According to the Downsian Median Voter Theorem, voters can control two competing parties in order to achieve an optimal policy outcome. However, compared with real party politics, there are several restrictive conditions in the classical Downsian spatial model. In this paper, we investigate whether voters can control public policies when the outcomes are weighted sum of positions of two parties. In addition, voters are adaptively rational in the sense that they mainly determine their vote just by observing policy outcomes. Our experiments reveal that voters can control public policies if they can abstain and show the frustration toward both parties.
This paper analyzes the relationship between substantive voting rights (SVRs) and electoral management bodies (EMBs). Since the Third Wave of democratization, electoral management has become a salient issueboth in developing and developed countries. We now witness many attempts, regardless of the level of development of a country, to improve electoral management. Two major directions are identifiable in this regard. The first approach involves making EMBs more independent from the executive branch. The secondapproach involves ensuring voting rights more substantively. These trends stem from a deep-rooted problem of worsening electoral performance evident in lower turnouts and eroding electoral credibility. This is an issue that, in extreme cases, can uproot the very foundation of democracy. However, despite widespread awareness of these problems, up to now there has been virtually no debate on the relations between SVRs and EMBs in political science. This paper utilizes the dataset in Massicotte et al.’s studyand provides a preliminary analysis of the relationship between EMBs and SVRs.