EU Studies in Japan
Online ISSN : 1884-2739
Print ISSN : 1884-3123
ISSN-L : 1884-3123
Volume 2007, Issue 27
Displaying 1-15 of 15 articles from this issue
  • Antonio MISSIROLI
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 1-14,321
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The paper focuses on the “crisis” that still affects the EU at large following the rejection of the so-called ‘Constitutional Treaty’ by French and Dutch voters in the spring of 2005. Such “crisis” is in part one of perception —both inside and outside the Union—and in part also one of direction, as it epitomises the difficulty of agreeing and delivering on policy for a Union of 25/27 members. Still, such a “crisis” has not prevented the EU from adopting a few important decisions on the domestic front and becoming an ever more active and visible player on the international scene.
    The paper recapitulates the main stages of the “crisis”, from the shaping of the final text (2002-04), to the shock of the referenda of May/June 2005, down to the ensuing “pause of reflection” and the establishment of a sort of ‘roadmap’ for tackling institutional reform (June 2006). It then analyses the sparse proposals for a solution to the “crisis” that have been put forward since September 2006 and the political context in which the debate has resumed lately, including the positions of some key players and member states' governments: the French presidential candidates, the new Dutch coalition, the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic and, of course, Germany, that holds the rotational presidency at a decisive moment for the future of “Constitutional” deal.
    Finally, it tries to evaluate the chances for a new arrangement that lie at the disposal notably of the German presidency in the run-up to the crucial European Council of 21-22 June 2007, taking into account the numerous unknowns that may still hamper a successful outcome—including the result of the French presidential and parliamentary elections of this spring.
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  • Toshiro TANAKA
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 15-28,323
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The year 2005 may be record in future as the European Union had turned a corner from the age of the Internal Market and the revival of new dynamism in European integration to the age of inward-looking and “enhanced cooperation”.
    The previous year, 2004 was full of rosy pictures on the developments of the EU. On May 1, ten states joined the EU and on October 29, the Treaty and the Final Act establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome.
    But, seven months later, the French and the Dutch voters rejected the European Constitutional Treaty. These events show that there are four dilemmas which the EU is now facing. The first is the dilemma between “neo-liberal Europe” and “social Europe”. The most important message of the “White Paper on Internal Market” of 1985 and “Single European Act” of 1986 was competition. However, the message of French voters and lesser extent in the case of Dutch voters was “no more social dumping with free movement of workers from less developed European countries” and more “social Europe”.
    The second is the dilemma of enlargement. To enlarge the area of peace, prosperity, stability and democracy to the rest of Europe will surely be good thing, but it will cost more for the existing members because rich countries like Switzerland and Norway stay away from the EU and possible candidates are relatively poorer. Bulgaria and Romania became member on January 1, 2007 to end the Fifth enlargement. But, further enlargement will be more delicate and more cautious issue especially for Turkey. With the rise of argument on the EU's absorption capacity, the EU may become less eager for enlargement in future.
    The Third is the dilemma of democracy. The more direct democracy for citizens, the more risk for the political leaders. Referendum is very democratic mean to hear voice of the citizens on the certain issue directly. But, at the same time, referendum is very risky mean, because the voters do not necessarily vote on the pros and cons of the specific issue. Once politicians rely on referendum, they cannot go forward without another referendum. France has to go to referendum on any European issue in future, including Turkey' entry to the EU.
    The fourth dilemma is unanimity or “enhanced cooperation”. There are some member states which want to deepen integration further but there are member states which do not want. The inclusions of “closer cooperation”, “enhanced cooperation” and “structured cooperation” seem to strengthen the deepening of integration but there are also tendency to strengthen national power by the mutual recognition of standards and use of Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
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  • Shigeyasu Osabe
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 29-54,325
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    After World War II, France defined the deepening and widening of European integration as its external identity and the establishment of “le modèle sociale français” as its internal one. But three political and social incidents that occurred consecutively during less than one year beginning in early summer 2005 have seriously damaged these two French identities.
    First, at the end of May 2005, the treaty of European Union could not finally be ratified when it was rejected in a French referendum by an unexpected massive “no” vote of 55 percent. Analyst of the “no” vote revealed that the opposition intended to defend at all cost “le modèle sociale français”, which means an isolationist declaration of shutting France off in its internal identity by abandoning its external one.
    Second, in late autumn 2005, violence exploded in the cities when immigrant youths in 200 suburbs throughout the country rioted during three weeks without any crying at all against the social model and more than ten thousands cars were burned. This desperate spasm flings the defeat of the republican integration model which forms one of fundamental pillars of “le modèle sociale français”.
    Third, in spring 2006, a new employment contract called CPE (Contrat Premier Embauch) for youth was announced, but it was dramatically derailed by massive demonstrations of students and furious insurgencies of immigrant youths. This event means the total defeat of “le modèle sociale français”. L'ESPRIT, the French opinion magazine of the Catholic left, described a chain of incidents as “the French September 11”. The French people seriously suffer from identity crises in this “French September 11”.
    Given the above, why has “le modèle sociale français” so clearly collapsed? How do these crises relate to an isolationist declaration proclaiming defense of “le modèle sociale” at all cost? What are the impacts on European future enlargement? I will clarify questions about the French social security system and its employment policies, focusing on unaccountable behaviors of statesmen as well as “les interectuells républicains” or “les élites éclairées”.
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  • The Roles of the Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament in the Making of the EU Response to the Global Threat of Terrorism
    Yasuji ISHIGAKI
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 55-74,327
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In the context of global efforts in combating terrorism, the European Union has developed a wide range of unique counter-terrorism law and measures which cover all the three pillars under the EU Treaty.
    The main features of the EU response to the global threat of terrorism would be summarized as follows:
    (1) A top political priority attached and most speedy action taken on its counter-terrorism measures.
    (2) Comprehensive multi-layer structure and uniqueness of the measures which include: i. Comprehensive policy measures such as Anti-Terrorism Action Plan, Declaration, Strategy; ii. Measures to freeze financial resources to terrorist groups; iii. Numerous Council Framework Decisions on terrorism, European Arrest Warrant, Joint investigating Teams, etc.; iv. Europol, Euroj ust, Police Chief's Task Force, Schengen Information Systems, EURODAC.
    (3) Close cooperation with the US.
    (4) Attempt to study the root causes of radicalization and recruitment of terrorists.
    (5) Acceleration of efforts in the wake of major terror incidents such as Madrid and London incidents.
    With regard to the roles of the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament in the process of making the EU counter-terrorism law and measures, the member states which have had the experiences of major terrorist incidents and have close ties with the US tend to be much keener than those which do not have such experiences. Some other countries which are mindful of basic human rights tend to take cautious attitude toward excessive counter-terrorism measures. The European Commission has been playing a principal role in preparing legislative proposals and action programs. On the other hand, the European Parliament, concerned over the infringements of human rights of EU citizens as result of excessive counter-terrorism measures, has been playing an important role in calling for utmost restraint and caution vis-a-vis the Commission and the Council on counter-terrorism measures.
    These different roles are clearly seen on such hot issues as (1) Data Retention, (2) Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement with the US, (3) alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners. In all those cases, the European Parliament has been playing a major role, as representative organ of EU citizens and upholder of EU human rights charter to warn against the infringements of human rights of EU citizens while the Commission and the Council taking counter-terrorism measures.
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  • Koji Fukuda
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 75-97,329
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    It had long been realized that for the EU to fulfill its mission of creating a “citizen's Europe”, higher levels of transparency and accountability would be essential. European Commission administrative reforms of the mid 1990's were not directly modeled on New Public Management (NPM) thinking, they were affected by their member states' NPM reform practices. The eventual resignation of the Santer Commission made a radical reform effort virtually inevitable. In 1999, the succeeding President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi appointed the vice president, Neil Kinnock (the UK Commissioner), to take charge of “European Governancei” reform using NPM guidelines with the intention of achieving administrative reforms and encouraging greater accountability
    Policy evaluation has already proved effective at eradicating bid rigging and political corruption and has helped to restore trust in the EU both among the Nation States' representative organs and the citizens themselves. Consequently the European Council's Laeken Declaration, 15 December 2001, stressed the need for the EU to create a Constitution as a way of achieving greater accountability and legitimacy. The policy evaluation element of NPM is considered to be another important method of enhancing democratization and efficiency in the policy-making processes of the EU. The specific objectives of this paper are as follows:
    Firstly, we will look at European governance reforms which have been introduced in the light of NPM thinking. Secondly, we will examine the history of the concept of Policy Evaluation and consider its definitions with regard to NPM reforms in the European Union. Thirdly, we will consider what kind of role is expected of policy evaluations in the EU, and the repercussions for accountability lines and links. We will analyze and summarize the EU's experiences of administrative reforms with regard to NPM and address the broader issues concerned with accountability, agencies and public management.
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  • Yoji KOYAMA
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 98-122,331
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU. Thus the EU enlarged itself southeastward. Beyond that there is a problem how to realize the EU accession of West Balkan countries. This paper discusses the prospect of EU accession as “external anchor”, which plays important role in stabilization and economic development of the West Balkans. This paper describes firstly, how Stabilization and Association process was launched and its concrete contents; secondly, present situations of economies of South Eastern Europe (SEE) and thirdly, achievement of each country in the Stabilization and Association process. Finally challenges for the West Balkans is discussed.
    The reason why the EU became earnest about the Balkan integration in the EU is because it was motivated by political necessity of stabilizing the SEE as a backyard of Europe. The Kosovo war in 1999 was a turning point in the EU's policy toward the SEE. To stabilize the region the EU felt it necessary to give SEE countries more positive prospect, that is, accession to the EU is not so distant future as far as these countries continue to make efforts.
    According to an optimistic prospect, after the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 Croatia and other countries of the West Balkans will be admitted to the EU one after another by 2015. However, the region still has the following difficult circumstances which do not allow such an optimistic prospect:
    (a) Structurally very fragile economies;
    (b) Problems such as weak state, weak rule of law, corruption, organized crime, etc.;
    (c) Ambiguity of the EU's policy toward the West Balkans;
    (d) Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of two Entities, and reconciliation among ethnic groups remains a serious challenge;
    (e) Kosovo, which has been originally an Autonomous Province of the Republic of Serbia, is now a de facto Protectorate of the UN, and there is a possibility of its independence;
    (f) Extraditions of war criminals to the ICTY.
    It may be said that the accession of the West Balkan countries and Turkey would impose heavy burden on the EU, being detrimental to the EU's future competitiveness. There seems to be some truth in a pessimistic view of Welfens who says, “Integration overstretch could be the end of the EU as a prosperous integration club” (Welfens, 2001, p. 94). Instead of enlargement, he recommends the EU to offer attractive association status to Turkey and some countries in the Balkans, and he stresses a necessity for internal effort toward deepening of the integration.
    However, the EU has already announced, “countries of the West Balkans are potential candidates” (European Council in Feira in June 2000) and “the future of the West Balkans is in the EU” (the European Council in Brussels in March 2003). If the EU attaches more importance to the cohesion of the existing members and discontinue the integration of the West Balkans it would contradict the EU's commitment to countries of the West Balkans and increase dissatisfaction among people in the region, fueling disputes. Therefore, it would be impossible for the EU to withdraw its goal easily. I think that the EU should continuously support economic development of West Balkan countries and promote intraregional cooperation of the region. Bigger assistance should be provided according to efforts made in overcoming parochial nationalism in each country.
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  • An essay on a possibility of a “Citizens' Initiative” compared with other traditional forms of citizens' participation
    Yuko HOSOI
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 123-147,333
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Although the ratification of the European Constitution has not yet been successful, it is still the attempt to design a democratic system that the EU has ever tried. This essay focuses on Article 46.4., which provides that no less than one million citizens coming from a significant number of Member States may invite the Commission to submit appropriate proposals on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution. This paper tries to analyze how this new form of citizens' participation could contribute toward enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the EC compared with the other traditional forms, that is, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and informal lobbying for the European Commission.
    This paper is divided into three sections. First, this paper surveys the theories to grip and conceptualize legislative processes in the EU/EC which is often described as sui generis polity. As a result, this paper is based on multilevel network governance as analytical framework. According to this policy networks are formed taking in both governmental and non-governmental actors, and the actors who don't have beneficial resources are excluded from these networks.
    Second, the notion of democratic legitimacy in the EC should be defined before analyzing the significance of Citizens' Initiative. This paper indicates that the conventional EU studies have had a tendency to discuss this subject only from “in-put” or “by the people” theory. This paper explains the importance of considering democratic legitimacy from “out-put” or “for the people” theory as well. In other words, it is also important to seriously consider how citizens could get intimately involved in the process of drafting bills by the European Commission in which numerous actors formally and informally access the policy networks.
    Finally, from that point of view, each traditional form of citizens' participation is surveyed in order to specify how well a Citizens' Initiative provides chances for the people to participate. The ESC has had a major problem of proportional representation. Not everyone can successfully lobby, nevertheless the European Commission is quite open to lobbyists. In conclusion, this paper tries to show that a Citizens' Initiative would be more user-friendly and that it could contribute to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EC in a sense that more people can participate in the legislative processes.
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  • Free circulation of capitals and Freedom of establishment
    Hiromi UEDA
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 148-166,335
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper presents a legal study of M & A between the energy enterprises in the European Union. Generally, the national interest is negative in the internal market, but toward the liberalization of European Energy Market in 2007, we can find some conflicts between the national interests, namely “Patriotisme economique”, for example the M & A for Suez (France). We study that the fundamental freedom of EU laws, —free circulation of capitals and freedom of establishment—, has a certain effect on such conflicts between the member states.
    In the merger plan between Suez and Gaz de France (GDF), there is two points at issue: the European concurrence law and the fundamental freedom of EC treaty. For the first point, the Commission approved their merger plan on November 14, 2006 after examination by EU merger regulation (Regulation 139/2004). For the second point, the French Decret No. 2005-1739 has an indirect influence on their merger plan.
    This paper analyzes the EU legal system by the points of M & A. Against the national interest in the internal market, we have the merger regulation (139/2004), the take over bids directive (2005/56/EC) and the European Company regulation (2157/2004) etc., and also many case laws of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
    The first part explains the harmonization of the practice of take over bids in the members states and the transposition of the directive 2005/56/EC in France, where is the scene of merger between of Suez and GDF. This directive regulates the practice of take over bids in the position of liberalism, but the article 12 of this directive gives the reciprocity for the defense against take over bids. In consequence the member states could be protectionist. France has chosen this article 12 and can protect French national company from the menace of take over bids by foreign investors and/or companies.
    The second part analyzes the case laws of ECJ concerning Free circulation of capitals and Freedom of establishment. If the specific shares (Golden Shares) are issued for the defense against take over bids, it seems to violate Free circulation of capitals (Art. 56 EC) and Freedom of establishment (Art. 43 EC). On June 4, 2002, ECJ pronounced that the French case (C-438/99) and the Portuguese case (C-367/98) violated the fundamental freedom of EC treaty, but the Belgian case (C-503/99) was justified by the clear criteria of objection. On June 2, 2005, ECJ pronounced that the Italian national law limiting the voting right for certain foreign shareholders of energy company, violated the free circulation of capitals (C-174/04).
    In conclusion, this paper states that the question of national interest remains to be solved in the European energy politics and the M & A for national company. The common interest in the Community should continuously be pursued by 27 member states of EU, including Bulgaria and Romania.
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  • At the Time of the Fifth Enlargement of the European Union
    Hideaki TADA
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 167-190,337
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    At the time of the fifth enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004, the competition rules of the European Community underwent the most fundamental and significant changes since they came into existence in 1958, both in terms of substantive and procedural rules. These unprecedented changes, called “modernisation” by the European Commission, are characterised by abolishing the prior notification system under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and introducing the decentralised enforcement regime under the new procedural regulation (Council Regulation No 1/2003). The Regulation provides a system under which the competition rules are enforced in co-operation by the Commission and the national competition authorities (NCAs) on the one hand, and by the Commission and national courts on the other.
    This paper first summarises the background to the introduction of the decentralised enforcement regime, followed by a discussion of the related rules under Regulation 1/2003. It then analyses the decentralised system from a statistical view point, as well as in the light of other related rules (including a series of the Commission notices). The author concludes that the new regime has, until now, worked relatively well under the European Competition Network, composed of the Commission and the NCAs. In fact, some 500 cases were handled under the Network during the first 2 years and 7 months, yet no conflicting cases have been reported.
    However, it is too early to conclude that the current system leaves nothing to be desired; indeed there remain several questions to be answered. First, the Commission and NCAs are requested to interpret and apply the competition rules in a consistent manner throughout the Common Market. In this regard, it is expected that a uniform leniency programme will be adopted by all NCAs in the near future in order to provide all undertakings with the same opportunity of immunity from fines regardless of the first national competition authority which they report to. Second, the importance of the accountability and legitimacy of the enforcement of the competition rules should not be overlooked under the decentralised regime, where a number of different authorities are, by their nature, liable to be isolated from democratic or parliamentary control.
    It is hoped that the new decentralised regime will surmount the above obstacles and realise the effective enforcement of the competition rules throughout the enlarged Union.
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  • Shin KANEKO
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 191-207,339
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In 1990, Germany was reunited. The new Federal republic of Germany (FRG) became a member state of the EC and the NATO. This event was the final achievement of the “Westintegration” of the whole Germany. In fact, it was the highest goal of the former FRG, West Germany, which was an original member of the European integration and which had gained membership in the NATO in 1955. This article deals with “Westintegration” of the (former) FRG under the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in relation to the German unification. It examines how and why Adenauer tried to integrate the FRG into the “Euro-Atlantic Community” during the crucial years, 1953-1955.
    “Westintegration” and the German unification were not antinomy to each other. All the following Political aims had to be achieved in the liberal democratic Western World: the European integration, the membership in the NATO, and the German unification. In other words, “Westintegration” needed to be compatible with the German unification, and “Westintegration” of the whole Germany had to be accomplished. In this regards, the European Defense Community (EDC) project was the most important but just a first step to integrate Germany into “Euro-Atlantic Community” and to recover its sovereignty in the free world.
    Why was the EDC important? Adenauer disliked the military framework of the EDC. However he needed EDC because this project contained the further plans to make the political integration (EPC). Moreover, EDC membership had to lead NATO membership in his recognition. European integration and Western alliance were inseparable basis of “Euro-Atlantic Community”. “Only in ‘Euro-Atlantic Community’, economic wealth, political stability, military security, and ideal unification will be achieved”. This “Confession of faith” was the main justification to adhere to EDC and to gain broad public support to Adenauer's foreign policy, “Politik der Stärke” (“Policy of Power”).
    In 1953, Adenauer reacted against the detente policy of post-Stalin Soviet government and behaved negatively to the Allied Four Power talks proposed by Churchill's Britain. For Adenauer who desired the realization of the EDC, the final failure of the EDC in August 1954 wasa terrible misfortune. Nevertheless in 1955, the FRG could gain membership in the NATO and welcomed new integration plan in Messina. These events of 1955 were just half, but precious steps of German integration into the “Euro-Atlantic Community”.
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  • Single Market of Genetically Modified Crops and the Member States
    Jun INOUE
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 208-224,341
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Scholars recognize that policy-making at the European level affects implementation at the domestic level and vice versa. The recognition and the fact that the Commission of the European Union has the exclusive rights to suggest policies in the area of market integration (the area of the “EC”) make it essential to examine domestic politics when we understand member states' response to the EC policy-making/implementation.
    Existing research which focus on domestic policy have pointed out some domestic factors such as veto points, formal institutions and political cultures. However, their comparative studies beyond “pillars” failed to show a particular order of significance among them. So, this article focuses on the market integration (“EC” area) and tries to order domestic factors that affect the member states' responses to the EC policy-making/implementation. This article chooses agricultural biotechnology (genetically modified crops) as the case study and examines domestic politics by comparing four member states (Austria, the United Kingdom, France and Germany).
    The Commission of the European Union pushed member states for authorizations of the genetically modified crops to create the single market in this area. Member states' attitudes toward authorizations depended on three domestic factors: the first and the most important is the national industrial structures; the second is the political institutions such as the lines of the government/party in power, the trends of the parliament and the existence of other formal political institutions; the third is the existence of actors that affect national policies through the political institutions.
    For example, a pro-biotechnology country and an export country of agricultural products were for genetically modified crops, and a country of organic agriculture was against them. Those attitudes could be (could not be) overridden when the other attitude was (was not) aggregated through the political institutions such as biotechnology committees or national petition. A strong aggregation through political institutions implies that some actors play important role for it.
    Single market project is an incessant process to catch up the development of the economy. Ordering the significance among domestic factors will contribute to an evaluation of status quo of market integration in a certain area and to a prospect of completion of the single market in the area.
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  • Takuma OBASE
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 225-241,343
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    An overview of the development of the EU shows that the position of individuals in the Community legal order has been strengthened in deapth and widened in scope in the course of integration. Before the treaty revision by Maastricht Treaty, the individuals had been conceptualized as “market citizen”. Under the present EC Treaty, they are vested with EU citizenship which is characterized by the ECJ as the “fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States”. This paper examines if the basic freedoms of the EU internal market (free movement of goods, workers, services and capital) are to be seen as a converged single set of rights, or alternatively if the basic freedoms relating to the movement of persons are diverging under the influence of the emerging law of EU citizens.
    To this point, convergence theory has been advocated since 1990's. This theory tries to show convergence by extracting common features of basic freedoms such as direct effect, cross-border relevance, intervention in the protected freedom, justification grounds and application of proportionality principle. Nevertheless, it is liable to risk of oversimplificaion to the extent that the intervention in the protected freedom is understood simply as restriction. The basic idea underlying the prohibition of restrictive measures is removal of double regulatory burden of the exporting/home state and the importing/host state. It indicates that the scope of the convergence theory is limited to the extent that the market access from one Member State to another Member State is relevant.
    The scope of free movement provisions is wider than that covered by the convergence theory, because the issue of basic freedoms is not exhausted to the market access. In this remaining area, the development of EU citizen's freedom to move and reside within the EU is of importance to the basic freedoms. Considering its constitutional character, the EU citizenship has potential to guide the interpretation of the provisions concerning the right of individuals. It is true that the EU citizen's free movement right is subsidiary to the basic freedoms. However, the crossfertilization between the EU citizenship and the basic freedoms relating to cross-border movement of persons shows that the case-law of the ECJ is guided by an overreaching principle that the persons exercising the right of free movement have the right to protection in the territory of the host state. This paper argues from the foregoing that there are diverged two groups of case-law, namely those concerning the cross-border market access and those concerning the protection of citizens for the integration into the society of the host state.
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  • Through the pros and cons of application of ‘country of origin’ principle by the proposed ‘Services Directive’
    Toru HARADA
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 242-266,345
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This article focuses upon the concepts of ‘services of general economic interest (SGEI)’ or ‘services of general interest (SGI)’, which correspond to public services in the EU, then, investigates the policy-making process of so-called ‘Services directive’. In that process, political actors debated about pros and cons of application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI or SGI.
    Through this investigation, I observe that once the key committee (Internal market and consumer protection) in the European Parliament (=EP) approved application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI, however, about 3 months later, at the crucial voting stage of EP plenary session, the application was substantially watered down by compromise between the center-right (EPP-ED) and the center-left (PSE) EP parties. This compromise was largely produced by the formation of new national coalition government in Germany. Because of this conversion, the attempted radical introduction of market mechanism into SGEI or SGI through ‘Services directive’ was definitely avoided.
    As for the constellation of political conflict about public services in the EU, I find three points. Firstly, conventional confrontation between left and right is significantly formed at EU economic policy dimension as the cleavage between the center-right and the center-left EP parties. Mainly, as confirmed by consistency of Evelyne Gebhardt's protectionist approach to SGEI or SGI, the positive differentiation by PSE against EPP-ED brings about this cleavage. However, EPP-ED also intensified the cleavage when it aligned with Liberal party at the voting stage of the key committee in the EP.
    Second, some national political parties' positions expected by their affiliated EP parties are distorted by their domestic condition. On the one hand, national center-left parties from United Kingdom, Spain, Hungary, and the other center and eastern new member states, hoped application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI or SGI. On the contrary, UMP, French center right party supported Gebhardt's protectionist approach very positively, and sudden conversion of German CDU caused by the formation of national coalition government with SPD can be included in this kind of distortion.
    Thirdly, there is ‘east-west’ cleavage between new and old member states. Especially, regardless of their affiliated national parties between center-left and center-right, most deputies from center and eastern new member states were at heart eager for the application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI or SGI, which were opposed, for example, by French political parties, irrespective of center-left or center-right.
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  • Searching for Commonalities
    Olena MYKAL
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 267-296,347
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Nowadays, the European Union and Japan pursue the concept of human security with its stress on coping with the threats to human lives on global scale. Adopted in 1998 by Japan and in 2003 by the European Union human security concept provides much visibility, credibility and identity to both actors and allow them to define common security agenda.
    It is therefore useful to study —admitting the human aspect of security— what differences and commonalities exist in the security policies of both actors and try to explore what can be done in order to diminish differences and strengthen commonalities that could foster Japan-EU security cooperation. In other words, the paper examines, firstly, the EU's security policy in the post-Cold War period; secondly, Japanese security policy in the same period; thirdly, Japan-EU cooperation in security sphere proceeding from the findings made previously (analysis of Japan's and EU's security policies); lastly, it distinguishes and focuses on the common points that can be developed in future as a core of the partnership in security sphere.
    Inasmuch as the paper is not aimed at finding differences and similarities between the notions of “civilian power, ” “human security, ” and also widely used definition of “soft power, ” for the purpose of the present study it is sufficient to note that they do not contradict but rather complement each other. It should be also noted that the crises of the 1990s, in particular in the Balkans, brought about a new type of internal, complex crisis in which the international community had to cope with failed states. Traditional forms of peacekeeping as such did not provide adequate tools for handling the new challenges. Military presence could help to create a secure environment, but it could not re-build a society with its infrastructure, basic services and administration. Therefore, a coordinated civilian action had to be introduced as a way to alleviate human emergencies and stabilize situation in crisis areas. Such kind of civilian assistance from outside a crisis area is now referred to as non-military or civilian crisis management. Therefore, in the paper “non-military” refers to civilian actions aimed at stabilization of situation in crises, conflict areas.
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  • its concept, process and aspects of the European integration
    Yoko Wadachi
    2007 Volume 2007 Issue 27 Pages 297-319,349
    Published: August 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Environmental integration means making sure that environmental concerns are fully considered in the decisions and activities of other sectors. The importance of integration has been acknowledged since 1980's (i. e. the 3rd Environmental Action Programme) and has been stressed in the sustainable development discourses since 1990's. The 5th EAP established this objective as a priority.
    The European Council in June 1998 decided to launch the Cardiff process, requiring different Council formations to integrate environmental considerations into their respective activities. As the relevant sectoral Councils established their own strategies, started the progress and submitted their reports, the Cardiff process has contributed to raising the political profile of integration.
    According to article 6 of the EC Treaty, the Cardiff process is considered to be one process for implementing the sustainable development and is one of the most important principles in the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) of 2001, but is not subsumed into the EU SDS. The Cardiff process and the 6th EAP set a wider environmental framework than the EU SDS.
    The stocktaking paper of this process was submitted in 2004. It showed the positive results and also pointed to negative ones: A general lack of consistency; Political commitment could be strengthened; Delivery, implementation and review mechanisms can be improved; Clearer priorities and focus are needed. And the complementary measures are required to ensure the effectiveness of the process at the community level and the national level.
    To improve the environment through the environmental integration, the further coordination and cooperation is needed among the sectors, the actors and the levels of government continuously, which will probably pose new problems concerning the EU governance. However, the environmental integration is indispensable for sustainable development and is promoted especially in the economic fields now.
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