As is said “Favorite Brussels phrase: global player”, the EU has endeavored to increase its own voice and influence in the world. In this paper, I will inquire into the image of the EU as a Global Actor mainly from the standpoint of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). I will inspect 4 requirements for a global actor as followed: Firstly, I will examine the problem of consistency. Since 1970 when the European Political Cooperation (EPC) started, the EU has paid attention for consistency between the EC/EU and EPC/CFSP to avoid structural dichotomy and inconsistency among various external policies of the EC/EU. At last under the Lisbon Treaty the EU succeeded in abolishing the structure of so called‘three pillars’. And yet, by the same treaty, EU acquired legal personality for the first time as the natural result of abolishment of the pillars. But I feel there remains some dichotomy even now. Secondly, as for the identity of the EU, Charlotte Bretherton/John Vogler point out two aspects: the EU as a value-based community and the EU as fortress (an exclusive actor). On the context, since 1990’s, the EU has developed the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). On the one side, the EU works for a civilian or normative power and aims to promote European values such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and so on. On the context, in the field of ESDP/CSDP, the EU attaches importance to the image of a civilian power on the rules of ‘Berlin plus’ and ‘Petersberg tasks’ which have been established as a product of compromise between the EU and the USA. On the other hand, the EU has an aspect of ‘fortress Europe’. Sometimes the EU demonstrates its identity, purposely struggling for American values such as the Kyoto Protocol, abolishment of death penalty, the International Criminal Court, the Iraq war and so on. Thirdly, as for the institutional aspec of the CFSP/CSDP, the EU set up the post of the high representative for the CFSP since the Amsterdam Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty the EU strengthened its role essentially as a EU foreign minister, and the EU established the European External Action Service (EEAS) which is equivalent to the EU Foreign Ministry. But the EEAS is not free from several restraints. Fourthly, as for the civilian and military operations under the ESDP/CSDP, the EU has deployed 31missioins sihce 2003. I will point out several characteristics among them. Finally I will refer to the future of the CFSP/CSDP. According to Charlotte Bretherton/JohnVogler, lately ‘a new debate has arisen precisely, worrying that the EU might step forward to some kind of a military alliance as a result of the development of the military missions under the CSDP. But the CSDP is not intended to be engaged in territorial defence. The EU never aims to have an integrated European army, but to contribute to the settlement of conflicts as a civilian power through the Petersberg Tasks under the framework of Berlin plus. I am sure there is almost no possibility the EU missions may lead the EU to any kind of a military entity.
The global environment in which the EU and other actors are constituted has changed significantly over the past twenty years, as the international system of the 16th century gives way to the global life of multipolarity. What this change suggests is that such widespread global transformations necessitate a rethinking of both power and actorness in global politics. This article argues that in a more global era the understanding of normative power, including the EU’s normative power, is more vital than ever. This globalising, multilateralising and multipolarising era requires a reconsideration of the nature of power and actorness and the theorisation of ‘normative justification’ in this context. This reconsideration is necessary because processes of globalisation have empowered transnational actors such as global credit ratings agencies; because multilateralising processes have empowered international fora such as the G20; and because multipolar processes have empowered emerging actors such as the BRICS. Second, the global era requires a reassessment by rethinking the nature of power, in particular because the breaking old dichotomies of ‘hard power’ vs. ‘soft power’ demands the reintroduction of an ideational dimension in the form of normative power. Here a discussion of ‘normative justification’ in action is useful in illustrating a rethinking of nature of power. Third, within this context of power and actors the article rethinks actorness because new global actors such as transnational movements, regional organisations, global governors, and emerging economies demand new thinking on how these actors are constituted through their use of new forms of power. Finally, the article argues that in this global era, the rethinking of power and actorness are crucial aspects of understanding the EU and understanding normative power in global politics.
This paper points out several challenges encountered in the process for integrating the EU’s development cooperation policy into its comprehensive external policy, which aims to ensure “consistency” of the EU’s external action. The Lisbon Treaty provides the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS was intended as a single institution to cover all of the EU’s external policies, including its development cooperation policy, at the beginning of the establishment process. Some actors of the EU who were concerned with the development cooperation, however, have expressed disapproval of the full integration. Why have they refused to accept the original establishment plan for the EEAS? What has made the full integration complicated? These questions are answered through evidence-based explanations in the following three sections. First, the EU’s external policy contains various policies with different forms in terms of the governance. The different settings in the policy making and implementation seem to restrict the development of the EU’s consistent external policy. Second, the debate on the establishment of the EEAS revealed the difficulty of bridging the gap between the development cooperation policy and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Several issues disputed at the debate were undoubtedly influential in the power balance of the actors such as the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. And third, the institutional reform of the EU’s development cooperation policy in the 2000s brought a significant change in the policy implementation. The new structure is marked by the devolution of authority and the cooperation with NGOs. It has raised further challenges for the collaboration between the EEAS and the public/private actors urging the EU’s development cooperation. In conclusion, the findings show that the EU is confronted with institutional, political and structural challenges, namely the divergent decision-making procedures, the power struggles and the EEAS’s inadequate competence for policy implementation. These challenges complicate the full integration of the EU’s development cooperation policy into its comprehensive external policy. Hereafter whichever option, the full integration or the equal separation, is taken finally, the EU needs to elaborate an institutional and political system in which ensuring the consistency makes the aid effective.
The European Union has carried out its own human rights diplomacy although it is comprised of plural nation states and has unique political powers. The track records show that it could act as a human rights promoter in the United Nations which is organized globally. It has also attempted to stress democracy and human rights norms by introducing conditionalities in many different kinds of bilateral relations. The specific historical progress which has achieved a lasting peace among the European nations and the collective consciousness which can be called a “European identity” can be considered as sources for such diplomatic practice peculiar to the EU. Its image as a civilian power and the active approach including the abolition of the death penalty and the making of the Charter of Fundamental Rights also would be good examples for sources that justify the EU diplomacy to prompt human rights. It seems the EU has furnished these sources over many years. The EU is an organization for international integration laying a special emphasis on economic affairs while leaving political multipolarity. Such structure can be seen as a foundation which brings these sources up. Moreover, this article indicates that there would be some factors which limit the EU diplomacy to promote norms of human rights. Such factors could include a wide variety of double standard, intolerance for non-European countries and unsatisfactory internal records of human rights protection. The viewpoint of these sources and factors provides an opportunity to consider the EU’s previous practices, although most available policies to effectual such practice may run out. Therefore it will be added to concern that how the EU as an institution can specialize good practices and continue them.
This article analyzes various environmental clauses incorporated in the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) concluded by the EU from the perspective of “fragmentation” and “multilateralisation.” While the surge of FTAs leads to a risk of causing fragmentation stemming from the divergence in the interpretations of provisions in the FTAs and those stipulated by the World Trade Organization (WTO), it holds the potential of creating new multilateral provisions through the multilateralisation of advanced bilateral rules. The EU, one of the hubs in the web of FTAs, plays a critical role in these processes. In order to examine the potential of processes, environmental clauses were selected for study since these clauses tend to vary among the agreements. Currently, the environmental clauses in the WTO are limited to the general exception clauses or similar provisions. Therefore, many countries, including the EU, place high hopes on the FTAs when developing environmental clauses. When incorporating environmental clauses in its FTAs, the EU introduces provisions relating to: ⒜ general exceptions; ⒝ prohibition of encouragement of trade by reducing the level of environmental protection; ⒞ encouragement of high levels of environmental protection; ⒟ the relationship with Multilateral Environmental Agreements; ⒠ adoption of international standards; ⒡ the precautionary principle; and ⒢ environmental goods and services. All but ⒜ are additional to the WTO (WTO-extra) and ⒟ to ⒢ are pioneering provisions in the sense that other counties’ FTAs do not contain such rules or even provide for them in a modest way. These additional provisions constitute the context of general exception clauses, thereby promoting diversification of the interpretation of the clauses in the FTAs and the WTO. Findings reveal that the EU is steadily expanding the scope of environmental clauses in its FTAs. Furthermore, some of those WTO-extra environmental provisions are also adopted in the FTAs concluded by other countries, encouraging a propensity for multilateralisation. However, other EU-specific provisions are likely to promote fragmentation of rules. Accordingly, while the EU’s FTAs would contribute to the advancement of environmental clauses in trade agreements, they also contain some risks for creating the situation that disputes are not settled effectively owing to the incoherence of rules between the FTAs and the WTO. Therefore, the EU must be cautious in establishing environmental clauses when these clauses are unlikely to be extended multilaterally.
When the Lisbon Treaty negotiations started in the spring of 2007, an intense dispute arose over the legal status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. While most states agreed on conferring legally binding force to the Charter, three states―the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic―expressed opposition to it. Amid the conflicting opinions, the Member States eventually worked out one political compromise: the Charter was to be given binding status but, in exchange, a ‘Protocol on the Application on the Charter’ was drawn up for these states. The Protocol, which is often referred to as on ‘opt-out’ or ‘exemption’ from the application of the Charter, is currently applied to the UK and Poland, and the Czech Republic is also to join them later. Why did these three states oppose a legally binding Charter in the Lisbon Treaty negotiations? Their opposition is puzzling given that, back in 2004, these three states had accepted a legally binding Charter. Existing studies and newspapers report that domestic concerns these three states had led them to oppose the Charter. But, domestic factors are arguably not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of why they opposed the Charter. The Charter was designed to codify the existing judicial practices of fundamental rights protection within the EU without amending the current competences of the EU. With such a guarantee, there should have been few concerns about the Charter. The purpose of this article is to examine why these states opposed the Charter in the Lisbon Treaty negotiations. To this end, it stresses the need to look not only at domestic factors but also at EU level factors. EU level factors, which are considered in this article, refer to activities of the EU institutions, such as the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Empirical examination shows that the activities of the EU institutions or behaviours of some members of EU institutions came into play as additional factors which strengthened concerns in these states about the Charter or which deepened their scepticism towards the EU. Therefore it is argued that, in combination with domestic factors, EU level factors, albeit in varying degrees and in different forms, were also involved in their opposition to the Charter.
One main concern about the EU’s democratic deficit is no-demos problem. Supra-nationalists argue that European citizens can constitute a European demos, intergovermentalists refute that. However, the theories of demoi-cracy claim the EU rests on the plurality of demoi (plural form of demos). In this paper, I analyse these theories in terms of boundary problem in democratic theory which re-examines the basis for defining the boundaries of democracy. The main questions are: Does demoi-cracy exclude the third country nationals in the EU? If not, how to include them? And what is the normative foundation for the inclusion? The paper starts with reviewing Cheneval’s Rawlsian demoi-cratic theory which he calls ‘multilateral democracy’. Using Rawlsian original position, he proposes the principles of demoi-cracy. Subsequently, it examines Besson’s deterritorialized demoi-cracy. Her argument is based on affectedness. Although both Cheneval and Besson commit republicanism and deliberative democracy, they differ in terms of the normative foundation for the inclusion of third country nationals. Cheneval gives great weight to the self-determination of statespeoples i.e. nations, and their reciprocity. According to his theory of demoi-cracy, the third country nationals are not included in the original position, but by liberal democratic states and universal deliberation. This demoi-cracy does not offer the foundations for the inclusion of third country nationals. Moreover, it risks the exclusion of them because the EU citizens and the third country nationals are legitimately different political subject. Besson, by contrast, focuses on affected interest irrespective of nationality. However, I argue that she doesn’t offer satisfactory legitimation of the inclusion of third country nationals from the perspective of demoi-cracy. Her theory gaps polity’s reciprocity and individual inclusion. In conclusion, I argue the theories of demoi-cracy still confuse state as nation with as territory, so they should revisit state as ‘territory’ seriously.
The purpose of EPC, launched in 1970, was to coordinate foreign policies among the Member States of the European Community by ensuring mutual understanding on the international problems through regular exchange of information and consultations, strengthening their solidarity by harmonizing their views…. The question is why the need to strengthen their solidarity through mutual understanding among the Six arose in the midst of détente? Moreover, why did it happen almost simultaneously with the achievement of British accession to the EC? The reasons can be considered along the two aspects: the way EPC was taking shape under the circumstances of détente, and the way British diplomatic attitude was involved in the formation and the progress of EPC. It is obvious that both aspects were closely interrelated, and promoted by the two different forces of détente, between the two Superpowers, and between the East and the West on the European continent. Because of American indifference toward the problems of Europe, the UK and the Six became active in the formation of European détente where they put emphasis on the Western value of the freedom of movement, against the Eastern insistence on the status quo. As a result, EPC became a driving force in promoting European détente. In contrast to the general understanding of British negative attitude toward supranational European integration, this study presents a different view that the UK is a positive and active participant rather than an observer in the process of European integration in the sphere of Foreign Policy as an intergovernmental character. First, in order to discuss the formation of EPC, the failure of French attempt, early in 60s, to pursue European political framework excluding the UK, is surveyed, while Atlantic attitude of British policies are examined. Secondly, the process of convergence among the UK, France and West Germany, early in 70s, in terms of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is examined. The process indicates the formation of Western approach, through which the importance of EPC as a vehicle of the European détente policy became eminent as compared to NATO. Finally, the process of the confirmation of EPC leading to the Single European Act is surveyed. In the process, British positive approach toward the establishment of European Foreign Policy is examined by analyzing its proposal for the Policy.
The Euro Crisis that started in 2009 has led many to argue that fiscal unification is necessary for monetary unification to work. This paper argues that fiscal unification is not sufficient to secure stable prosperity. The problem is wider than the fiscal aspects of the economy. The euro crisis resulted from asymmetries, in particular asymmetries with respect to structural reform, which remained within the Euro Area. “Asymmetry” is a term used by economists to describe a characteristic that exists in one country but not in the other. Fixed exchange rates and single currencies do not coexist well with asymmetries. This is because exchange rates change when market participants buy one foreign currency and sell another, and such transactions happen because of asymmetries. With or without the Euro, the European economies are not going to enjoy sustainable prosperity without convergence towards fiscal consolidation and high productivity. For such a convergence to take place, member states must undertake painful structural reforms. The euro was supposed to induce such reforms, by taking away the easy options of monetary and fiscal expansion. The European Central Bank is the one central bank for the entire euro area, and the aim of its policy is price stability. The deficit and debt reference values of the Maastricht Treaty were carried over as the Stability and Growth Pact. As it turns out, however, these monetary and fiscal constraints were not enough to ensure convergence towards fiscal and economic health in the Euro Area. To encourage member states to take the necessary measures towards convergence, the European Union (the Euro Area in particular) has now embarked on a major governance overhaul. It is possible to describe this as a large step towards interference in domestic policy-making. The European Banking Union is one aspect of this governance reform. The EU is the first region of the world that is simultaneously tackling all of the following basic contradictions: 1. fiscal consolidation and economic upturn, 2. financial regulation and active financial intermediation, 3. sovereignty and integration. As the EU moves forward, how well will the EU strike a balance between the two extremes for each of these basic contradictions? The rest of the world has a lot to learn from this process. In this paper, we first confirm that asymmetries remained within the Euro Area, and that lack of fiscal unification was not the only problem. In doing so, we briefly turn our eyes to the United States to emphasise that fiscal unification alone cannot ensure stability. Next, we review the extensive governance overhaul taking place in Europe, and stress the importance of ensuring that the different fiscal rules are mutually consistent. In closing we discuss the tasks ahead.
Euro crisis has made a stronger impact on the financial market, on the back of the emergence of sovereign risk and concern for a financial system crisis. In this paper, I will first summarize how euro crisis has evolved and how the financial market has been affected by it so far, for the purpose of keeping a record of facts. I will then point out the nature of sovereign risk observed in the financial market, such as rating migration and negative feedback loop with concern for a financial system crisis, by focusing on some of the key drivers behind sovereign risk premium.
It has been questioned whether the single currency system in the EU works without a federal budget and an automatic stability mechanism. To this problem, the EMU has responded theoretically and offered a plan for fiscal integration. The object of this article is to analyze the ideas of the EMU and to investigate the way forward toward European fiscal integration. This article consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the way fiscal discipline for the member states is set without losing economic stability. Both fiscal discipline and an automatic stability mechanism are attained by covering structural deficit. The new fiscal pact in the EMU has made use of this theoretical investigation. It is meaningful that this pact links the economic stability of the member states and the common governance of the union to their budgets. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether this pact is able to respond sufficiently to the short-term recession. A fiscal transfer system would solve the problem. Chapter 2 discusses the way such a transfer system would be established in the EMU. First, a fiscal transfer system is needed because the national fiscal policy of a member state is not able to make the automatic stability mechanism effective in the case of a recession arising from fiscal discipline. This transfer system works as an automatic adjustment mechanism to offset a non-symmetrical shock. Second, the fund to support such a mechanism is formed by the member states which are able to afford to finance it. Financial transfers based on the fund present a centralized system. Third, this kind of fund is the rescue fund in the EMU and designated as the ESM. Besides, the EMU is ready to promote a fiscal union with a banking union. Chapter 3 discusses the way European fiscal integration should be made to progress from the viewpoint of fiscal federalism. First, cooperative federalism as a model of European fiscal integration should be desired over competitive federalism. The former assumes the equivalence of competence among partners and therefore requires the redistribution of funds. To make such a redistribution possible, a certain centralization is necessary. Second, the EU has executed the redistribution of wealth with a structural fund. The EU has insisted on the reinforcement of so1idarity between regions and directed structural policy. Third, to what degree Germany and France, playing the main role for such a policy, will achieve coordination is investigated. In conclusion, to promote European fiscal integration, common governance in the EMU should be strengthened with the idea of fiscal federalism. To realize this integration, the political solidarity of the member states must be strengthen with the reinforcement of coordination among them.
The global financial crisis broke out at on August 9, 2007. Although the U.S. was origin of the crisis, it became the global one. The entire global economy entered a severe recession. Both the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve began to react aggressively and it didn’t take so long time to stabilize the U.S. economic growth. On the other hand, the European economy has suffered from both the sovereign debt and banking system crises for years. Comparing the U.S., it takes too long time to cope with the sovereign debt and banking system crisis. It has been wondered broadly why the European authorities and people can’t solve the problems with affluent resource, sophisticated knowledge and painful historical experiences of the economic and financial crises. It is noticeable to see that the Federal Reserve’s responses to the crisis have been aggressive, theoretical and accountable. Including the unconventional monetary policy such as LSAP, Large Scale Asset Purchase Program, their easing policies have followed systematically a response function, which is a derivative of the Taylor rule, Year 99 version of the monetary policy rule. After years, we have got an accumulation of the historical data and it is possible now to estimate how effective their quantitative easing is and they are following the Year 99 rule. This denotes that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies during the crisis era have been theoretical and very accountable. This means that the monetary authority can cope with a similar crisis in the future. The European authorities have responded the crisis substantially. Comparing the U.S., it was not successful for the European authorities to stabilize the economic fluctuations and the recession has come. This poor outcome may be coming from the nature of European integration. The EMU doesn’t have the united power to handle all of economic policies simultaneously and the biggest concern has been how to finance the unintended debt of fiscal failure. Stabilizing the economic fluctuations has not been the first priority. It is the era of flat Phillips curve and stabilizing inflation doesn’t mean stabilizing the economic fluctuation directly. In the past it was possible to say that stabilizing inflation rate will be followed by the economic stability and sustainable economic growth. It may not be true under the current flat Phillips curve era. The ECB began to act aggressively to promote economic stability in 2011. They introduced LTRO, Long-term Refinance Operation and OMT, Outright Monetary Transaction. It is remarkable to find that they have apparent strategies. The worst of the financial crisis in the U.S. has gone due to many measures by the Fed to inject liquidity. They were successful to revive the paralyzed money markets in the U.S. Some academic authors explained how they worked very well. The LTRO by the ECB was very successful to gain trust in the Euro money markets. Seeing the difficulties in the sovereign bond markets, the ECB decided to react decisively to protect the EMU and they introduce the OMT. This measure may be a historical revolution of the monetary policy. It requires implementation of economic reform and fiscal consolidation, if the country needs an intervention by the ECB to their sovereign bond markets. Some of major economies are walking on the edge of the liquidity trap. This OMT programs is considering the incentives explicitly. If the OMT is successful, the monetary policy can be more effective than people have believed because the monetary policy may alter behaviors of the economic agents. (View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)
European countries started integration of company law from the 1960s. European countries groped for the system which be able to get country agree, aiming at unifying company law. In recent years, in order to correspond to change of environment, such as development of an information technology, and generating of a financial crisis, European Union focuses on corporate governance and is carrying out company law reform. This paper focuses on an argument until it catches the integrative company law which is the foundation of the corporate governance in today’s European Union. First, this paper considers confrontation between the member states produced in the arguments from 1960 to 1990 which aimed at establishment of company law of unific European countries. This paper shows clearly that European countries next shifted the system of the member states into the harmonizing plan by the arguments from 1990 to 2000 which it aimed at establishing an alternative system. Furthermore, this paper clarifies having shifted the plan into integration of corporate governance and having carried forward the step to a new stage by reform in and after 2000 when the Societas Europaea was born in Europe. Integration of the company law system in the European Union is the result to which the 1960s which tried unification of the corporate system to 30 years were applied and which was constructed as a system where it can agree. This result will surely have the power of overcoming the monetary crisis of these days. Furthermore, European Union is gazing at formation of the previously more detailed company law system. This experience of European Union has a possibility of forming the standard in the world, as an example of a success of the advanced experiment which unifies a regional company law system. This paper analyzes the company law institutional reform over this honest long period of time. Then the mission of Europe as an integrated area and a battle of right protection of a member nation are caught systematically. This paper has the novelty of arguing how the corporate institutional reform in European Union is utilized in the future reform.