How the election system in Modern Japan is designed and implemented till now? Go through this stage, it should be discussed election district, vote weight disparity, direct or indirect election, voting method and election campaign. Through this research, we could find out the author's intuition has deeply effected on later amendment. Unlike the constitution and parliamentary system, the election system in Modern Japan didn't have any specific pattern. The Author shaped it up with referring the case of other countries. These investigations develop the system into the one of the “institution”.
It seems reasonable to suppose that African countries' electoral systems are hugely influenced by their former suzerain countries. However this research on the parliamentary electoral systems of the fourty-nine countries indicates internal efforts to modify them. For example, among the twenty-two Anglophone countries, while fifteen have adopted the FPTP, nine have added special rules like affirmative action based on ethnicity or sexuality. On the other hand, the research that was conducted on the performance of the electoral system shows that twelve countries are under hegemonic party systems, nine countries lack working electoral systems, six countries are in a negative spiral caused by the turnover of the new authoritarian ruling parties by elections, and only seven countries have established stable and democratic party systems. Based upon these results it can be said that most African countries are still in the process of implementing their electoral systems in their societies.
The first Indonesian general election was held in 1955. Although the election process was fair and democratic, the outcome was not increasing the stability of parliamentary democracy. So, President Soekarno proclaimed martial law in 1957. In 1960, Soekarno dissolved the People’s Representative Council (DPR) and established the People’s Representative Council of Mutual Assistance (DPR-GR). The membership was determined by the president. By 1967, General Suharto had wrested all power from President Soekarno. Suharto banned the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In 1969, the government passed an election law that set membership of the DPR at 360 elected and 100 appointed members. In 1999 election after Suharto stepped down, 38 seats were reserved for the military/police faction. Since 2004 election, all seats were elected. There are no appointed military officers in DPR though the military are not given the voting rights for political stability since 1971 election.
This article attempts to offer a new answer to the traditional question of how people vote, by shedding light on voter attitude toward risk. A change in government leadership often results in drastic policy changes, which subsequently lead to economic instability. Therefore, risk-averse voters who are afraid of such instability do not support or vote for the opposition parties, but stay with the ruling party or abstain, even when they are dissatisfied with the ruling party, while risk-acceptant voters are willing to support or vote for the opposition parties. The findings from multinomial logit analysis of the 2012 Japanese Election Study V (JESV) are generally supportive of this hypothesis in that risk-acceptant voters who supported the DPJ in 2009 were more likely to switch their vote to the LDP or Ishin in 2012, and less likely to stay with the DPJ, even after controlling for party support and economic perception.
The term “Contingent voters” that I defined at the time of the snap general election that Koizumi called for “Postal Service Reform” (Koizummi-Yusei-Kaisan) in 2005 seems to be generalized widely as political mind for Japanese. The tendency of “contingent voters” is significant especially in the range of middleaged and elderly voters. In relation to voting behaviors, their choices are made only at the time and complete the process during the coming political election period, so that the election is tend to be “consumed” as an event in a short period. The term so-called “independent voter” or “swing voter” has been used symbolically to express the characteristics for political minds and voting behaviors of young people. However, it has to be said now that the term should be used better to express characteristics of middle age to elderly. Their tendency of being “contingent voters” is inextricably associated with apathy in the elections. The general election in 2012 implies that secession from local political elections has been spread to the national political election. It is to say that a decrease of voting percentage in the general election in 2012 was caused by the local society's change by a trend of non-relation among people, in addition to lost reality of one vote, which is described as a distrust of politics and political parties, the local society's change by a trend of non-relation among people. In this report, I introduce some data that I used to support my interpretations above. I would like to appreciate in advance if you make remarks or comments on this report.
This article aims to explain public support for the Japan Restoration Party (JRP). In recent Japanese political scene, it has been recognized as a rising party that can challenge the LDP and the DPJ. Much of existing studies point out that the rise of JRP can be explained from the point of view of Populism. It is considered that the alienated people enthusiastically support JRP. In this article, we challenge the conventional views. We test the validity of the populist views with our original survey data and offer the alternative explanation that focus on the effect of Hashimoto image as a party leader. The results of empirical analysis show that no evidence supports the populist view, and that two types of Hashimoto image, one is ‘competent political leader’, the other is ‘conservative politician’, are the most important factor for determining the levels of support for JRP.
Although the female representation in Japan remains at a low level, more and more women have become governors and mayors since 2000. This paper tries to identify the reason for the increase of female governors and mayors, by investigating career paths of them and conducting a case study of two female mayors currently in office. It argues that the increase of female governors and mayors is well explained by the reorganization of Japanese political and economic regime. First, the increasing relevance of care policies, in combination with the decentralization of power to local governments, has enhanced the legitimacy of female political representation. Second, Japan’s labor market characterized by gender-based dualism has produced two types of career paths to female governors and mayors: working as public servants (or taking a few other professional jobs requiring licenses) on the one hand, and becoming local assembly members after engaging in community activities on the other.
What factors promote political efficacy? Although much of the relevant literature has attempted to answer this question, it does not reveal the general causal relationship between efficacy and other political factors. This study aims to clarify the general relationship by focusing on two level factors, the national and the individual. On the national level, I focus on three factors that form “channels” to link citizens and the political realms: electoral systems, decentralization, and corruption. On the individual level, I concentrate on socioeconomic status (SES), which is considered to have a basic causal relationship with efficacy. Using the survey data of 27 countries taken from the CSES data, this study demonstrates that 1) the effects of electoral systems are not robust, 2) decentralization has no easily observable effects on efficacy, and 3) corruption negatively impacts efficacy but also distorts its basic causal relationship with education (i.e., SES).
Why so many legacy Diet members? This article estimates the effect of being legacy candidates on the “vote succession rate” (i.e. the ratio of citizens who vote for a candidate in an election to citizens who also will vote for the candidate's successor in the next election). This study proposes comparing legacy challenger with non-legacy challengers, not incumbents. This new statistical method estimates the effects of party and personal votes on the vote succession rate as well. We analyze the data of the Liberal Democratic Party candidates under the single member district system and find as follows: (i) the legacy challengers' advantage against non-legacy challengers is not less than the incumbents'; (ii) the effect of party votes is the same as that of legacy votes, but the effect of personal votes is not confirmed; and (iii) the legacy challengers' advantage emerges not because they are young or reelected many times.
In previous studies about multi-member districts under the SNTV, the “M+1 rule” was proved using the Lower House election data. (Reed (1990, 1997), Kawato (2004)) In this paper, we show the difficulties that occurred by using the Lower House data and propose the use of the prefectural election data of ordinance-designated cities. There are two advantages in using the prefectural election data of ordinance-designated cities. The first is that the numbers of the candidates who have few possibilities to win the election are few. The second is that there are many cases that the numbers of the seats of the districts are changed. Using these two advantages, we confirm the “M+1 rule” for the number of the whole candidates and the stability of “M+1 rule.”