In this paper, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) theorem is empirically investigated in the Japan-U. S. trade. The HOV theorem for bilateral trade and a method of decomposition analysis are presented and applied to the Japan-U. S. trade data. The results are as follows:
1. The HOV theorem performs relatively well in predicting the direction of trade. However, it fails to predict the volume of trade.
2. This failure of prediction is caused mainly because the assumption of the production side is not fulfilled. In other words, the factor intensities of industries are different between Japan and U. S.
3. The huge difference in the land endowment between the two countries hinders the factor price equalization and causes the difference in land intensities. For other factors such as capital and labor, the reason for the factor intensity differences are yet to be found.

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The consistency and revitalization of capitalist development had been focused in recent academic and journalistic arguments. And there: is growing interest in exploring more effective international contestability along with regulatory reform program or structural adjustment policy. However, the primitive accumulation process, which occurred at early phase of capitalist development in each country's socio-economy, and the relative surplus (labour force) population, which occurred in capitalist development itself, had little attention in those arguments. In this paper, I will analyze labour force structure and its change by applying Marx's analytical framework with reference to international comparative data. Then, reconsidering the characteristics of contemporary stage of world economy.

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In this paper we present optimal intervention policies of government in an international duopoly model. The domestic government have two objects of improving the welfare of its country and of increasing domestic employment.
Main results are as follows. The first case (the domestic firm is profit-maximizer.): If the foreign firm is labor-managed, then the export tariff is welfare improving. But if the foreign firm is profit-maximizer, then the export subsidy is welfare improving. The second case (the domestic firm is labor-managed.): If the foreign firm is profit-maximizer, then export tariff is welfare improving. But if the foreign firm is labor-managed, then we don't get clear results.
Above results will be changed, when the government puts higher priority for employment, and optimal policy may change among no intervention, export tariff and export subsidy depending on it degree of priority.

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