This paper develops a two-country model of intraindustry trade in which overseas shipping incurs transport costs. National governments make investment in the transport infrastructure to reduce the transport costs and enhance national welfare. This paper investigates what patterns of public investment can be derived as equilibrium outcomes and whether these equilibrium investment patterns are socially efficient. It is shown that, among others, if the public investment technology exhibits increasing returns at an international level, coordination problem of public investment may occur.
This study clarifies how governments’ industrial policies affect the firm’s R&D choice when firms simultaneously conduct both cost-reducing process and quality-improving product R&D. We found the following results. Under Cournot competition, while output increases when quality improves and/or the production cost decreases, output decreases as the proportion of product R&D becomes higher compared to that of process R&D. Under Bertrand competition, whether prices become higher or lower depends on the degree of fraction of investment in two types of R&D. If firms only conduct one of the two kinds of R&D, this effect does not exist. A government always subsidizes its domestic firm’s R&D investments.