clarify the reality of EU through the theory of the government (or state), which is the traditional theory of politics. The reality of the EU could be investigated by the ‘governance’ theory, which is the different from the Global or international governance. European Governance, from my point of view, is analyzed through the four factors, (1) to create the order (to create or reform the basic treaty and the EU policy-making), (2) to maintain the order (judicial through the ECJ and administrative through the member states' government office), (3) the order is accepted by the people of the member states of the EU, (4) and they have the opportunity to refuse the order which the EU provides and maintains. With these four factors it would be possible to explicate the mechanism of the EU governance, however, the ambiguity of the legitimacy remains, or the ruler (EU) is not directly responsible to the governed people. The government theorists explain the relation between the ruler and the governed through the democratic legitimacy, but in the EU the legitimacy is not still guaranteed through liberal democracy. It is nothing to say that in the EU the legitimacy should be established, but the successful economic integration so far would shown consistent tendency to eliminate the democratic legitimacy because the most influential drive force of the integration was and is still the power dynamism of the member states and the power struggle between the supra-national EU Commossion and the member states. My result of the analyzing the problem of the EU legitimacy, it is turned out that the legitimacy of the EU is brought by the governd people's consent, for example, the basic-treay ratification and the national Refarendom on the treaty ratification. And it is also very important that the EP is democraticaly given the power to check and monitor the Commission and Commission members, i. e., the EP could have the opportunity to refuse the EU authority. So now the EU faces the political integration beyond the economic integration, it is inevitable for the EU to improve the level of ‘governance’ through consolidating the EU's political accountability for the EU citizen.
Decrease of intra-EU disparities has been one of the most important tasks in the EU integration process. However, the accession of Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) in the 1980s anticipated expanding disparities among the member states. Until then, the EU had consisted of almost homegeneous countries, and the southern countries had developed to lesser extent than the original member states. The EU had to tackle this issue in order to realize upward equalization. Otherwise, the significance of the EU would be questioned. Originally the EU offered the Structural Funds in order to solve such disparities. Since the 1980s, capital movement, especially foreign direct investment (FDI), has been expected to decrease disparities among the countries, together with the Structural Funds. This paper analyses the effect of FDI on convergence within the EU, mentioning the experience of the Southern European countries. According to statistics on FDI evolution and economic variables, Southern European countries faced different economic situations after their EU accession. On the one hand, Spain attracted substantial EU FDI, and achieved remarkable growth in the late 1980s. On the other hand, Greece did not received much EU FDI, relying instead on the Structural Funds, but without recovering its economy. After EU accession, Spain and Portugal almost succeeded to satisfy convergence conditions for the EMU and introduction of the euro in 1999, although they still have some problems to solve. However, Greece failed to join the EMU because of poor economic performance. As regards real convergence, according to variable of convergence, GDP per capita, we find that while Spain converged especially in the late 1980s, Greece did not show any tendency to converge. However, in the early 1990s, with decreased FDI in Spain, it has not progressed to the EU average of GDP per capita. This is clear when we compare FDI per capita and GDP per capita. The effect of FDI on economic development should not be oversimplified and overstimated. Even if disparities among nations have been resolved, there remains the problem of regional disparity. Any areas in Europe have a problem of regional unbalances, and, in the recent literatures, convergence has been discussed from a regional perspective. Taking Spain as an example, some regions, such as Cataluña and Madrid, have sustained higher development level, and enjoyed higher income per capita. On the other hand, some declined regions still have lower level of income. This difference can derive from whether each region could attract substantial FDI. Thus, this paper concludes that there is a contradiction: while Spain converged at a country level in the late 1980s, Spanish regions rather diverged after EU accession. In the 1990s, FDI shifted from Spain to some Eastern European countries, e. g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which are regarded as promising FDI recipients. This implies that development depending on foreign capital in Spain has been interrupted, even though the EU integration process is going on. Although Spain still has some factors that attract FDI, it is necessary not only to rely on foreign capital but also to increase her own productivity not relied on foreign capital in order to sustain economic development as well as to break existing technological barriers whithin FDI.
The validity of the Taylor rule in the entire EU is discussed including a theoretical, empirical analysis using many examples. However, an analysis of individual countries are hardly done. We show that it is generally pertinent for the entire EU though the rule does not apply to each country. Along with the introduction of a common currency realized in Europe for 11 participating in the shape of participation of 11 countries, a lot of discussions as to the monetary policy have been performed. The thesis which Taylor (1993) introduced has been debated at many chances. Some economists say it would be profitable to apply this rule to the real economy. First of all, a comparatively small model is used. Next, the movement of interest rates are is explained only by inflation and output gap. Finally, using the rule known to everyone may help reduce uncertainty about the stance of monetary policy and avoid instability of the policy. The validity of the Taylor rule in the entire EU is discussed with a theoretical, empirical analysis using many examples in a lot of opportunities. However, the analysis of individual coutries is hardly done. We show that it is generally roughly pertinent for in the entire EU though the its rule does not apply to correspond in each country. We found that it would be generally pertinents for the entire EU though the rule does not apply to correspond in each country. In the EU unified monetary policy would be going on, so it would be an appropriate instrument for using the Taylor rule. This is one area where the Taylor rule is applicable. Its rule has been appropriate to this area.
As the EC integration progresses, more EC laws including laws originated from EC laws are applied in the Member States. This has diminished the roles of Member States' parliaments as legislative and controlling authorities. The so-called ‘democratic deficit’ is the problem of degree of incorporation of the representative democracy into the EC system. In this article, the national parliaments' scrutiny systems are focused as ways to control the EC legislative process and to reduce the ‘democratic deficit.’ The national parliaments are ‘closer to the citizen’ and they play important roles in the representative democracy in the EC, complementary to the European Parliament's role. After the Single European Act entered into force in 1987, the number of EC laws increased dramatically. The national parliaments have amended internal procedures and established scrutiny systems to control their own governments' positions in the Council. In the 1990s, to make their scrutiny more effective, the French Senate, the British House of Commons, the Danish Folketing and the Finnish Eduskunta have established representative offices in the building of the European Parliament in Brussels. This enhanced relationships among European and national parliaments. First of all, the scrutiny systems of these four parliaments are studied as examples. Problems are that the governments do not always provide the parliaments all the information, that they do not provide it promptly, that the EC legislative proposals are sometimes adopted by the Council before their scrutiny is exhausted and that governments do not always take into account the parliaments' views (except in Denmark and Finland). For the purpose of the scrutiny, it is important that the parliaments can express their views before the EC legislative proposals under scrutiny are adopted in the Council. In this regard, ‘scrutiny reserve’ has been introduced. It can be said that the continued interaction between the governments and the parliaments through the scrutiny systems has contributed to make the scrutiny systems more effective and the governments to take into more account of the parliaments' views. At the EC/EU level, the protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty provides measures, although limited, to enhance national parliaments' ability to express their views on EC legislation. The European Parliament encourages the reinforcement of the national parliaments' scrutiny in its resolution A4-0179/97. To make the democratic control of the EC legislative process more effective, the European and national parliaments can jointly influence the EC legislative process by taking similar attitudes in the areas where their interests converge. Through their scrutiny systems, the national parliaments can be said to have incorporated to a certain extent the representative democracy into the EC legislative process.
Given the exchange of views at the conference organised by the Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI) of the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques in 1994, this book is dedicated to discuss whether multiculturalism could give a pragmatic and ideological response to the management of diversity in the context of the building of Europe. Having dealt with the diverse identities in the context of the Nation-States, this historical concept of multiculturalism will be reconsidered, in terms of its definition and applications through the interdisciplinary studies proposed by anthropologists, sociologists, jurists, political scientists and philosophers. Through the examination of the emergence of a common political culture among the Nation-States of which Europe is made up, some authors investigate if the multiculturalism could evolve a new form of political organisation by managing the cultural and national diversities at the European level, and eventually construct a European identity. On the whole, the arguments of this book emphasise that the possibility of constructing a European political culture and a European identity would not be totally independent from the roles of the States and ‘nations’. At the same time, it is essential to re-examine the traditional concepts of the States and ‘nations’ for the purpose of constituting a new and open space that would recognise various identities through the interactions of the actors at the different levels, such as the European Union, the Member-States, groups and individuals (including both EU citizens and foreigners). This book stands out as an excellent and fresh contribution to the literature discussing multiculturalism in the European context. My only reservation is that empirical studies are largely ignored to discuss the social and political contexts in which the diverse identities demand their recognition and the fulfillment of their rights.