On October 29, 2004, the Heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 25 member states of the European Union and the heads of Institutions of the European Union gathered together at the Campidogli in the Sala Orazi and Curiazi, the same room where the original Treaties of Rome had been signed in 1957. The European political leaders came to Rome to sign the Treaty and the Final Act establishing a Constitution for Europe. The aims of this article is to shed more lights on the process from the Convention through the IGC-2003/2004 to the ratification procedures and analyse the politics among the member states of the European Union and European institutions. The European Union had muddled through and managed to adopt the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. But, again this time, it is still not “Finality”. The European Union has not yet reached its final destination. As Antje Wiener predicted that “it is not the end of the story but a mere stage in the process of constitutional change in the EU”. The member states are now in process of its ratification through parliamentary decisions and/or referendums. The forecast seems to be not so bright and not so easy especially in some of the member states holding referendums. Thus, it is in the hands of citizens to decide the fate of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
The present paper argues that the EU is a new type of non-state polity in which the Member State constitutional order and the Union constitutional order compete as well as complement each other. The paper first categorises four main approaches to the EU polity analysis: State Sovereignty Approach, Super-State Approach, Functional State Approach and Non-State Polity Approach. Then the paper discusses various legal aspects of the Constitutional Treaty to analyse which of the four approach best captures the unique legal features of the EU as well as the political practices that have been taken so far. In brief, State Sovereignty Approach captures well the Member States' ultimate EU polity making power, but fails to recognize the on-going polity making by other fully entitled actors including the European Parliament. Super-State Approach does not correspond to the legal settings that the Constitutional Treaty stipulates, nor does it correspond to the political reality of current Europe: there seems no Member State or majority of Union citizen that want a European level nation-state. Functional State Approach, on the other hand, captures well the EU's functional similarity to a state. However that approach also faces the inconsistency between the legal provisions of the Constitutional Treaty and the functional reality: there is no formal suggestion or stipulation in the Constitutional Treaty that the EU would supersede the Member States to form a single state (with or without creating a “nation” at European level). In the end, therefore, the current and the future EU under the Constitutional Treaty are at best captured as a non-state polity at European level. However, it is the present paper's contention that the legal analysis of this polity suggests that the EU legal order is not a unitary legal order, but is consisted of two different kinds of constitutional orders: Union's and the Member States'. The Member States' constitutional order still construct a nation-state polity based on “sovereignty” concept, whereas the Union's constitutional order seeks to build a non-state polity without relying on “sovereignty” concept. These heterogeneous constitutional orders complement as well as compete to create new legal rules and concepts that suit this new type of mixed polity as a whole.
Rome, October 29, 2004-the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed. One of its new and important features is its institutional strengthening of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the security and defence component through the establishment of the “double hated” European Foreign Minister. Already the founding fathers of the Union had envisioned a united and therefore internationally strong Europe. As usual in the history of European integration, the idea evolved slowly overcoming quite a few setbacks. After the milestone of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) which founded the European Union and the CFSP, the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened this new common policy and clarified its role. Procedurally the CFSP was made more effective through increased Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the creation of the office of the High Representative which gave a human face to this new common policy. Under the impression of the war in Kosovo where a NATO intervention cruelly demonstrated the EU's incapacity to enforce peace and security in its own backyard and the dissipating willingness of the United States to be the European peacemaker of last resort the EU was pushed to set up another new policy, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This paper analyses the latest development of CFSP as reflected in the Constitution for Europe. Has the European Constitution brought about an important change in the nature of the common policy or is it just another functional modification of the status quo with an ambitious name? Although the EU is finally granted legal personality, the treaty has not significantly increased the supranational element in foreign policy making—neither through pooling of sovereignty through the increase of qualified majority voting nor through the transfer of sovereignty to the European foreign ministers. Nevertheless, although both, the CFSP and ESDP, remain intergovernmental, the Constitution was another important step in shaping the common policy in a way which could enhance the Union's capacity to act effectively on the international scene. The Constitution is flexible, dynamic and has the potential to Europeanising national foreign policies—if Member States allow this to happen. Different speeds and endeavours will be able to move forward within the Union. Some Member States may be entrusted to perform a task within the Union framework as a group. In case of military capabilities fulfilling higher criteria and having made mutual binding commitments they may establish “permanent structured cooperation”. While this flexibility can be a useful tool to get a process started and to build up capacity, it will need vigorous steering to avoid disintegration rather than integration in the long run. Furthermore, the European Union has gained enhanced actor recognition in international politics. The Constitution does not only call for a fully fledged Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it also creates a European External Action Service (EEAS) —a European Diplomatic Service— as well as a European Defence Agency. In clarifying the institutional structure it makes the CFSP potentially more coherent and Europe could gain a clearer international profile. However, the new set-up does not respect the building principles of the Union in mixing the tasks of the Council with those of the European Commission through the at least double hatted EU Foreign Minister, who potentially is in competition with the President of the Union who is also entrusted with representing the Union at his/her level. Thus, institutional squabbling—in addition to the sword of Damocles of referenda in countries like the UK, France, Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Ireland—could endanger a project necessary to better equip the Union of 25 and the challenges ahead. Unfortunately, France and the Netherlands rejected the
With the accession of ten new members on 1 May 2004, adoption of the Constitutional Treaty by the European Council in June and its signing on 30 October, 2004, and the forthcoming decision in December to start accession negotiations with Turkey, the European Union is entering a new stage of its institutional, political and economic development. A stage of which we don't know yet where it will lead to in the medium and long term, and which presents formidable new challenges, but also opportunities. What is at stake, is more than a simple widening or deepening. It amounts to a full-fledged transformation and regime change of the Union: The quantum leap to 25, and in the foreseeable future to 27 members and more, is tantamount to a quality change. In my following remarks I shall confine myself mainly to some economic aspects, while I shall touch upon the constitutional aspects only in passing. In fact, they have been covered extensively in today's previous sessions.
Because of large income disparities between the incumbent and the newly acceding countries, the 2004 EU enlargement has been marred by concerns of massive inflows of cheap, low-skilled labour from the East that would seriously disrupt the EU labour markets. These concerns were underlying the rationale for establishing restrictions on labour movement from the East that would protect the labour markets and, at least partially, help to pacify a strong popular sentiment against the enlargement that prevails in the societies of the incumbent EU member states. The paper shows that in reality, as the labour movement in Europe has been partially replaced by trade and capital flows, the potential for the labour inflow from the East has been greatly overstated. The evidence from the south enlargement (when Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the EU) shows no dramatic increase in labour inflow that would follow the enlargement. Also substantial relaxation of the travel restrictions between the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU member states after the transition reforms in the former had began did not result in disruption of the latter's labour markets. It seems that the analysts forecasting massive inflows of labour force from the East tend to draw their conclusions from simplistic presentation of the basic macroeconomic inequalities while failing at the same time to capture the mechanism of labour migration. This results in failure to distinguish between a general inclination to move and a readiness to bear costs of a decision to migrate to a different country. If allowed for such a distinction, the potential labour movement from the East would not be greater than approximately one percent of total labour force if all restrictions are removed. This is significantly less than predictions based exclusively on the income differences. Therefore the restrictions introduced into the 2004 accession treaties seem to be not only unnecessary but also harmful to the integration process as they delay the moment the freedom of movement of goods and production factors will have been achieved within the whole area of the enlarged Union. They may also create some side effects to the incumbent EU member countries markets (namely distort the capital movement within the EU and create some incentives for reforming labour markets in Western Europe) and constitute a significant departure from the enlargement philosophy that may negatively influence further negotiations with candidate countries as Turkey and West Balkan nations.
The Central and Eastern European Countries (the CEEC) have been undergoing the radical transformation from the socialist economy to the market economy since the collapse of the socialist regime. Since the middle of 1990s their economies have been developing thanks to the large inflow of the foreign direct investment mainly from the EU countries, and they acquire the new chance of the economic development by the accession to the EU. While the CEEC have to comply with the law and rule of the EU by the accession to the EU and are forced to carry out the radical reforms of their social and economic structures in order to be adapted to the competition regime of the EU, they would be the competitor to the Western European Countries, taking advantage of the low wages and corporate taxes, the flexible labor markets etc. Many multinational companies, mainly Western European companies, are shifting their manufacturing plants from the Western Europe to the Central and Eastern Europe. As the shifts are accelerating, the fears of further job drain and higher unemployment are growing among the Western Europe, and the labors and trade unions in the Western Europe are increasingly under the pressure of wage cost cut, dismiss and deregulation of the employment protection. In other words, they are being threatened by “social dumping” from the East. Against such threat of social dumping from the East, the social democratic group in the EU, composed by mainly the trade unions, social democratic parties, are trying to save their corporatist industrial relations and the social models by enhancing the social dialogue strategy and extending them to the CEEC. But their strategy are faced with difficulties even in the Western European countries. The bargaining powers of the trade unions are weakening in the Western European countries because of declining density of the trade unions. In the CEEC, the trade unions are much weaker. Moreover the association of employers, which should be the social partner of the trade union in the social dialogue, are decisively lack, whereas the people hope social cohesion and stability after the radical and long transformation from the socialist economy to the market economy. The enlargement is the challenge not only to the CEEC, but also to the Western European countries.
The British Government under Harold Macmillan made its first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in August 1961. This application marked not only a significant turning point of Britain's post-war external policy, but also a very beginning of the enlargement process of the European Integration (“from the Six to the Twenty-five”). In the existing studies, it has often been pointed out that the British Government's consideration about its “special relationship” with the United States, particularly its recognition that the new John F. Kennedy Administration (inaugurated in January 1961) supported the EEC and Britain's entry into it more vigorously than the previous Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, was one of the factors which facilitated the first application. However, this article, which is based on both British and American governmental records, claims that America's strong support for the European Integration of the Six and its relative coolness towards British initiative such as the European Free Trade Area (FTA) plan (the so-called Plan G) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were largely consistent throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. The British Government tried hard to persuade the Americans into adopting more pro-British and pro-FTA/EFTA attitudes, but those efforts turned out to be mostly abortive. Consequently, the consistency (rather than change, as often pointed out in many existing studies) of the American attitudes facilitated Britain's policy change towards its first application to the EEC. In the diplomatic sphere, Britain's first application to the EEC can be understood as a measure to maintain and strengthen its “special relationship” with the United States, by becoming a member and a “stabilising force” in the EEC. In the trade sphere, Britain's first application can be understood as a measure to secure an equal access to the EEC market, which was expected to be an alternative to the huge but still protective American market but (if Britain remained outside) be surrounded by relatively high common external tariffs. Therefore, it can be pointed out that Britain's first attempt to join the EEC was a primarily defensive effort to avoid the danger of being sandwiched by the United States and the EEC and seriously losing the basis of its international influence and economic power.
In this paper, we review why and how the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced, then discuss the problems and prospects. We conclude by pointing out some lessons and some topics for future research. The SGP was the EU's answer to the question of whether Member States could maintain budgetary discipline once they were allowed to join Stage III of EMU (Economic and Monetary Union). Without such a pact, it was feared that Member States would be tempted to expand fiscal deficits, inviting inflation and euro depreciation. For this reason the Pact was considered indispensable for a successful EMU, and Germany was the principal motor in its introduction. As it turned out, Germany became one of the twelve countries that, as of November 2004, were judged to have an “excessive deficit”. More problematic was the decision by the Ecofin, in November 2003, not to impose sanctions on Germany and France. Then in September 2004, it was revealed that Greece had never actually satisfied the 3% criteria. The SGP is currently under review and the outcome will be known in March 2005. In the meantime, there are three lessons; (1) German fears for loss of budgetary discipline after Stage III were justified, (2) the problem of regional differences in budgetary balances will not go away by merely establishing a unified EU fiscal authority, (3) signing a pact is not sufficient when its workability depends critically on credibility of data. Topics for future research would include, aside from where the SGP is going, why smaller countries tend to be more successful in achieving fiscal balance, and why even among smaller countries some successes turn sour with time.
The EU Constitution Treaty and its Protocol, signed in October 2004, reinforces the method in which subsidiarity principle is applied. Since the Maastricht Treaty introduced this principle in 1992, it has been pointed out that the EU institutions did not properly apply it in practice. Although the question of applying the subsidiarity principle has long been a controversial matter since the IGC of 1996, the priorities have rather been taken on such issues as the Euro and the 5th enlargement. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle has always been treated as a “leftover” in the process of EU reform. The subsidiarity principle has a dual function. The first is to improve the administrative efficiency by searching for an optimal level among the actors (EU, national, and local governments) in implementing policies. The second function is to demonstrate the new image of democracy: an idea that the European citizens can ensure political accountability of the EU and policy-making or implementation should be undertaken as closely to citizens as possible. It is noteworthy that the EU Constitution Treaty expects national parliaments of member states to play crucial roles in the process of the subsidiarity principle. National parliaments have gradually been recognized as indispensable actors, along with the European Parliament, in legitimating the EU policy-making process and in overcoming the democratic deficit. This article follows the arguments over application of the subsidiarity principle and clarifies the reasons why the application rule has to be modified. Next, it focuses on the efforts of French Parliament to strengthen the influence on the government negotiating in the EU policy-making process, and analyzes the movement of national parliaments to increase cooperation one another or with the European Parliament through the COSAC. In conclusion, I would like to provide a plausible future of the EU parliamentary democracy in the future.
The religious issues involved in the European integration, will provide us, beyond the realm of religion itself, with an opportunity to examine the issues inherent to the cultural unification project in Europe, namely, to reconsider what, in fact, will support the emergence of real European citizens. Such being the case, an essential part of the Convention of the Constitution Committee was to talk about how to make reference of God in the Treaty, and to let people recognize the tradition and the role of Church which are both indispensable and contributories for the spiritual and social lives among Europeans. The religious lives in Europe, however, are more secularized than in America, and got fallen merely as a ceremonial service in the daily life nowadays. The assertion that God should be referred to in the Constitution, as a token of a cultural inheritance of Europe, got encountered with and doomed not to be realized by the strong insistence, arisen mainly by France, that the integration must be free from God under the principle of secularization i. e. laïcité. The constitution is, as it were, a legal embodiment of public opinion, which, in turn, serves as a guideline for the interpretation of the constitution itself, that is to say, that the basic principle to work out the draft treaty of a constitution is how to incorporate the identity, so-called common consciousness of values among citizens, therein. In this sense, it will be quite natural to put the draft to the vote by all European citizens who are supposed to subdue, but the reality is to put it this time only for a limited number of nationals. It is to be understood that they prefer establishing the Constitution Treaty as early as possible so that they can achieve decision making efficiently in order to cope with the keen economic competition in the world, but they should never be so hasty in installing the fundamental law of the Union especially when they are now in a new step toward the completion of political unification. The religion is the source of political ethics. The ethics and the morality are the essentials of a religion where Christianity is included. While we fear that excessive requests of national interests are expected, a prudent retrospection into Christianity is hopefully required in this place. It is Christianity, i. e., Catholicism itself, which occupies the pivotal position of numerous universal cultures in this area, and which has been casting their influence decisively on the thoughts of the European citizens in the society and in politics up to the present time. The potentials, which the religion conceives even where the secularization expands, seem to be still vibrant in the view of values and in the rhythm of their lives. In Europe where the independent sovereign states gather together, the Constitution Treaty remains after all as a treaty, and it can't become the Constitution itself. Even though the increase of the member countries, as time goes on, will require them more rapidity and efficiency of decision-making, they should not be hasty in installing constitution as long as they could not duly articulate the philosophy thereof, but rather they should persevere continuing accumulating treaties, ie, acquis communautaire, be it so impatient, when the sovereignty remains in the hands of member countries.
The enlarged EU has now entered on a new phase; ratification of Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The Constitution, which represents the will of EU to be more democratic political community, defines the EU citizens as one of the subjects of New Europe. The ‘EU citizen’ is every person holding the nationality of a member state. Consequently, the third-country national residents are excluded. Moreover, they are at a disadvantage by comparison with EU citizens. The EU citizen has a lot of rights which third-country nationals (TCNs) don't because the EU Citizenship is the membership both in EU and member states. In other words, the Duality of EU Citizenship disadvantages TCNs. However, the boundary of citizens cannot be determined by democratic processes because by definition, democratic decisions are made only by the citizen. Initially, at least, the boundary of citizens is given. However, there are immigrants crossing borders. In this sense, the democratic citizenship is defined as permanent re-demarcation of the boundary identifying citizens and subjects. Therefore in this paper, we explore the access of EU Citizenship in order to make EU Citizenship democratic, focusing on legal status of third-country national residents in the context of the ‘integration’ of TCNs in EU which has established ‘progressively an area of freedom, security and justice’ since the Treaty of Amsterdam. In this area, TCNs are now considered not only human resources, but also members of society. In 2003, EU established ‘long-term resident status’ of TCNs, which would be a core legal status in ‘integration process’. The long-term residents have many rights including freedom of movement. However, the EU Citizenship is still linked to nationality of a member state, which is the final legal status in ‘integration process’ of TCNs. Paradoxically, if a long-term resident exercises her right to free movement, she and her family may not meet conditions of nationality acquisition because of the residency requirement. Therefore, the asymmetry of duality turns out to be a problem, and the EU Citizenship must have another criterion independent of member states nationality. Finally we would find the possibility of open membership in the symmetrical Duality of EU Citizenship, which could ensure integrity of memberships in EU.
Compared to the vast quantity of literature on European integration, books on the theory of integration are surprisingly few. In this regard, European Integration Theory edited by Wiener and Diez is certainly a welcome contribution. While it provides a concise overview of the field of European integration, it also takes stock of the achievements of the theories as well as highlighting their problems. The volume therefore is not only useful as an essential textbook for postgraduate students who are interested in the various conceptual and theoretical frameworks for EU studies, but also provides academics with a survey of the scholarly development in a field which is expanding at breathtaking speed and invites debates on ways of assessing what stage of development the theories of European integration have reached and in what direction they should move forward. One of the main contributions of this volume is that it illustrates how the various theories of European integration have incorporated and digested the relatively new theories of International Relations (those led, for example, by social constructivism or discursive approaches) and how these new integration theories have made unique contributions to the study. It should be emphasised that, in the Japanese scholarly context, this new marriage of European integration theories and IR theories has largely been neglected, making a (sometimes overly) descriptive approach the mainstream one in European studies. However, a quick scan of the representative journals of European integration published in Europe, immediately reveals that the current focus of interest is not so much making empirical updates, but rather ways to better conceptualise the policies and institutional developments of the EU. This should by no means be taken as a claim that Japanese academics should themselves follow this scholarly trend in Europe. However, as the book by Wiener and Diez strongly suggests, an increased interest in theories and concepts has undoubtedly helped to stimulate the scholarly enthusiasm to understand, explain, analyse and make normative interventions to the policies and politics of the EU. In this regard, the volume could well be seen as a timely alarm call for those engaged in EU studies in Japan, urging us to stop and consider how we can make the most of the theories and concepts of European integration.