The electoral reform adopted by Japan in 1994 features single-member districts, though it also includes a proportional representation (PR) tier. Many hoped, based on one of political science's most reliable generalizations, Duverger's Law, that the new system would foster a two-party system. I argue that it has indeed done so. Using many different indicators of the existence of a two-party system, I find that the Japanese party system has gotten closer to bipolarity at each successive election, and now surpasses the archetypical two-party system, Great Britain, on some indicators. Interestingly, the PR tier, far from reducing the power of Duverger's Law, seems to have enhanced its operation. I also speculate about the future and the possibility of an alternation in power.
This paper examines the effect of the newly introduced “one man two votes” electoral system in the 17th National Assembly election in Korea, using survey data. First of all, the rate of ticket splitting was not significantly high at only 20.8%. The ticketsplit voting behavior of Korean voters in the 17th National Assembly election could be seen as strategic. But strategic calculations were not so strong. Introduction of a new electoral system affected party arrangement. The Democratic Labor Party and the Open Uri Party benefitted, but the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party suffered losses under the newly introduced mixed electoral system. The effect of the introduction of the “one man two votes” electoral system in resolving disproportionality was minimal. The introduction of “one man two votes” electoral system neither systematically affected the voting turnout nor mitigated the traditional regionally based voting behavior of Korean voters.
Many studies on Taiwanese voting behavior have addressed the topic of the electorate's voting choice. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to the implications of different electoral systems on voting behavior. This paper examines voting behavior in single-member districts and multi-member districts and argues that inter-party strategic voting exists in presidential elections. In regards to the presidential election, partially overlapping social bases of political parties provide the framework for inter-party strategic voting. In the legislative election, which uses a single-nontransferable voting system (SNTV), party lines are mostly respected. Party-line voting, however, would be replaced by inter-party strategic voting once SNTV transforms into a single-majority voting system. To test our hypothese, we examine the 2000 presidential election, in which there were three sets of major candidates. We also examine the 2001 and 2004 legislative elections as examples of the SNTV system. Our conclusion is that Taiwanese voters respond to change in the electoral system and that there will be vote switching when the number of parties is reduced.