日本EU学会年報
Online ISSN : 1884-2739
Print ISSN : 1884-3123
ISSN-L : 1884-3123
2006 巻 , 26 号
選択された号の論文の17件中1~17を表示しています
  • Anton Pelinka
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 1-19,417
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The paper argues that the EU and its political system are a special case between a federal system (like the US) and an international organisation (like the UN). This can be exemplified by the interests behind the EU's three main institutions—Council, Commission, and Parliament. It is especially the Council and the veto power each member state enjoys in still many decisive fields that prevents the EU from becoming a federation. The lack of an integrated party system indicates the “unfinished” status of the Union—but at the same time, that lack is one of the reasons why the process towards a deeper Union is not going on faster. The paralysis of the deepening process, caused by the French and Dutch constitutional veto, underlines the contradiction of the EU which is more than a confederation but clearly not (yet?) a federation. The paper argues that the paralysis can be interpreted in a more optimistic way only from the viewpoint of neo-functionalism in combination with the brinkmanship-argument: The integration process will go on—only or especially, when the result of the whole integration, that is the EU itself, is in jeopardy. The lack of a coherent and substantive Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can provide the Union with such a shocking (and hurting) experience, but also the need to deepen the Union not despite but because of the enlargement of 2004. The Union is a paradox: Hugely popular for those who are still outside but have some reason to hope to join; but less popular for the insiders as could be seen in the referenda in France and in the Netherlands in 2005. Part of this paradox is the unholy alliance between rightist nationalists and leftist anticapitalists united by nothing else but by the EU as a common enemy.
  • Yoichiro Usui
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 20-62,419
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The article discussed the roles of soft law in EU environmental governance. It demonstrated that, even in environmental issue-areas, the EU has introduced new modes of governance, a core element of which is soft law. On the basis of these empirical observations, the article theoretically examined the implications of soft governance on EU democracy, on the one hand, and the possibility of soft law as a vehicle of discourse, on the other hand. The article argued that the softening of EU environmental governance by too much depending on soft law may disturb the subtle balance of the Community method between supranational legal processes and intergovernmental political processes, thereby leading to democracy without the Parliament. However, by drawing on discourse approaches of Hajer and Dryzek, the article also suggested that soft law can serve as a vehicle of discourses that construct a shared story-line, around which a discourse coalition between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament is established, and this discourse coalition enables the EU institutions to facilitate communicative network. In this sense, the article asserted that soft law as a vehicle of discourse is an interface between law and politics and therefore environmental governance studies need to pay attention to discourse politics on soft law.
    The article is divided into six sections. First, the article made a quick survey of new modes of governance such as framework directives, coregulations/self-regulations, open method of coordination, network initiatives and regulatory agencies, taking example of the introduction of these modes into environmental governance and thereby illustrating the emergence of soft governance in environmental issue-areas. Second, the article examined the concept of soft law as a core element of new modes of governance, referring to the legal approach of Senden and the political approaches of Trubek et al., and then offered the widest possible understanding of soft law, which consists of non-binding instruments that are preparatory, interpretative and supplementary and can be expected to minimise sovereignty cost and even to change actors' identities through mutual learning. Third, the article clarified the characteristics of soft governance as civic participation and softer legalisation and argued that the use of soft law in governance implicates democracy based on European civil society and democracy based on the nation state, however, this type of governance mode may lead to democracy without the Parliament. Fourth, the article theoretically examined the possibility of soft law that serves as a vehicle of discourse, which enables the Commission, the Council and the Parliament to facilitate communicative network. Fifth, the article gave specific contexts to the foregoing theoretical arguments, by reviewing EU environmental governance from two viewpoints: multi-level participatory arrangements; and the softening of obligations. Finally, referring to the conceptualisation of Dryzek, the article considered a possible environmental discourse coalition between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, which is based on the story-line of sustainable development orientated towards democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism.
    Based on these forgoing arguments, the article tried to demonstrate that studies on environmental governance in the institutional complex of the EU need to pay attention to two facets of soft law: the possibility of undermining the Community method; and the potential of constructing a discourse coalition, which may conceal from view the former.
  • Stephen DAY
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 63-83,421
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The role and significance of national political parties for democracy and representation at the national level has a long and well documented history. By comparison, far less attention has been given to the possibility of transnational party political actors playing a similar role at the transnational level. The goal of this paper is to highlight the possibilities and some of the difficulties associated with such an endeavour. The primary focus will be up the European Political Parties (Euro-parties). In addition examples will be drawn from the global Party Internationals in order to illustrate some of the issues that problematizes the existence and potential future development of these transnational actors. Following a brief introduction of the Euro-parties, the paper will question the significance of transnational ‘party-based’ organizations given a series of historical and contemporary problems. It will be argued that if they are to enhance their role and significance, future development requires these actors to pursue a pathway that lies between the structural rigidity of a party and the flexibility of a network. In addition they will also need to show that they are capable of providing a ‘value-added’.
  • Meri OKANO
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 84-99,423
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines governance of transnational cooperation in the EU regional policy, tracing its evolution from a narrow cooperation of the first period to a more comprehensive policy including spatial aspect in the framework of Community Initiative INTERREG. With the development of the European integration, the status of regions (hereafter the same meaning as subrational governments) in the EU has changed remarkably. Having established a direct contact with the European Commission and a participation in the political process, regions are gradually becoming important actors in EU politics alongside national governments and the EU institutions. Multi-Level Governance accounts for this unique nature of the European regional policy. Regions began to form horizontal networks of the cross-border cooperation bypassing national boundaries. It could constitute a new political space at transnational level alongside with the three fundamental levels: the EU and the national and regional levels.
    With the beginning of INTERREG IIC at the end of 1990s, the aspect of spatial planning has been incorporated in these cooperations. The first grand design for EU territory has been crystallized in European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP).
    It combines vertical and horizontal networks for better management of the EU space based on the fundamental political aims of the EU as an economic and social cohesion, preservation of natural and cultural heritages, and balanced competitiveness of the EU.
    However, as the EU does not have the competence in the field of spatial planning, the question of how to incorporate the idea of ESDP to EU public policies remains. Moreover, the difference in administrative systems and traditions of spatial approach between member states could be an obstacle. This problem became even more complicated with the enlargement. Therefore the spatial planning for post-ESDP process requires further discussion.
    In conclusion, this paper states that although many problems still remain, the idea of the EU spatial planning gives a new role to regions of member states connecting them to the concept of the EU territory as a whole. Regions are not only the administrative units of the member states, but they also assume a pivotal role to pursue transnational cooperation involving local societies. In this sense, transnational cooperation became more important for territorial cohesion as well as for the success of the European Integration.
  • 岡村 堯
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 100-129,425
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The concerns lie on how to understand the environmental governance. Specifically, it means to control environmental issues from the legal perspective. It is to say that it is important to know how environmental policies comply with environmental laws. Therefore, the basic principle of environmental governance is firstly to build legislatures regarding pollution on atmosphere, water, soil, as well as waste management, and legally handle the issues. In other word, the principle of environmental governance is how to implement the legal management.
    Thus, in this paper, firstly, the development of environmental policy and its legislation are introduced. Then, typical acts for each field of environmental law are raised. Later, cases on European Court of Justice and the court of first instance are analyzed.
    Next, legal structure on environment in Japan and its related cases are described.
    By analyzing legal structure on environmental between EU and Japan, their comparative analysis is conducted.
    The main characteristic of environmental law in EU is that the environmental right has been clearly stated as one of the basic rights for citizens in the EC Treaty, the basic law for the Europe, or European Constitution yet to be ratified. On the other hand, the word environment does not appear in Japan's Constitution. Moreover, the Japanese court does not recognize environmental right as a practical right.
    As for the environmental legislatures, they are enacted in broad field both EU and Japan. Yet there seem quite remarkable differences on their implementation. While there have been already various court cases dealt with environmental issues in Europe, environmental cases brought to courts are very rare in Japan. There is a time lag between environmental policies in EU and Japan, reason of which lies on differences in future vision towards Environment in EU and Japan, while EU wants to play a world's leadership in dealing with environmental leadership, when Japan in still very cautious on implementing the environmental legislature.
  • 渡邊 啓貴
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 130-157,427
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The objective of my article is to conduct comparative research between two referendums in France for the ratification of the Treaty of EU in 1992 and the Treaty of European Constitution in 2005. We find some similarities and differences. As for the similarities, there are such common aspects as the political reason why two French Presidents, Mitterrand and Chirac, resorted to referendum for the ratification of two treaties, the current of public opinion during the campaign before the voting and the lack of French people's understanding on the European Integration.
    There are, however, some differences. The first is that French people did not anticipate the impact of the successful EU for them in 2005, while they seriously worried about the failure of the EU development in the form of EMU, CFSP and so on in 1992. French people's perception on the future of the EU has become much more pessimistic since then, because they are disappointed with the present results of the EU. Secondly, the socio-economic environment in France was far more serious in 2005 than in 1992. Prime Minister Raffarin had encountered such difficulties as an unstable social seceerity. Thirdly, there was some indifference among influential French politicians on the Treaty of European Constitution, which did little to enhance French people's EU identity. The process of the referendum in 2005 was renationalized in the sense that French people preferred to view the referendum on the Treaty of European Constitution as a contest of internal politics.
    Those characteristics above-mentioned reveal the lack of the EU identity among French people as well as their reluctance to accept the enlargement of the EU including the East European States and the Turkey.
  • 井上 裕司
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 158-178,429
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    As public and academic references to a globalizing economy have become increasingly common over the last two decade, explicit efforts to theorize about the relationship between globalization and regionalism such as the EU, NAFTA, and APEC have been made within international relations. In such efforts, regionalism has been described as a set of state-led or states-led strategic projects designed to improve international competitiveness of domestic industries and to ensure advantageous trade conditions for them. A glowing number of scholars argue that the most striking characteristic common to all the regionalist projects is their commitment to “open regionalism” which is in conformity with a principal idea of globalization, that is, neo-liberalism, and thus point out regionalism as an essential part of a multi-layered system of global governance.
    However, why have some regionalist projects been carried out, even under a condition of a globalizing economy, in accordance with political dynamism which has constrained the neo-liberal regionalism in the history of the EU? In this article, two mechanisms which have generated the dynamism are suggested: two-level games and Europeanization.
    The former mechanism works through member states' domestic political process. In this mechanism, the structure of domestic preferences and the nature of domestic political institutions imposes constrains on the government's regionalist strategies and affects the government's international bargaining position.
    The latter mechanism has been developed with the process of Europeanization, which is defined as the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance. In this mechanism, some domestic socio-economic actors are stimulated to participate directly in the European political process and to strength interaction with European Organizations such as the European Commission and the European Parliament.
    These two mechanisms has been restricted an unconditional pursuit of the neo-liberal regionalist projects in the EU politics.
  • 松浦 一悦
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 179-204,431
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims at evaluating the effects and problems of the ECB monetary policy in Ireland. As far as the Eurosystem is a central bank system, the Bank has to attain two fundamental goals, that is, to stabilize the rate of increase in consumer price and to maintain the payment system in the Euro-area.
    However, the uniqueness of the Eurosystem makes it harder for the ECB to attain two goals for two reasons. First, a common monetary policy has different impacts on the nations in divergent business cycles. On one hand, a single Euro interest rate has a deflationary effect on the nation whose natural interest rate is supposed to be lower. One the other hand, an Euro interest rate has an inflationary effect on the nation whose business cycle is in an almost boom.
    Second, the present ECB's monetary strategy cannot deal with a persistent rise of asset prices. For example, in Ireland, house prices have been continuing to rise due to massive capital inflows and flexible central bank credit policy. Although heated house prices are expected to decrease in the future, the ECB cannot tighten its stance to calm down the prices. Because it is the level of consumer prices that the ECB directly targets to control, not that of assets prices.
    Moreover, if the house prices dropped dramatically in a short run, its drop deteriorates assets of the banks that are deeply involved in mortgage loans and real estate loons. Bankruptcy of a big bank could lead to systemic risks that damage the payment system in a nation in the Euro area.
    First, we look at the reasons of persistent rise of house prices and explain the role of the Ireland National Central Bank. Second, we examine the ECB's monetary strategy in terms of balancing two goals, that is, price stability and maintenance of the payment system. Third, we point out issues of the EU prudential policies.
  • 安藤 研一
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 205-231,433
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) changed the economic conditions within Europe, and the multinational enterprises (MNEs) restructure their business and operation. This paper examines the relationships between the eastern enlargement of the EU and the MNEs through the cases of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI).
    From the general trend, Japanese FDI into the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) is relatively limited compared with both total FDI into CEECs, and total Japanese FDI into Europe, although on the increasing tendency. In addition, it shows the geographical and industrial concentration. That is, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are the main recipients in CEECs, while the manufacturing sector, especially electric and electronics equipments and transport equipments, shares much higher weight than those into Western Europe. The investigation of the location pattern of Japanese plants from the supra-national perspective makes clear Japanese MNEs expand or newly enter into CEECs, rather than relocate their subsidiaries from the West to the East. The examination of the coefficient between the plant location and the sub-national regional economic character shows no significance on the demand factors, but suggests the significance of the supply side factors; i. e. the labour market conditions, the degree of the industrialisation, and the level of the infrastructure. Here, it is worth to note that the negative sign of labour market conditions is confirmed, contrary to the expectation.
    We can indicate some implications from the above investigation. First, the EU enlargement has a kind of announce effect on the FDI which is absorbed even before the formal membership. Second, Japanese MNEs treat CEECs as the production and export base with low wage costs, and their strategy tends to expand their presence in Europe rather than the simple relocation. Third, some significant coefficients of the sub-national factors suggest the importance of the supply side factors. Japanese MNEs tend to locate their plants in the regions with relatively high wage level, low unemployment rate, high industrialisation and good infrastructure. These as a whole have negative meanings for the economic divergence among the regions, since less developed regions in CEECs failed to attract Japanese FDI.
    As a future research agenda, more precise investigation, the disinvestment of Japanese MNEs, the industry-specific character, and the macroeconomic aspects of FDI are pointed out.
  • 細矢 浩志
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 232-259,435
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper discusses the structural change of the Car Production Networks in the European Automobile Industry which associated with the Enlargement of European Union.
    Since 1990's, the transformation of the Car Production Networks in the European Automobile Industry has been changed dramatically in accordance with the market-oriented economic reforms in the Central and Eastern European Countries and the beginning for these accession to EU, which affected the relocation of car production sites towards the CEE. After the CEECs have become the members of EU, many automobile factories in the CEE emerge as multinational companies' bases which play some important roles in the automobile networks. The restructuring of the CEE automobile industry has evolved around the integration to the European-wide area networks based on the division of labor.
    As united the CEE bases with the networks, it appears a movement to reform the old regional division of labor between “core center” and “peripheral areas”. New regional networks of car production in Europe consist of three areas as follows; (1) industrial heartlands, (2) old peripheral areas, (3) new peripheral areas. In Europe's industrial heartlands, which have concern about “hollowing out of industry” due to the relocation of assembly plants towards CEE, the opening up new type of “compact-car” assembly plants (for example, Toyota in Yaris France, MCC Smart in Hambach) and the integrated research centers made these areas more competitive, and made them possible to continue to draw strength from their advantages. In so-called “old peripheral areas (the Iberian Peninsula)”, there is an expansion of some production sites assembling Multi Purpose Vehicles and their design, technological and organizational innovation competencies have developed. In “new peripheral areas”, such as the case of the CEE, we suppose that the main purpose of the car makers in moving into has been to assemble smaller vehicles more efficiency, however, some car makers started to carry out the production of more innovative and/or the top-of-the-range vehicles and to engage higher level activities.
    The keywords for the European-wide area network system of car production are “specialization” and “clustering”, but nowadays, we need to monitor carefully its complex functions-based spatial structure of division of labor.
    It is important to appreciate that the transformation of new production networks in European automobile system now in progress, where the regional integration dynamics eternally works, is the continuous process to build up more appropriate structure in division of labor and to reshuffle the comparative advantages in its system.
  • 山村 延郎, 三田村 智
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 260-284,437
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The EEC's first banking directive (77/780/EEC) established the authorization system for credit institutions in each member state in 1977. Twelve years later, the single authorization system and the home country control were adopted through the second banking directive (89/646/EEC). In the financial services sector, the integration of a single market has made great strides forward.
    The universal banking model which the EU adopted came from the German banking system, however such a system had never existed in France until 1984. The German banking system has served as a basis for the regulatory structure of the common market of the EU. Under the influence of this system in neighboring countries, the French banking system underwent various reforms. The universal banking system was introduced by the Banking Act of 24 January 1984.
    In the 1990s, each member state liberalized their financial services markets and brought on competition in an open-market system under a single currency, the euro. The regulatory harmonization of the EU financial services market was further brought to fruition via the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP).
    Despite freer competition and many examples of state enterprises being privatized, there still appears to be low competition from outside players in each domestic market, which is confirmed by an EU Commission report which showed that cross-border M & A activity is still very low.
    This report suggests that measures up to now, such as single-nationality or regulatory harmonization may not be enough to spur cross-border competition. Further policies that encourage freer competition across the EU may be needed. For example, one area in need of improvement may be changing policies that continue to allow local governments to protect and favor their regions' public or legal institutions. Private institutions have long protested against such protectionism.
    In Germany, as a result, the guarantees for the saving banks (Sparkasse) and its central institutions (Landesbank) from their public owner were abolished in July of 2005. In France some parts of the largest state-owned credit institution, CDC, were separated and privatized, leading the savings bank division, known as Caisses d'épargne, to be spun out as a cooperative bank.
    From the viewpoint of the traditional German economic model, which is known as “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” (social market economy), the privatization of state-owned institutions might be interpreted as the demise of Germany's long-held social market economy. However, there is still great inheritance in many of the EU member countries under such privatization moves. These cases on Germany and France in EU give some suggestions to the recent economic policies in Japan under the globalization.
  • 宮本 光雄
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 285-308,439
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    Quo vadis Europa? When the Cold War ended and the EU accession of the East European countries seemed certain, it arose widely this very question in Europe. Now that the EU, having been enlarged eastwards and southwards, consists of twenty-five member states, everyone who is interested in European integration would give much consideration to what would result from the enlargement. This article does that through analysing the European and security policy of Poland, which is the most influential among the ten newcomers.
    In Poland people regard the EU as a good organisation for Poland to get a chance for better future, in expectation that it would give Poland a lot, especially economic and financial benefits, so the support of the people for the EU is always wide and solid.
    But there exists also a notion that the EU is dominated by two big member states, Germany and France. Accordingly the Polish government seeked in the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 to secure a “strong position” in the Union so as to be able to carry out its demand and not to be voted down easily, and succeeded in the end. Poland holds now a position of a “not easy to handle partner in the Union”, as foreign minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz formulated in the Sejm in January 2004. Consequently, a possibility is stronger than ever that a decision-making in the Council will become still more difficult, as a result of Polish sticking to its standpoint.
    Polish security policy is based first and foremost on bilateral relations with and the firm loyalty towards the USA. Looking upon Washington as the only reliable power in the world, Warsaw prefers NATO to CSDP. This inclination roots not only in realism but in precautious mentality against so-called franco-german dominance. In particular Poland tends to look at Germany with suspicion, because of its memories of the past.
    As for the future shape of Europe, the dominant Polish view is based on the intergovernmentalism. All the major political parties in Poland define the EU as the organisation of solidarnosc narodów (solidarity of the nations). The definition reminding us of that of Charles de Gaulle implies little supranational integration, so there won't be much initiative or activeness in the deepening of European integration on the part of the Polish government.
    That has been the case with the SLD government until recently, and so will be it with a new one led by PiS, the winner of the Sejm election in September 2005. Nevertheless, it must not be ignored that a geopolitical position could play a decisive role. Poland by self-definition, unlike Great Britain, is a European state and its future lies in Europe, which Poles themselves realize. Herein can be seen room for a chang of Warsaw's European policy.
    And, what is a noteworthy thing, Polish public opinion on foreign and security policy has been undergoing a fundamental change since the Iraq war began, that is, from enthusiastic Atlanticism to pro-Europeanism. Polish people these days is in favour of an autonomous European security power and Europe's role of a world player. Taking into consideration all the factors mentioned above, a conclusion could be drawn: Poland's accession to the EU would not contribute much to the deepening of European integration in the short or medium terms, but in the long run Poland could help the construction of “strong” Europe, aligning itself with big powers like Germany and France.
  • 高屋 定美
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 309-333,441
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper investigates for economic policy design in EMU, particularly for Stability and Growth Pact, SGP. Though the SGP was introduced for stabilization of fiscal policies in EMU, Some countries, that is, Portugal, France, Germany, and Italy have violated the pact since 2002. In 2005, the European Commission made modification of operating way of SGP, not basic reforms. However, the modification is thought to be not sufficient to stabilize the EMU in severe recession and/or regional economic disequilibrium.
    We, at first, examine the fiscal policy effects with common monetary policy by using concept of game theory, to conclude the need for fiscal policy coordination. Secondly, some suggestions as to SGP reform are reviewed for our proposal. Thirdly, our proposal of SGP reform is suggested. The proposal includes fiscal transfer among member countries in EMU, which strengths stabilization to asymmetry shocks.
  • 小野田 摂子
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 334-368,443
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the reunification, East Germany entered a period of social instability through the collapse of state economy, actually, it was not caused by the collapse of state socialism. The data of the invested money in factories, Treuhandanstalt, education, job security in Germany shows much evidence that the transformation of eastern Germany is still ongoing and in need of assistance and assessment. During this period of high unemployment and economic turmoil in Germany, a wholesale forced adaptation and re-masculination of labor have occurred. Furthermore, the allocation of training places and quality of ‘reform’ has considerably remained gender- and region-specific. The transformation policy, starting with the national project, has caused much greater differentials and disparity, especially, as a form of double standard. This provoked the disputes over financial affairs, distribution of wealth and structural unemployment in Germany.
    When two or more disputes overlap, the feelings of hostility and hate leave communities and the psyches of their members deeply traumatized. Viewed in a practical light, the existence of a gulf between the eastern-western disputants implies that new steps must be taken to bridge or fill this gap. To be sure, developed countries including Germany in EU era, possess certain means of mitigating troubles such as massive financial assistance. At the same time, however, they have always caused latent confrontations to surface because of their structural defects of capitalism.
    Developed countries in Europe have made a fortune and prosperity on the basis of unequal trade and/or certain differential systems. The most important problem is, however, when and how they do address the own structural reform in prosperity and build the welfare-oriented economic system. The problem of social changes and turbulence in Germany should not merely be regarded as the shifts from eastern to western, socialism to capitalism. Beyond this simplified aspect, we must see the essential proposition: community restructuring or community rehabilitation in Germany. Since, the parafisci, as the measures for establishment new relationship between eastern-western communities, as well as the common factors in European Union, have a possibility of overcoming the structural defects of conventional reform policy conducted by developed countries.
  • 河越 真帆
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 369-388,445
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The mutual relations between the European Union (EU) and its member-states have come to be termed “Europeanization”. This new European study agenda has been referred to widely in European political science literature. However, no common standard has been established for its definition, its analytical objectives and its approaches.
    Considering such these approaches, this paper firstly examines a historical overview of the studies of the Europeanization of the EU policy process, which contain both bottom-up and top-down perspectives. The former stands for the upload direction—how member states influence the EU—and the latter refers to the EU's download impacts on member states.
    This article then indicates that the Europeanization of the EU policy-process itself has theoretical problems: (1) divergent policy areas that are sector-based and differentiated by each member-state; (2) a normative division between EU and member-states competences (subsidiarity); and (3) European citizens who belong to both the EU and individual memberstates.
    Historically, the focus on the relations between the EU and memberstates has transferred from a bottom-up perspective to a top-down approach. The turning point could be observed in the 1990s when several European-wide dynamics emerged after the launch of the internal market. Since the 1990s, theoretical background has contributed to the development of Europeanization studies: the rediscovery of the importance of nation-states in EU studies; the introduction of a new institutional approach toward the policy-process; and the embrace of a governance approach. Here the author cites three representative papers: (a) “the Europeanization of national interest groups” by T. Tanaka (1984); (b) “Europeification” debate by S. S. Andersen and K. A. Eliassen (1993); and (c) “The Europeanization of national policy” by S. J. Bulmer and C. M. Radaelli (2005).
    However, none of those papers precisely responds to the questions mentioned above about divergent policy areas, subsidiarity, and European citizens. Among these three, the author evaluates the “Europeification” approach, because it includes the idea of power-sharing between the EC/EU and member-states for the understanding of subsidiarity and has more process-oriented concepts than the others.
  • 南 佳利
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 389-408,477
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article discusses the political role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in setting food policies and its limits. To play an active role, it must form a coalition with the European Commission, which monopolizes the ability to make propositions.
    This role has two aspects. The first is to present suggestions through judgment. Interpreting this judgment, the Commission makes proposals for legislation. This process is observed in the ‘mutual recognition principle’ introduced in the Cassis de Dijon Case (1979), or the ‘precautionary principle’ introduced in the BSE Case (1998). The second is to introduce principles that serve as a basis for case law, which put pressure on and constrain other institutions or Member States to agreement.
    However, this political role of the ECJ has limits. Firstly, the ECJ can neither make a judgment nor present a suggestion unless a suit is filed. Secondly, any judgment presented by the ECJ has no political power if the European Commission does not support it, as seen in the ‘Food labeling case’. Additionally, the organization of the European Food Safety Authority and the network surrounding it, responsible for forming food policies, has further excluded and diminished the influence of the ECJ.
    To investigate and maintain the political role of the ECJ, it is necessary to focus on its interdependence and coalition with other organizations.
  • 原田 徹
    2006 年 2006 巻 26 号 p. 409-415,449
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this book, scholars of comparative politics analyze political contestation concerning the European Union, using diverse sources of data, and examining a range of actors such as citizens, political parties, members of the European Parliament, interest groups, and social movements. The main purpose of this book is to investigate and to find some patterns of conflict in the EU.
    In the introduction, the editors present four hypothetical models. The following chapters, however, substantially focus on the examination of the validity of two competing models, the Hix-Lord model and the Hooghe-Marks model. These two models differently conceptualize some dimensions of contestation.
    One of them is the “EU-national dimension” ranging from more integration to less integration. The second one is the “socio-economic left/right dimension”, which is rooted in the basic conflicts that have shaped political life in Western Europe for many years. The third one is the “GAL-TAN dimension” ranging from the green/alternative/libertarian to the traditional/authoritarian/nationalism, which is tended to be submerged into the “socio-economic left/right dimension”. (GAL is fused into left and TAN into right.). So, the second and third dimensions form “single left/right dimension”. The core question throughout this book is whether the “EU-national dimension” and the “single left/right dimension” correlate or not.
    The Hix-Lord model assumes that the “EU-national dimension” and the “single left/right dimension” are schematically orthogonal, because national sovereignty issues are difficult to assimilate into the existing left/right pattern of contestation. Correspondingly, four alternative positions are feasible for different actors—left/more integration, left/less integration, right/more integration, and right/less integration.
    On the other hand, the Hooghe-Marks model assumes meaningful correlation between the two dimensions, that are not fused together. This model hypothesizes that the left who aims to regulate market at the European level, is likely to become more pro-European integration. In contrast, the right who wish to combine European-wide markets with minimal European regulation, are considered to be more skeptical of further European integration. Therefore, contestation in the EU is vaguely structured in two camps—Regulated capitalism (left+more integration) and Neoliberalism (right+less integration).
    Through the analysis of the following chapters, at the aggregate level, when treating European integration in general irrespective of policy field and nationality, the Hix-Lord model seems to be valid. For example, Chapter 5 (EP election manifest research) confirms that four alternative positions are historically observed for EP political groups.
    On the other hand, the validity of the Hooghe-Marks model is conditional. Especially, Chapter 6 reveals that only with individual market correcting policy fields such as environment, employment, and regional policy, center-left political parties (social democracy) in the member states support EU and right parties are skeptical. However, including other policy fields, and excluding a few far right parties, national political parties seem structure the dimension ranging from left/less integration to right/more integration. This means that the direction of correlation between the two dimensions assumed by this model is entirely opposite, therefore, the validity of this model is decisively denied. Moreover, Chapters 3 and 4 also present compelling evidence of the opposite correlation, showing that in redistributive welfare states it is the left that oppose further EU integration, whereas in liberal-residual welfare states it is the right.
    In the concluding chapter, Gary Marks, one of the inventors of this model and editors of this book, tries to find the condition
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