法哲学年報
Print ISSN : 0387-2890
最新号
選択された号の論文の23件中1~23を表示しています
  • 大塚 滋
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 1-3,268
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    The 2006 annual meeting of JALP was held on 25-26 November at Aoyama Gakuin University, in Tokyo. Its general theme was “Legal Philosophy and Legal Education; in the Law School Era”.
    The concomitance of two types of organs for legal education in Japan from 2004 might throw us into disorder, but it might be a golden opportunity for us to reflect and reform the status quo of Japanese legal education systems in general and of the legal philosophy education in particular.
    This meeting was planned before the start of Japanese Law Schools, searching for our common measures to reform the education of the legal philosophy.
  • 大塚 滋
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 4-17,268
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Many Japanese Law Schools were established in 2004. The Aim of this paper is to assess their influences on the traditional system of the legal education in Japan, and to suggest what ought to be the contents of the legal education at faculties of law in Japan.
    Firstly, the author points out the abnormality that two different systems of legal education happened to exist. One is that of the Law Schools, the graduate schools specifically for legal professions, and the other is of the faculties of law, the undergraduate schools not directly for legal professions.
    Secondly, he overviews the ideas of Japanese Law Schools and their realities, and criticizes them from the viewpoints of the reform plans proposed by Jerome Frank and by Rudolf von Jhering. According to the author, our Law Schools are, more or less, becoming degraded into mere preparatory schools for the new Japanese Bar Examination, forgetting their ideal: the improvement of the quality of lawyers, and ignoring Jerome Frank's criticism of Langdellian case method in his “Courts on Trial” (1949), and Jhering's criticism of the “Begriffsjurisprudenz”, which consists in that of the traditional system of the legal education in Germany.
    Thirdly, he proposes the reform plan of the educational program at our faculties of law, in order to make them survive in the Law School Era. The plan says that their program have to be multiple, meeting the diverse needs of Japanese law students; for the majority of them it has to provide some subjects like “literacy for ordinary legal life”.
    Finally, he urges the persistence of our faculties of law and graduate schools of law in spite of having set up Law Schools, on the ground that they are indispensable for nurturing our successors -legal academicians and law teachers-, and for keeping and furthering the diversity of our studies in law.
  • 北村 隆憲
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 18-31,267
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article reports some of the findings based on an empirical study conducted as to the actual situations in which “legal-philosophy” and its cognate classes are taught at law schools in Japan. The study consists of three modules; first, content analysis of the “syllabus” texts of the classes; second, interviews with law school students who attended those classes; and finally, questionnaire conducted for law-school professors in charge of the classes and their students.
  • 萩原 金美
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 32-43,267
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Justice System Reform has introduced the “American Style” law school (graduate school) system while keeping with the existing faculties of law at undergraduate level. Its impact on legal education at the latter is apparently enormous but, strange to say, to this date this problem has never been seriously debated.
    It would appear to be an excessive dualistic structure in legal education; a hybrid or compromise of the American legal education system with that of the continental law countries. Then, in what way should legal education at undergraduate level be transformed? The answer or solution is not easy because the matter is closely related to manifold problems which go beyond education. I propose the main feature of faculties of law should transform into general arts education focused on law. In addition, sufficient practical vocational education for para-legals should be made available for students not aspiring to enter law school (probably they constitute the majority).
    I also mention something about the relationship of legal education in law schools and legal philosophy. While practice oriented education is emphasized in law schools, it is also vitally important for students to gain an insight into the fundamental problems of law and lawyers. In this regard, legal philosophy plays an important role. One of the present problems which require urgent philosophical thought is, in my view, ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution). ADR is gaining popularity in many countries, including Japan. However, I have doubts as to whether ADR is really consistent with the rule of law. Is justice under ADR the same as that under judicial procedure? If it is not, how is it different and how is the difference justified? It is expected that legal philosophy will provide the correct answer to these questions, especially in this country where “quasi rule of law” dominates.
  • 仲正 昌樹
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 44-56,267
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    I will present my personal view on legal education from the perspective of a semi-outsider, namely as the one, who did not study law as a student but is working actually as a professor in the faculty of law. The legal education in the faculty of law of Japanese universities has a very particular tradition, which was established in the imperial universities before the World War II. The objectives of the legal education in those imperial universities were to raise up legal elites who should play important roles in lawmaking process and lead the legal practice. However, as the number of law students increased drastically and the roles of the academics and the practi-tioners were separated after the war, the meaning of the legal education changed as well. Nevertheless, the professors of the faculty of law have been persisting in the traditional elite education system, which are causing enormous difficulties for normal students. There are standardized styles of textbooks, in which the key notions of the codes are exactly defined and explicated in the lexical order and accordingly the exemplary cases are introduced. Seemingly, students are supposed to learn the ideally constructed law system rather than actual legal conflicts. Professors of the faculty of law have been insisting this sort of systematized education would help students gain the comprehensive view of the living law. But this argument has been getting invalid since the introduction of the Law School system. The students who really want to be lawyers are studying at law schools, in which different methods of education are adopted. Then, what are the objectives of the legal education in the remaining faculty of law? Is it still necessary to present concurring academic doctrines in the textbooks, although most of students are not willing to be jurists? I propose that students of the faculty of law should learn more of actual legal conflicts from the perspective of a ‹client›. It often happens that jurists will not respond to the requests of their clients, suggesting difficulties of actual cases. Sometimes sentences of the court deviate from the literal interpretation of the written code. It should be useful to learn such ambiguities and irregularities of law practice that every citizen may face when they seriously seek the course of justice. There should be classes of legal communication from the viewpoint of clients in the curriculum of the faculty of law.
  • 那須 耕介
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 57-75,266
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    With the recent establishment of law school in Japan, the social role of legal education at the university is now becoming our focus of attention.
    As often pointed out, the legal education at the Faculty of Law has suffered by its serious contradictions and blindness. Especially, although most students do not choose to become lawyer, both method and content of education has been designed without proper consideration of their needs. Now that the locus of lawyer training is moved to the law schools, the serious doubt turned to the raison d'_??_tre of the Faculty of Law will not be able to be removed, as far as this state continues.
    After pointing out that the current state of legal education in Japan owes much to the particular circumstances of many late-started modernization countries (including Japan), this report proposes a new task that should be borne so that Faculty of Law may continue next future.
    My main point is that bringing up the mediator who fills the gap between lawyers (the specialist) and citizens (the nonspecialists) might be a new role of the Faculty of Law. These jobs are supposed to function as translators, critics or commentators who understand and evaluates the way of thinking and acting of legal specialists. If the faculty of law should live through current impasse, it has to upgrade its educational program so as to develop the cultural foundation of the rule of law.
  • 宮川 光治
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 76-83,265
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    New legal training system was established at the request of society as a way to greatly improve legal profession both in quality and quantity. Law school is the core of such legal training process and the professional school which provides education specialized in training for the legal profession. By collecting diverse human resources and being exposed to the competition between law schools and the third party evaluation, law school tries to secure the quality of education and to achieve diversity and specialty. Unless national bar examination and apprenticeship training become bottlenecks, this system will, with efforts of faculties and students, fundamentally reform personal structure of Japanese justice system and gradually develop towards educational philosophy.
    Having been released from training for the legal profession, undergraduate law faculties became able to create a clear future vision. For development of the rule of law, it is necessary that citizens with basic legal knowledge have the increased presence in the society. Undergraduate law faculties should continue to play a role of nurturing such citizens. Liberal arts education will be conducted first, then various specialized professional education will be provided. It is expected that legal training is left with law school. Moreover, a careful examination may be required when considering training of specialists in fields adjoining law (so-called quasi-legal professionals) as an objective of undergraduate law faculties. It is important to take the future of continuing education into consideration when creating a vision of legal education at undergraduate.
  • 山田 八千子
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 84-99,265
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    New legal training system was established at 2004. It organically connects legal education, the national bar examination and legal training as a “process”. Law school system would be its core. Law schools have to provide the education especially for training for the legal professions (judges, prosecutors, and lawyers). Therefore the education at law school should build a bridge between theoretical education and practical education. This paper would examine that the subject of legal philosophy plays an crucial role in such new legal training system.
    Legal education would be classified into two categories. These categories are the rationalistic theoretical education and the apprentice education as apprenticeship. In Japan the undergraduate schools and the postgraduate schools have given great deal of weight to the rationalistic theoretical education. But not only the theoretical education but also the apprentice education are indispensable for the education for legal professions.
  • 平野 仁彦
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 100-114,264
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the Judicial Reform now in process in Japan, the new law school system models itself mainly on that of the United States. American law schools, based on accreditation by A. B. A. and A. A. L. S., have three characteristics in their curricula: stress on the first year courses of required subjects, providing various opportunities of practical or clinical education, and teaching a variety of basic and/or interdisciplinary studies of law. Jurisprudence or legal philosophy is among the last category.
    This paper, focusing on Jurisprudence, expounds the history of American legal education, its background ideas, and the major questions in the philosophical inquiry.
    It argues that despite a long history of apprenticeship the legal education made a drastic turn in the middle of the twentieth century into making much of the theoretical side of instruction partly because of the diversity of law and legal practice in America; that the fundamental idea in law is a limited sense of pragmatism which has been widely shared by various American legal theorists from Christopher Langdell to Ronald Dworkin and which underlies the idea of “Respon-sive Law” driving legal developments; and that theoretical inquiries that embody the idea of responsive law converge on the issues of legal justification as well as legal process in jurispru-dence, with considerations that we may call the “legal system balance” and the “legal principle balance”, which mold, as a result, particular features of the rule of law.
    Fostered through American legal education, the idea of responsive law is a vigorous source of legal practice in contemporary societies.
  • 亀本 洋
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 115-127,264
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Can education of legal philosophy be standardized? It seems extremely difficult to do so in view of liberal character of our discipline. It would be impossible to standardize philosophy of law in the same way of standardization in microeconomics, in which contents to be taught are completely standardized according to the level of students. Microeconomics for beginners is a subject without whose knowledge it is difficult for everyone to learn any other field in economics. It is in this sense the base of economics. Even civil law for beginners as what many jurists might think is the base of law in general is not standardized as elementary microeconomics, much less philosophy of law.
    But I believe that it is promising to standardize legal philosophy through teaching its history, that is, noteworthy doctrines of great philosophers of law and state, even if such standardization were different in kind from one in economics. Fortunately, there is a broad consensus among legal philosophers on which philosophers should be discussed. It is essential in each lecture to begin by taking up the simplest cases or problems and then to go to the more complex ones. We should learn this way of teaching from economics. But we do not have to commit to any economic thinking, though it is necessary to make use of it in some appropriate cases.
  • 道垣内 弘人
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 128-133,263
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    What are the characteristics of legal thinking is a fundamental but difficult problem to answer in legal sciences, including philosophy of law, even if we focus on the way of the interpretation of statutory laws. However, at least, we might say that to keep the consistency of law is one of the most important requirements in the interpretation.
    What to evade is not only the apparent contradiction in the interpretation but the hidden conflict of different principles, for example, liberalism, libertarianism, paternalism and so on, when we cannot justify the coexistence of principles by the difference of situations. In this context, philosophy of law works as a supplier of tools for analyzing the hidden principles behind legislation, cases and statutory interpretation by academics. The education of philosophy of law as a tools-supplier might have three stages.
    1) To teach the principles themselves (e. g. justice theories).
    2) To teach the way of analysis.
    3) To discuss the relative merits of principles.
    However, too much emphasis of the importance of philosophy of law sometimes drive the students to settle the cases on the principle which they believe in, without paying attention to the possibility of making other contradiction in the whole system of law.
    Legal thinking is a restrictive one in the sense that they should respect the firmly established rules.
  • 嶋津 格
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 134-141,262
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    The following are my comments on the presentations in our symposium on legal education. 1) Teaching law has been an effective route for Westernization in Japan. One of the marked features that graduates from a Law Department tend to acquire is their readiness to be accountable for social order. Compared with graduates from Literature or Economics, bachelors of law are likely to better manage norms in general. I believe recent sea change in legal education in Japan, which includes new establishment of about 70 law schools, will not affect the basic advantage of law education at undergraduate level. 2) When social norms are under perpetuated change lawyers are required to be more creative than regular study of law interpretation facilitates them to be. In such a circumstance Legal Philosophy, together with Sociology and Comparative Study of Law etc., will become all the more important. The fact that first rank law schools in the U. S. have rich courses in those theoretical studies of law is revealing this. 3) Professor Hagiwara talked about Japanese pseudo-rule of law. In that context too much focus on the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice might be harmful. In ADR, legal rules which are relevant to the concerned legal case will not be identified and confirmed. Otherwise, the rules found applicable to a new case today are likely to be applied to the similar cases in the future so that the number of cases which will come to the court for just resolution will be reduced greatly. In ADR, there is no guarantee that similar cases will be resolved similarly, which is one of requisites for the appearance of justice or that of rule of law. 4) The most fundamental thesis in my observation is that in the ideological phenomenon like law social belief in its existence which has something to do with people's sense of justice tends to make people behave accordingly so that the social reality in which we can talk on law meaningfully will come in place. In short the belief in law tends to fulfill itself. So, the main task of legal profession has been and still is to disseminate this belief.
  • 大塚 滋
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 142-149
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 三本 卓也
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 150-157,262
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this article, I discuss two kinds of legal conceptions that Hohfeld described in his 1913 article: duty and privilege (or [unilateral] liberty). I focus on one specific interpretation that most readers seem to share; that is, the interpretation of Hohfeld as adopting a thesis ‘duty implies liberty’ (hereinafter T1). In order to assess the validity of T1, I think it necessary to stress the analogy between duty-liberty relations in Hohfeld's analysis on the one hand, and obligation-permission relations in deontic logic on the other. From this standpoint, T1 above equals a well-known thesis in deontic logic, which maintains that 'Op D Pp should be included as an axiom of a deontic system' (hereinafter T2). Moreover, T2 is closely related to yet another one, that is, `there exist logical relations between norms' (hereinafter T3). I argue that it is possible to interpret Hohfeld as denying T1 (contrary to currently dominant approach), and that this inter-pretation has its merits when it claims itself to be a system of deontic logic.
    After briefly summarizing what jural ‘opposites’ (in Hohfeld's term) mean, I argue that his own text becomes perfectly consistent when read as rejecting Tl. One might wonder if, logically speaking, Hohfeld's system thus interpreted is rich enough (as pointed out by Lindahl and others). I argue that it is, particularly when connected to the deontic system of von Wright's.
    Here, we must be aware that von Wright made, as time went by, at least three different kinds of arguments about T2 and T3. Of these three, particularly of note is, in my opinion, the system proposed in the third period. At that time, he contended that, while one should reject T3 (and hence T2), this never means the demise of deontic logic. To support this contention, he introduces ‘rationality’ standard, and thereby tries to reconstruct deontic logic from a new perspective. Based on this, I suggest that Hohfeld be understood as ‘von Wright in the third and (in my opinion) maturest period’, although this interpretation has several unsolved problems to be dealt with.
  • 早川 のぞみ
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 158-167,261
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Ronald Dworkin's theory about the ‘moral reading’ of the Constituion has made an influence not only on legal theories but also on constitutional theories through our country. The feature of his theory is on the point that he understands the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, as a comprehensive system of abstract moral principles.
    My aim in this paper is to clarify the characteristics of his theory by comparing a very different type of theory, the ‘Originalism’. I also look at the abortion case. Examining how the two theories argue over this case, I try to discuss not only the signigficance about Dworkin' s theory, but also its problem as well.
  • 伊佐 智子
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 168-178,261
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, the reproductive rights are explained, at first, from its historical background, particularly in terms of the international declarations. Secondly, it shows this right should be a right to “reproduction”, because only women can choose whether to give a birth to a baby or not. A woman and fetus in her body are united on one side, but on the other independent. In this meaning a woman can choose to or not to give a birth to a baby with a responsibility towards the fetus. We should realize the importance, concerning society with decreasing birthrate. These rights must be a fundamental right for women as a moral and legal person. Finally, a nation has a moral and legal responsibility to fulfill and realize reproductive rights of women, then it leads to protect fetal life as well.
  • 吉岡 剛彦
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 179-189,260
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper is about Arthur Kaufmann's legal philosophy. Especially it focuses upon his theories of “the right to cheap resistance, ” “the principle of tolerance, ” and “relational person, ” which Kaufmann took into much account in his later years. These theories are related to his basic thinking on ontology of law (right), legal hermeneutics, legal methodology. I will try to describe Kaufmann's design for “an ideal society” by my own evolutional interpretation of his legal philosophy. In this description I pay attention to his insistence that statutory law (positive law) should be moderate or last resort (ultima ratio). The ideal society in Kaufmann's legal thought is, I think, a society through which voices of people (minorities) raising objections to the status quo can be circulated surely, and in which other people pay respect to the voices and can be stimulated to break away from their present viewpoints by “another vision” of the society in the voices.
  • 石黒 太
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 190-197,260
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I try to articulate the core of John Rawls's theoretical shift from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism by examining his idea of democracy.
    Rawls's theory of justice gradually displays the democratic character. In Political Liberalism, he introduces the idea of Public Reason to his theory. This idea allegedly plays a significant role in Deliberative Democracy; therefore Rawls is regarded as one of the vanguards of Deliberative Democracy. But how can his liberal theory be consistent with his democratic shift?
    In my opinion, Political Liberalism differs from A Theory of Justice with regard to the place of democracy. In A Theory of Justice, democracy is derived from “Justice as Fairness”, whereas Political Liberalism presupposes the democratic arrangement, and “Justice as Fairness” is offered as the most reasonable conception of justice for our democratic society. Thus Political Liberalism admits that “Justice as Fairness” is but one example of a reasonable liberal conception of justice.
    This difference corresponds to shift in the way of justification of “Justice as Fairness”. In my point of view, “Justice as Fairness” in A Theory of Justice is justified through “Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (“in the case of one person”), whereas it is “Full Reflective Equilibrium” (“Wide and General Reflective Equilibrium”) that plays very important role in justification of “Justice as Fairness” in Political Liberalism. The latter Reflective Equilibrium includes dialogical moments.
    It is concluded that the place of democracy in his theory shifts with a change in the structure of the justification of “Justice as Fairness”, and his position in Political Liberalism can be interpreted as a dialogical approach to justice.
  • 稲田 恭明
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 198-207,259
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    This essay aims to explore the scope and limits of cosmopolitan citizenship, the most ambitious of the various conceptions of new citizenship which try to reconstruct the traditional concept of citizenship which has been closely connected with that of nationality. This conception is an attempt at revitalizing democracy by diversifying citizenship in accordance with the multiplied political decision-making processes under the circumstance that the autonomous competences of nation states are undermined under the pressure of economic globalization, and the state sover-eignty is being diffused both upwards and downwards.
    After surveying several important theories on cosmopolitan citizenship, we will review several criticisms against them. Those criticisms are mainly concerned with the preconditions which enable democratic deliberation, and the idea of democratizing transnational institutions. This new conception of citizenship requires both institutional and ethical approaches.
  • 横濱 竜也
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 208-218,259
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Why should subjects defer to and obey their ruler? This question which is taken seriously especially by civil disobedients, coustitutes the core of the problem of legitimacy, and inquiries of the answer to the question has been mainly done in the theories of political obligation. But standard theories of political obligation have not given enough attention to the moral character of vertical relationship between ruler and subjects and the basis of intrinsic value of the latter's deference to the former. Arguments from fairness regard the state as a social cooperation between the equal members, and as an instrument to supply goods indispensable for us, so they do not adequately recognize the intrinsic value of deference. One of the arguments from natural duty of justice appeals the needs of political institutions which administer stably in a specific territory the principles of justice, but they attach little importance to how the relation between ruler and subjects has formed, and how subjects consider that their ruler believes in good faith that his judgment is just. The reasons for ruler to care about the basis of his political authority and the reasons for subjects to take seriously the basis of their political obligation are essentially different, and we should treat them separately. But in spite of the difference, to the virtue of ruler who presents consistently his understanding of the common goods, subjects have a (strong) reason to defer because in his claim of consistency, ruler has to be open and accountable to dissentients who blame him for inconsistency.
  • 赤岩 順二
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 219-228,258
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    This essay offers an interpretation of Plato's Nomoi 842b-860e, from agricultural laws to the answer of Athenian Stranger who was himself raising the question whether legisla-tive activities are recommended or not. There are three parts in the essay. The first part (section I) shows that the agricultural legislation is well designed and could be seen as a prototype for the rest of legislation. The second part (section II) shows that the legislative story, from the beginning of Book IX to an objection by Cleinias (857 b), is regarded as an error, which shows a possi-ble misbehavior of criminal justice in a post agricultural society. The third and final part (section III) discusses about the question whether judicial and legislative activities themselves are included in the subject of a Socratic paradox, “No one willingly do wrong”, introduced by Athenian Stranger (860 d). This essay answers “yes”, according to interpretations in the first and second part of the study. If that is the case, Plato assigns the Socratic paradox to a roll preventing the deviance of criminal justice.
  • 中村 隆文
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 229-242,258
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Locke's theory as a contractarian has a great influence on the debates about social justice between “liberalism” and “libertarianism” yet. Even have many differences of opinions in those, they almost depend on the “natural law” and “natural right” elaborated by Locke when he tried to defend the “liberty” against an authority of the king. This reason is that they believe Locke's natural jurisprudence and ideas of “liberty” and “right” are set in the Declaration of Independence. It's nothing to be surprised at this, so now I intend not to doubt this fact, and that, not to convict their debates as pointless.
    I suggest that “liberty”, “right” and “justice” can be also defended philosophically by a school of thought in the eighteenth century other than Locke's, no matter how we estimate his influence on the then America. Directly and frankly professing, I regard the Scottish Enlightenment as functioning that role in the century, and its significance has still lived under the debate about the idea of social justice.
    I place a special emphasis on the point that Scottish thinkers, especially David Hume and Adam Smith, had defended the America outside the theory of contractarianism involved with liberalism and Libertarianism. It shows that “justice” intrinsically exists in a relationship, in other words “convention” and it can not be discovered in the contractual lawmaking way but in the judiciary way reflecting sense of justice, or moral sense, because law of justice will be expanding over the domain of human rationality of economical worldview.
  • 西迫 大祐
    2007 年 2006 巻 p. 243-250,257
    発行日: 2007/10/30
    公開日: 2010/12/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    The concept of risk occupies centre-stage in debates about individual and social responsibilities. In this paper, we examines the work of Francois Ewald, who analyses risk and responsibilities within the French codified tradition, to show the questions which the legal philosophy of 21st century has to answer.
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