INNER ASIAN STUDIES
Online ISSN : 2432-2695
Print ISSN : 0911-8993
Volume 34
Displaying 1-12 of 12 articles from this issue
  • Hirotoshi Yagi
    2019 Volume 34 Pages 5-26
    Published: March 31, 2019
    Released on J-STAGE: June 16, 2025
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In the dominion of the Timurid Dynasty founded in 1370 in Iran and Central Asia, there existed many local potentates or rulers. However, these local potentates were not clearly defined in the governing structure of the Timurid dynasty in previous studies. This paper selects the so-called Badakhshān government as an example of a local potentates, and investigates the nature of its relationship with the Timurid dynasty. Historical sources frequently mention that Timurid rulers conferred jurisdiction over the local Badakhshān government to Timurid princes. This system was far less sufficient than enfeoffment, a feudal system whereby a prince or a amīr is given land: as the princes only supervised Badakhshān government. Since the reign of Tīmūr (r. 1370–1402), the Timurid dynasty imposed several duties on the Badakhshān government to secure their submission, such as tax payments, military service, regular attendance at the Timurid imperial court, and so on. Despite this, the Badakhshān government enjoyed a certain level of autonomy, as is suggested by their marital and diplomatic relationship with other rulers, including the Moghul Khanate and the Ming dynasty.
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  • Naoya Umeyama
    2019 Volume 34 Pages 27-48
    Published: March 31, 2019
    Released on J-STAGE: June 16, 2025
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Although few figures of authority among the Chahar Mongols surrendered to the Later Jin forces (later the Qing dynasty) by 1633, Hong Taiji received them warmly. Additionally, Hong Taiji acted as a “Mongol Khan” antagonistic to Lindan Khan by granting titles to Mongols and thereby enhancing his unifying power. Most Chahar Mongols who surrendered to the Later Jin after 1634 were incorporated into the Chahar Eight Banners. From the beginning of its establishment, the Chahar Eight Banners had the same hierarchical structure as the Eight Banners. Additionally, the former leaders of the Chahar Mongols became the bureaucracy of the Eight Banners; other Chahar Mongols lived in Mukden and were bureaucrats in the Six Ministries or were aides to Hong Taiji. Thus, they were separated from their former subjects. Ejei, Lindan Khan’s bereaved child, and Tuba Jinnong were not incorporated into the Chahar Eight Banners, and their power was limited to approximately 1,000 families each. Such was Hong Taiji and the Qing dynasty’s political strategy, which divided the Chahar Mongols and prevented their uniting.
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  • Tomomi Sekıne
    2019 Volume 34 Pages 49-72
    Published: March 31, 2019
    Released on J-STAGE: June 16, 2025
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this study is to analyze the Jasakhtu Khaan killing case of 1662 and the process of negotiation between the Qing Dynasty and the left wing Khalkha immediately following the case; this study also reveals the Qing Dynasty’s Khalkha policy in that period. In previous research, it was thought the Qing Dynasty began to actively intervene in the Khalkha problem after the suppression of the Revolt of the three feudatories; this is assumed because the Khalkha was not under the control of the Qing Dynasty at this time, and the relationship between them is regarded as a mere tribute relationship. However, this research revisited this issue by clarifying the use of Mongolian and Manchurian sentence historical materials that have been made available in recent years. The Qing Dynasty actively negotiated with the left wing Khalkha immediately following the Jasakhtu Khaan killing case and worked to control them under the order of Qing Dynasty on the premise of the Shunzhi era pledge as well as forcibly reinterpreting the pledge and imposed its view on Khalkha. When the political situation changed, the Qing Dynasty thought the one which makes a relation with the Khalkha become stable is preferred and made soften the attitude. Whenever a problem arose between the Qing Dynasty and Khalkha in the early years of the Kangxi era, the Qing Dynasty would bring up the pledge and developed a policy that was only convenient for itself.
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  • Keisuke Iwata
    2019 Volume 34 Pages 73-94
    Published: March 31, 2019
    Released on J-STAGE: June 16, 2025
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper shows the Qing Empire’s policy concerning the League-Banner system for Qinghai Mongol in the first half of the eighteenth century by examining the pasture demarcation in Qinghai. Qinghai Mongol came to be governed by the Qing after Lobzang Danjin’s revolt in 1723. The Qing organized Qinghai Mongol into twenty-eight Banners (qosiγu in Mongolian) at that time. They demarcated the borders of the Banners’ pasture and organized documents with the boundary place names of the four directions of each Banner. Because the Qing created its inner territory along the Ulan Muren River flowing in the northern part of Qinghai for defense against Zunghar, the chiefs of Qinghai Mongol living there were forced to move to the south of Ulan Muren. After that, some asked the Qing court to move their Banners because of the new pasture’s lack of adaptability to the environment. However, the Qing thoroughly excluded them from their inner territory along the Ulan Muren, and instead, it permitted them to live only in the south of Ulan Muren. That the Qing Dynasty restricted the pasture of the Qinghai Mongol shows that defense against Zunghar had priority in its northwest boundary measures in the first half of the eighteenth century.
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  • Atsushi Nakamura, Munkhbaatar
    2019 Volume 34 Pages 95-118
    Published: March 31, 2019
    Released on J-STAGE: June 16, 2025
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The relay station system of Mongolia, established by the Qing Dynasty, facilitated the movement of people and information on a large-scale. Many people were mobilized to maintain this relay station system. Therefore, the relay station functioned as a hub for both people and information. There are archival materials regarding the Altai route, which was the primary line in this system at the time. In contrast, there are limited sources and studies that have examined the fourteen stations established on the southbound route linking Ikh Khuree to the Altai route. Although this route served as a branch line, it generated at least as much traffic as the primary line. This study analyzes the relay station system, particularly the Ikh Khuree route, from various perspectives, by examining a wide range of sources, including official documents as well as maps, travelers’ journals, and findings from our own field work. We have been able to uncover basic information regarding these fourteen stations; specifically, their names, how they were constructed, what types of terrain were used, and how they changed over time. We have also found that this route, while nominally a branch line, was managed as a vital line and was systematically operated over a long period of time. Our research also shows that every station occupied a spacious area and that each station was also accompanied by various fixed facilities, such as a temple and a warehouse. The relay station was actively used until the 1940’s. It continued to be a stationary site of importance in the nomadic society.
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