Online ISSN : 1884-2739
Print ISSN : 1884-3123
ISSN-L : 1884-3123
2004 巻 , 24 号
  • 羽場 久〓子
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 1-23,305
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    On May 1, 2004, 10 countries in Central and Eastern European (CEE) finally joined the EU. It was decided at the Copenhagen Summit of the EU in December 2002. According to that decision, referendums were held in 9 countries except Cyprus in 2003. Bulgaria and Romania will join in 2007, and Turkey, the Western Balkan countries, Norway, and Switzerland will join after that. There is already a landscape of more than 30 countries in the EU. NATO also decided that it would be enlarged by 7 new countries at the Prague Summit in November 2002, and there are 26 NATO countries from March 2004. Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO, and they are already hard at work in the Iraq War and other military operations.
    What are the most important and serious issues of the enlarging EU and NATO now, especially from the viewpoint of CEE countries? In this article, the author investigates this from the following angles:
    1) International Politics. After the Second World War, European Integration was unfortunately started by European division. After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the two divided Europe began to integrate. Integration and enlargement of Europe became a symbol of the end of European division. Can CEE countries really achieve this?
    2) European Values and European Culture. With enlargement comes the integration of “European Values, ” and the reconsideration of “European Modernization.” For them, the enlargement of the EU and NATO is a “Return to Europe, ” that is, Christianity, liberalism, democracy, equality and a market economy. Can they integrate successfully?
    3) The Economic Context and Adaptation to Globalization. About the economy of the enlarging CEE, it works well, in fact. First, investment in the EU is moving from the South (Greece and Spain) to the East (CEE), and the GDP per capita is also swiftly growing in new member countries. Now the GDP of CEE also is overtaking that of Greece and Portugal, so it looks like they might catch up with Spain and Italy in the near future. The economic axis has transferred from the South to the East.
    4) The Security of Europe. Now the Security Policy of the EU (CFSP, ESDP, and the Saint-Malo Declaration) has begun to differentiate Europe from that of the US. After September 11, 2001, the US policy on security changed quickly. From that time, the center of gravity of security of the US changed from East-West Germany to the Balkans, Central Asia and the Black Sea. The strategic importance of Romania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and Russia increased greatly. That is, CEE was seen differently by the US and the EU. Romania and Bulgaria are on the periphery of the economy of the EU, but they are most important strategically for the US.
    5) CEE countries. Now they have started to assert themselves. In the 1980s, the idea of Central Europe (as opposed to Yalta: the Conflict system) was asserted by the anti-establishment CEE intelligentsia. During the 1990s, their governments and regional cooperation worked successfully, and they were able to join the EU and NATO. Before the Iraq War in 2003, they declared their support of the US, and got Rumsfeld complimented them, saying “New Europe.” CEE countries such as Poland used their position as US supporters in tough negotiations with the EU. The author investigates these problems.
  • Giuseppe Schiavone
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 24-49,307
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The enlargement from 15 to 25 member countries in May 2004 is the biggest single expansion of the EU since its establishment half a century ago and poses a formidable challenge both for the institutional structure and the decision-making process of the EU itself. The Communities first and the EU afterwards have gradually moved from trade and common market goals to a convergence of principles and values that have been enshrined in the draft Constitutional Treaty prepared by the Convention on the future of Europe between February 2002 and July 2003. The Constitutional Treaty, consisting of a preamble and four main parts for a total of 465 articles, is intended to replace all the existing instruments, that is the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community as well as all the acts that have amended or supplemented them. The well-known “pillar structure” introduced by the Maastricht Treaty will also be abolished even if special procedures will continue to apply in the fields of foreign policy, security and defence. The fundamental principles governing the EU are embodied in Part I of the Constitutional Treaty which represents the “core” of the document and in a certain sense the “real” Constitution of the enlarged EU. The areas of competence of the EU are clearly described although the powers of the EU itself are not extended to a significant extent. Among the most important institutional changes of the Constitutional Treaty are the creation of a full-time post of President of the European Council, bringing to an end the current system based on six-month rotating presidencies, the appointment of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the substantial extension of the co-decision procedure to be implemented jointly by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The move from the traditional formula of “weighted voting” to “double majority”, based on the number of countries as well as on their population, has been another outstanding innovation of the document produced by the Convention. The provisions of Part II of the Constitutional Treaty give the EU its own catalogue of rights through the incorporation of the full text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed in Nice in December 2000. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was unable to approve the text of the Constitutional Treaty before the end of 2003 as widely expected; however, the Irish presidency managed to have the text approved by June 2004. Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by all the 25 member countries should on no account be taken for granted and considerable challenges remain in the foreseeable future. While a permanent division within the EU between leading countries and second-rank members must be avoided, it should be possible for a “pioneer group” of countries to work harder to pursue initiatives of common interest in a number of key political, economic and security areas with the possibility for other members to join at a later stage, without compromising the prospect of a “common future” contained in the Consti.
  • 小久保 康之
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 50-66,309
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purposes of this paper are to clarify the complications involved in Cyprus' becoming a member of the EU when compared with other Central and Eastern European applicant countries and to inquire wether Cyprus' accession to the EU may be a catalyst for resolving the “Cyprus Problem”.
    Cyprus is the only country among the 13 countries who have applied for the membership in the EU, which has been divided into two communities. Internationally, the Greek Cypriots, the southern part of the island, is recognized as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot, TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), claim to independence, is recognized only by Turkey. Greek support for the southern part of the island and Turkish recognition for the northern part places these two countries at the center of the Cyprus Problem.
    The Greek Cypriots had submitted an application for the membership of the whole island to the EU in 1990, hoping to solve the Cyprus Problem or at least to gain membership in the EU as a guarantee against a Turkish invasion of the southern part of the island. The EU was from the beginning in favor of Cypriot membership but the reunification of the island was considered implicitly as a precondition for the membership of Cyprus. In 1995, the EU decided to open the negotiation for accession of Cyprus under strong pressure from Greece, which accepted in return, the customs union between the EU and Turkey. In 1998, the EU began the accession negotiations and decoupled the membership of Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem, hoping that its membership might be a catalyst for the reunification of the island. But then, the EU had to tackle seriously the question of Turkish membership as well.
    The author's conclusion is that the membership of the Republic of Cyprus, leaving the island divided into two communities, will be an abnormal situation for the EU and that if the EU hopes for the reunification of the island, it must also accept the membership of Turkey. Therefore, Cyprus' membership may bring a positive effect toward the stabilization of the Eastern part of the Mediterranean resolving not only the Cyprus problem, but also the question of Turkish membership in the EU as well as Greco-Turkish antagonisms.
  • 鈴木 一人
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 67-95,311
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since mid-1990s, the capability gap between Europe and the United States became explicit and many in Europe, particularly in France, Britain, Germany and Italy, recognized the necessity to “fill the gap” to be able to make Europe's own decisions. However, because of financial constraints, difference of strategic positioning, and national industrial and technological interests, it was difficult to achieve a consensus among European countries.
    However, the industry realised the danger of fragmented national defence market and uncoordinated industrial structure. Thus, large European defence companies, notably those “national champions”, merged and created EADS. The emergence of this large European company was expected to inprove its competitiveness vis-à-vis American industry, but it also threatens small and medium-sized companies in Europe. Also national governments lost their initiatives to negotiate with industry on prices and requirements for their strategic planning. Therefore, it put pressure for European governments to coordinate their R & D and procurement policies for regaining the negotiation power.
    This endeavour started outside of the EU policy framework. In 1996, WEU created WEAO for common defence research and development, including non-Member States from Central and Eastern European countries. But larger Member States were not satisfied the arrangement at WEU because it was based on the principle of juste retour, a deliberate mechanism to support uncompetitive companies in smaller Member States to survive. Thus, France, Germany, Italy and Britain formed OCCAR for common procurement and LoI for rejecting the idea of juste retour. Also major satellite owner countries formed BOC to increase reconnaissance capability.
    On the other hand, within EU framework, there have been several challenges to enhance the policy scope for defence industry issues. Three communications from the Commission in 1996, 1997, 2003 and STAR21 report were clear manifest of Commission's intention to intervene. Also following the establishment of European Rapid Reaction Force, there has been the discussion of European Capability Action Plan, initiated by the Commission, to strengthen European defence technology and industrial capability through EU policy frameworks. Furthermore, among the discussions of European Convention, the creation of European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency (ARMC) was decided. It was intended to be the centre of defence R & D and procurement issue in Europe, inclusive to all Member States. It was thought that the EU is going to lead the policy for defence industry.
    However, the enlargement may cause problems for the process to improve European capability. Not only candidate countries are technologically less developed, but also they may claim their share of industrial return through the principle of juste retour. This may slow down the process and put negative effect for catching up with US capability.
    Thus, it is necessary to introduce the concept of flexible integration. However, current arrangement.for decision-making is based on the “structured cooperation” which excludes Member States without willingness or capacity. This is not an appropriate structure because it would increase the dissatisfaction of smaller Member States including new Members, and it would complicate the decisionmaking process. The important factor is, while larger Member States promote their programmes to increase capability, there should be a system to provide industrial incentives for smaller Member States to satisfy their industrial and technological demands.
  • 東野 篤子
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 96-124,313
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article explores how the EU reached it decision to finalise accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. At the time of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, there was an apparent lack of consensus on the three crucial questions concerning enlargement—‘timing’ of the conclusion of accession negotiations and the date of the accessions, with ‘how many’ candidate countries, and how to ‘finance’ enlargement. It was extremely hard to find solutions that might satisfy both the current member states and candidate countries. This article analyses when, how and why these questions were solved, and how these painful accession negotiations were able to be finalised at Copenhagen.
    As for the question of the ‘timing’, most of the EU member states had initially been extremely reluctant to set any specific ‘Target Date’ to conclude the negotiations, while the candidate countries had constantly been demanding the EU to present such a date. The only ‘commitment’ that the EU made at Helsinki was to indicate that it would be ‘in a position to welcome new Member States from the end of 2002’. However, it turned out that the EU had to step up its commitment by a proposal after the Commission and the French Presidency to create the ‘Road Map’, a detailed scenario to finalise the negotiations, which was endorsed in the Nice European Council in December 2000. Although creating the ‘Road Map’ and setting a ‘Target Date’ were not precisely identical, it turned out that implementing the ‘Road Map’ directed the EU almost inevitably to refer to 2002 as the EU's goal to finalise the accession negotiations with the most prepared countries. Also, the pressure from the European Parliament to set the date of the accession as 2004 had a great influence on the conclusion of the negotiations by the end of 2002.
    The question of ‘size’ was settled in two stages: when the EU decided to conclude the accession negotiations with the most prepared candidates by the end of 2002, the question of the size was almost automatically settled. Then, having to admit the considerable progress of the accession negotiations under the Road Map, the Laeken European Council in December 2001 named 10 countries which were likely to finalise the negotiations by the end of 2002.
    The finalisation of the negotiations on the chapters with budgetary implications—‘Agriculture’, ‘Regional Policy and Co-ordination of Structural Instruments’ and ‘Finance and Budgetary Provisions’—was by far the most difficult. Although the EU claimed that their common positions were agreed at the Brussels European Summit in October 2002, the candidate countries were far from being satisfied by the deal. The negotiations were therefore on the brink of collapse. However, two factors contributed the finalisation of accession negotiations with the 10 candidate countries at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002: the Danish Presidency played a role as an honest broker to find a compromise between current member states and the candidate countries, and EU member states were ‘entrapped’ to keep their ‘commitment’ at the Laeken European Council to finalise the negotiations by the end of 2002.
  • 蓮見 雄
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 125-143,315
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Kaliningrad problems are the test of Europe after enlargement of the EU. The EU is confronted with the question how to realize the Eastward enlargement without creating a new dividing line between the enlarged EU and Russia. On one hand, it requests future Member States to tighten the control of their borders with external areas. On the other hand, it seeks for closer cooperation with Russia.
    Accession negotiations have been separated from external affairs over the years. Kaliningrad, —a Russian exclave—has been treated as if another mere Russian border. But the daily life of the people there depends on Visa-free transit between its borders of Poland and Lithuania, based on a historical heritage of the past Communist bloc. With the failure of the Special Economic Zone due to conflicts between Moscow and Kaliningrad, it brings about soft security problems (shadow economy, illegal activities, and pollutions), which pose a threat to the security of the whole Europe.
    Kaliningrad, which is located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, will become a Russian enclave within the enlarged EU and find itself enclosed by Schengen borders causing access problems for outsiders. It might broaden the socio-economic gap between the EU and this region, and make Russia isolated. Eventually, it would threaten the sustainability of the region.
    Therefore, the prospect for getting rid of the gap is vital to solve the Kaliningrad problems. In other words, the future development of Kaliningrad is closely linked to building the Wider Europe, including the Common European Economic Space between the EU and Russia. Recently Russian government is making the development plan based on the national strategy to change Kaliningrad from Symbols of dividing to Footholds of cooperation, coming close to the EU system through the Common European Economic Space.
    Economy and social life in Kaliningrad are sensitive to external factors—EU and NATO expansion to the east. There is a need for favorable international relations and a stable legal and institutional environment of the market, which are based on the balance of various economic and political factors. Without cooperation of neighbouring countries, Kaliningrad is not an advantageous region as a Russian gateway to Europe. But its unique geographical location—enclave within the enlarged EU—offers opportunities for more cooperation and more prosperity for the people there. It could be able to play the role as a pilot region, where the EU and Russia discuss issues affecting common interests and work together to realize cooperation experimentally. Now the EU and Russia are Ever Closer partners in a Wider Europe.
    The Northern Dimension aims to intensify cross border cooperation between the EU and Northeast regions of Russia, creating security and stability and addressing the problems related to uneven development in the region. And its concept might be applied to the cooperation with European CIS (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) in the future. In the process of building Europe with no dividing, St. Petersburg could restore the traditional position—a Russian window to Europe—and Kaliningrad could play the role of its Satellite. The slogan—Russia in Europe—is an effective trademark for the Kaliningrad playing a major role in its closer ties with Europe.
  • 岡部 みどり
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 144-167,317
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    Facing 5th Enlargement, current EU member states had apparently been worrying over the future trend in ‘East-West’ labour migration. Some econometrical analysis showed that only the limited scale of labour movement is to be seen after Enlargement, whose impact on the whole EU labour market is modest. The member states have succeeded so far in persuading the citizens with the data, while Germany urged EU to set up 7-year transition period in the area of ‘free movement of people, ’ for the protection of its domestic market.
    Concerns over migration in the enlarged EU are in fact wider-ranged. Most member states now see new members, not so ‘migrant-sending’ as ‘migranttransit’ countries; the new member states have been requested high-qualified capability in external immigration control, to prevent sudden and unlimited influx of illegal migrants from outside the enlarged EU. These states were therefore obliged to meet the criteria of various JHA policies; they were even under pressure to sign such international treaties as 1951 Geneva Convention and Dublin Convention.
    EU's policy towards its new members as above is well understood as a part of EU strategy on global migration control. ‘The Strategy Paper on Immigration Policy’ presented by Austrian Presidency in 1998, whose essence has benignantly been modified in Tampere, considers EU's political strategy to 4 areas respectively; (1) Schengen area, (2) EU, (3) future EU, and (4) others. The strategy aims at strengthening external border control facilities of EU, as well as combating illegal migratory movement through ‘root-cause’-approach-based negotiation with migrant-sending countries. Area (4) apparently matches for the target of the negotiation, while in most cases area (3) needs effort to provide sound immigration control system. The EU accession dialogue has so far been effective for countries of area (3) to be set in the EU strategic script. The 5th enlargement can also be explained in this logic. Cooperation with area (4), however, has not yet fully established as there is few means to be found up until today of motivating area (4) countries to set themselves for the cooperation with EU.
  • 鈴木 邦成
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 168-185,319
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The postal systems in the European Union are presently undergoing radical changes, especially in their institutional framework and competitive practices.
    The postal sectors in the European Union are required a modern regulatory framework which aims in particular at enhancing the internal market for postal services. The European postal markets are also going to a new stimulating competitive run and, at the same time, the rapid development of new extremely advanced markets with added value such as express, logistics and e-commerce may have encouraged them to adopt various strategies to these sectors.
    The Deutsche Post World Net and TNT Post group cases clearly show this trend. Deutsche Post World Net AG is especially focused on services in the fields of express and logistics, after its postal reform in 1990s and was transformed from a state-owned authority to a performance-oriented logistics company. The company is internally structured into four independent business units, such as postal services, financial services, express and logistics, while TNT Post Group, the Dutch postal sector has expanded the business and also affiliated some large logistics companies, owing to liberalization and globalization processes in the European Union. Deutsche Post World Net and TNT Post Group are the leading global integrators in a pivotal position. Global post, express and logistics companies are entering a period of rapid growth.
    Since the European integration in 1992, deregulation in the field of logistics has been progressed. However, European forwarders have fallen into a difficult situation because of the abolition of the border checkpoints; they lost their important business. Some European postal operators, such as Deutsche Post and TNT Post Group began to penetrate into the business fields of forwarders.
    Nevertheless, it is still difficult for some countries to accomplish the privatization and liberalization of the postal systems because of stiff resistance of the labor unions which are eminently strong in some countries. It is possible there will be also the wide gap among the member states in the European Union concerning the postal and logistics systems of the countries.
  • 中野 聡
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 186-206,321
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    In an era in which neo-liberalism has strong societal influences, it seems particularly indispensable to look into the efforts and achievements in Europe to create the social dimension of the integration. Particularly focusing upon the European social dialogue at the macro level, this article depicts its history, function and the challenges it faces.
    In the main section, the social dialogue at this level is examined in terms of (1) actors, (2) tripartite concertation, (3) consultation according to Articles 137 and 138 of the Treaty and (4) the bipartite, autonomous dialogue between the social partners. With regard to the actors, such problems as the decreasing density and legitimacy of trade union representation in some countries and the lack of a sectoral institution of employers are described, along with some recent organizational developments In the context of the Lisbon strategy adopted in March 2000, the tripartite concertation has taken a significant, albeit embryonic step towards the advent of the corporatist configuration that relates economic and social policies. The consultation processes have created three directives that set minimum standards in the EU. Together with the increasingly autonomous bipartite dialogue that began with a work programme in November 2002, the social dialogue now serves as the driving force of labour market regulation and social integration.
    Nevertheless, with the national corporatist systems being encroached upon, the European system has been facing some challenges In the last section, its major problems are classified into five categories: the legitimacy of interest representation, the effectiveness of social legislation, dim prospects as a means of macro-economic regulation, the decentralized systems of industrial relations in the CEE countries and an unclear position in the future associational democracy. The European social dialogue may open up a new possibility of formulating innovative policies based on participative democracy that was only available in each member state. Nevertheless, whether or not such a possibility will come true in the near future remains to be seen.
  • 中村 英俊
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 207-228,323
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The EC/EU has evolved as an international actor, or rather as one of the ‘great powers’ over the issue of peace and international security. This article asks what kind of actor or power the EC/EU has been since the 1970s, with special reference to EC/EU policy towards Saddam Hussein's Iraq (1979-2003).
    In 1972, François Duchêne described the EC as a ‘civilian power’ in discussing ‘Europe's role in world peace’. The new concept of civilian power was introduced as different from the traditional concept of military power. The EC behaved as a significant actor in external economic affairs. However, the international setting in which the EC developed its international identity changed from the East-West détente to the new Cold War. In 1982, Hedley Bull harshly criticised the notion of ‘civilian power Europe’ as a contradiction in terms, because the EC had yet to be an international actor and because the influence exerted by ‘civilian’ European states was ‘conditional upon a strategic environment by the military power of states’. From the perspectives of ‘the return to power politics’ of the 1980s, Bull was rather advocating a ‘Western European military alliance’. As the Cold War was ending and the EC was transforming into the EU with CFSP, the concept of civilian power re-emerged. Christopher Hill and William Wallace discussed the ‘actorness’ of the EU, which ‘requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy’.
    Section One of this article examines the conceptual history of ‘civilian power’ from the 1970s to the 1990s. Section Two attempts to apply the concept to EC/EU policy towards Iraq: from Saddam's inauguration in July 1979, through the Iran-Iraq War in 1980-88, the Gulf conflict in 1990-91 and the Operation Desert Fox in 1998, to the de facto collapse of Saddam's regime in April 2003. The EC/EU became deeply involved with the issues revolving around Iraq: oil, hostages/terrorism, economic sanctions, arms transfer, UN peace-keeping, logistical and financial assistance to the US-led multilateral forces, and the issue of a continued UN inspection or a war.
    The Iraq War broke out in March 2003. International society would effectively disarm Saddam of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and change his undemocratic regime. Some Americans might well be overwhelmed with a success. It would however be naïve to conclude that the EU did not play any role in pre-war and post-war Iraq. At least two significant issues remained in Iraq, the Gulf region and the world: the establishment of a truly international regime of WMD non-proliferation and the promotion of democracy with little use of military force. In terms of capabilities, the EU collectively may still be a civilian power. In terms of expectations, the EU would cease to be such a power. With ten new members joining the EU and with a EU constitution and CSDP in sight, however, the concept of civilian power Europe should be more sophisticated and more effective in describing and analysing EU diplomacy. This must also be the lasting task of European integration theory.
  • 井上 淳
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 229-245,325
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article touches on the relationship between policy of the EU and that of the member state. There is a research area of “Europeanization” as one of preceding researches analyzing relations between the EU and the member states. In this research area, some scholars who study domestic impact of Europeanization often use the integrated approach used within the International Relations study and the Comparative Politics. This approach should be welcomed, because the EU is not treated as a research object sui generis, but more general one by using the approach.
    However, there are some problems to be solved in the arguments that preceding researches have developed. Firstly, it remains to be unsolved whether independent/dependent variables can be set up clearly in analyzing the relations between the EU and the member states. Secondly, the word “Europeanization” is broad and what “Europeanization” means depends on time and issues. So, in this article, policies of the EU and the member states are analyzed by focusing on the issue in case of telecommunications sector.
    As for the telecommunications sector, telegraph and telephone were exclusively controlled and managed by the state. However, in the 1970s and the 1980s, telecommunications sector was internationalized due to the technological innovation related to the electric communication, and it became possible to provide new services. New and strategic services had emerged from the PTT sector which was originally controlled by the states, so each member state had to tackle with both new service area and traditional ones such as telegraph, voice telephony, and network infrastructures.
    From the latter half of the 1980s until 1992, the EC did have discretion to make policies only related to new service sectors. Member states had discretion in the area of voice telephony, network infrastructures. As far as policies that were suggested by the EC level concerned the actors engaged in the PTT sector in the member states, member states approved and enforced the policy of the EC. It was after 1992 that EC started to liberalize the traditional service areas related to telephone and infrastructure. Member states agreed to the EC's plan because they came to notice that they had to reform traditional service sector to develop new service sector. However, this did not show that all of the actors in the member states agree with the reforms. Member states faced difficulty to implement the reforms due to the resistance of the domestic actors, especially labor unions that had many privileges in the traditional service sector.
    The research agenda that tries to apply the knowledge of the EU to the general considerations can contribute to the various arguments we can see today, because such considerations will give us some frameworks to analyze the relationship between international organization/institution and its members. It is urgent necessary for us who are studying the EU from the outside to provide a framework so that we can use the findings from the EU for the general considerations. The approach used in this paper will be a help.
  • 和達 容子
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 246-275,327
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the forms and roles of stakeholder involvement and public participation in the EU environmental governance.
    The Commission adopted the White Paper on European Governance in 2001. It concerns the way in which the Union uses the powers given by its citizens because the Union is often seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive. The White Paper, therefore, proposed “Better involvement”, “Better policies, regulation and delivery”, “The EU's contribution to global governance” and “Refocused policies and institutions”, and defined five principles underlying European governance of openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.
    On the other hand, the “participation” is one of the indispensable conditions in the sustainable development as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration defines “Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level”. It is recognized that the EU environmental policy has been legitimized by the policy effectiveness since its beginning and later required the democratic procedures which strengthen democracy and also ensure efficient policy implementations.
    The EU has adopted a lot of directives including provisions on public participation, e. g. the EIA directive. And the Commission adopted legislative instruments in order to apply the Århus Convention-access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters-to the European Community institutions and bodies, e. g. “general principles and minimum standards for the consultation of interested parties”. The EU opens up the policy-making process to get more people and organizations involved in shaping and delivering it's policy. However, it is to be understood that the EU institutions and bodies remain the decision-making authority and the representative democracy is essential in the EU political systems.
    These systems and measures seem to institutionalize the “deliberation” in the EU environmental policy process, which allows for the information provided by those concerned and their views to be taken into account at the earliest possible stage in the political decision-making process and is believed to contribute to solve the problems mentioned in the White Paper. The successful environmental policy needs the interaction and partnership among all levels and all sectors with democratic process. The deliberative arrangements cannot always lead to the ecologically rational policy output, but the deliberation is expected to play an important role in the democratic legitimacy of EU environmental policy.
  • 武田 健
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 276-296,329
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article examines the causes of the BSE crisis in Europe and reviews the administrative reform of the EU after the crisis. The European Union, which had privileged an economic interest of beef sector over other interests such as public health and food safety, had continued the policy of circulating beef and beef products from UK in the internal market until the British government announced a possible link between BSE and vCJD in March 1996.
    Through an empirical analysis of the crisis, this article will illustrate that the development of the crisis was largely caused by the following factors. First, the system of collecting information concerning BSE was dominated by the UK government. The EU, therefore, couldn't get scientific information adequately. Second, bureaucratic politics inside the European Commission made it difficult to coordinate policies on the BSE issue across the various DGs. Third, valuebased norms and administrative culture in the Directorate-General for agriculture prevent it from thinking the BSE matter seriously. It devoted itself to protecting an interest of beef sector in Europe. Finally, lack of administrative resources which the Commission can make use of delayed the Commission dealing with the BSE matter.
    After the Crisis, the EU initiated comprehensive institutional reform of EU administration in terms of public health and food safety. This reform is divided into four parts: the reorganization of DG for health and consumer protection, the enhancement of involvement of the European Parliament in the policy-making process, the improvement of transparency and openness concerning comitology procedure, and the establishment of independent regulatory agency, namely the European Food and Safety Authority. These reforms may improve the administrative system managing food safety and lead to enhancement of democratic legitimacy in this policy area, but a few points remain to be improved: the mechanism of policy coordination inside the Commission and the lack of administrative resources by which the Commission can accomplish its tasks and duties.
  • 坂本 進
    2004 年 2004 巻 24 号 p. 297-303,331
    発行日: 2004/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This book, with a title of A Soul for Europe, is essentially a scholarly research, devoted for seeking a European Identity both from the political and cultural aspects.
    Deep and unprecedented multilateral investigation is achieved herein in regard to the necessity of defining and building a common identity for the European citizens and organizations.
    It is composed of two volumes, of which Vol. 1, reader, is allotted for a broad sphere of general readers, with a comparatively plain description, focused mainly on the political identity in Europe. In its substantial introductory chapter, Prof. F. Cerutti emphasizes, above all, the importance of the political identity of Europe, which underlies the basic parts of this book. He looks at the upcoming of thin political identity of the Europeans' as a post-national and post-modern feature, which will become a precondition of EU's democratic legitimacy. He also points out that a European identity is not necessary monolith, and that it has metaphorically two main moments, i. e. Mirror Identity and Wall Identity, of which the former one will help looking at oneself in an internal mirror, whereas the latter will let one be aware of one's group consistency and individuality, while being conscious of one's boundary from the others. He even says that the current deficit of democracy of EU could be attributed to the lack of identity in EU.
    Ranged widely from Prof. J. Weiler's chapter on “European Democracy and the Principle of Toleration”, up to Prof. E. Rudolph's “Historical Manifestations of European Identity and its Failures”, it covers intensively various subjects, including European citizens, Social Justice and Solidarity, Freedom and Human rights, Wars and Peace, National borders etc, in order to concentrate on European identity.
    In the Second Volume, Scientific Essay collection, on the other hand, Prof. E. Rudolph points out, first of all, the necessity of surveying the origin of the historical Europe in order to search for the European identity, and many indepth analyses of the essential issues of identity, such as, religion, art, myth, civil society, etc, follow thereafter.
    As for the cultural aspect, references are made, for example, for “Religions and Iconoclastic debate”, “Role of Political Identity in the Modern myths”, and as for the political aspect, for “Role of economy on conforming European civilization” and for the difference between “Europe and the West”, together with several contributions from outside of Europe.
    If it were not based on identity, no polity could be legitimate, nor any law or any rule will be made effective, if it were not rooted on the souls of citizens, it insists.
    Prof. Therborn addresses in his prominent chapter that the future of Europe relies principally on an adequate recognition of European history essentially by European citizens, intellectuals and the politicians.
    What it signifies to provide with European soul, is to find out ultimately, through an incessant discussion by the public, what kind of values, what sort of legal principles and what type of political perspectives, would be most suitable in order that Europe could prescribe the reasons why they need to build a new political paradigms.
    In this way, it apparently aims to raise pluralistic public debates to be created, centered on various values, principles or on fundamental policies how to conform a core on common identity in Europe.
    It further says, by quoting Mr. Morin's phrase, that what is required for the current Europe is, not to seek for the old identity, but rather to rediscover a new identity of Europe. It stipulates that, to think of Europe on how to take responsibility on a global basis is to think of Europe, well conscious of the limits of morals, society and environments closely in connection with the modern world of globalization.