After the Russian financial crisis of 1998 issues such as the sustainability of economic growth, economic inequality and poverty have become points of contention both in Russia and in the world. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate economic disparity and inequality and their influence over market transition in Russia, and to consider how people behave under conditions of economic inequality.
First of all, globalisation and the market transition in Russia has brought about increased international disparity. As a result of the investment gap, the real disparity in economic power is greater than it seems. At the same time, domestic economic disparities in Russia have expanded during market transition. There is a striking contrast among industries. There are growing sectors like exports, resources and energy, average sectors and stagnating sectors such as light industry and machine assembly. Equipment age structure and investment capacity also gives an account of industrial disparities. In addition, regional differentiation is striking with Russia's economy often referred to as “one metropolis capitalism”. We can observe an increase in regional disparities in unemployment rate and in the share of loss-making enterprises, which suggest different levels of adaptability to the market.
Is Russia egalitarian in relation to income and assets? Considering the Gini coef-ficient, inequality increased in Russia during the transition process. It is important to appreciate that changes in inequality were very large and occurred during the early years of transition. Income and expenditure of households indicate such changes. Revenue from business activities and property income are increasing, while wage differentials have maintained their influence. Among expenditures, the share of savings is increasing. Consumption differentiation can be observed among non-basic goods like consumer durables. These phenomena suggest the existence of a segmented market. The redistribution effects of social transfer, however, have been preserved and we cannot neglect them under the flat income tax system. Thus, empirical evidence suggests heightened inequality and social stratification has accompanied government failure.
However, the population of Russia has not always reacted destructively regarding inequality and poverty. The nature of industrial disputes also suggests weak resistance and low levels of dissatisfaction. First, economic inequality has led to the exit of losers who have sought additional revenue in the informal sector. Second, families have enlarged their economic activity, which compensates for income shortages. Third, there is a gray area between the official labour market and unemployment. According to the new investigation, the informal employment includes more than 15% workers. Fourth, elasticity of wages is strong and stimulates the second job. Finally, Russian enterprises have kept their social function in the transition period. The above re-sponses are based on the legacy of the former system and they have the twofold effect of both easing and intensifying inequality. Economic inequality and the specific reactions to it to a large extent reflect the peculiarities of the Russian market.

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This paper attempts to analyze changes in the Russian local population movement from the viewpoint of social differences in this area. First, peoples returning from outside the country principally move to the Russian European districts due to un-stable living conditions. Second, the tendency towards over-centralization in Moscow's population is highlighted conspicuously. Third, an another side, population outflows from cities and farm villages under the jurisdiction of Siberia, Far East districts are intense. Fourth, increased urban decay is common except in some of the resourceexploitation areas, and this paper suggests that the Propiska system would speed up this trend.
Furthermore, natural population dynamics are studied. First, this study looks at the development of the aging of Russian European village populations and intense population decrease. Second, geriatric and chronic diseases in the Central districts are serious and are particularly related to alcohol consumption. Third, a high death rate from infectious diseases can be seen in Siberia and the southern districts, a phenomenon common to many“developing countries”. This may be due to the large range in Russian inland social levels.
Changes in the population dynamics in this period are magnified by these varying social differences. In addition, the Propiska system has strengthened limitations on the movement, and the division of a unified labor market between cities and farm vil-lages has not yet been overcome.
The main reason for Moscow's over-centralization could be explained by its economic role (mainly, enlargement of financial systems and the service trade) . However, the Propiska system seems to strengthen it. Thus, Moscow's over-centralization tendency is accelerated while, at the same time, including a policy which is aimed to contradict it. The aging population, a lack of a sufficient work force, and increases in illegal immigrants are worsening, while Moscow is enjoying“saecial privileges”.
The above-mentioned population movements have weak“pull factors”, and“push factors”such as social and economic crises are powerful. Moreover, this movement itself is unstable. However, in the long term, the enlargement of Moscow, its ever increasing economic and social dominance, and increasing differences in society will continue to be problematic.
Therefore, a policy that aims at general development in the Far East district, city inflow regulation problems (eg. actions to stem the farm village problem), a decrease in the death rate and a rise in birth rates (social stability and measures to protect geriatric and chronic diseases) would become necessary in the future in order for the Russian Federation to maintain its character as a unified nation.

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The economic disparities in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) consist of three levels. The first one is a domestic one, that is, disparities among central and peripheral regions in one country. The second one is among central and peripheral countries in CEECs. And the third one is among EU 15 countries and CEECs, that is, among central and peripheral countries in Europe.
In this paper, we have considered why these disparities have occurred, whether they will disappear or be magnified, and how to diminish them.
The main conclusions are:
—The economic disparities have caused by the initial conditions and transition policies in CEECs.
—They will not diminish, at least in the short period.
—CEECs, especially Southern and Eastern countries, have to enhance their efforts to close the gaps and to accomplish the task “Return to Europe”.
—External factors such as aids from the EU are also important for attaining the aims.

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Income inequality has greatly increased in the Republic of Moldova since its independence in 1991. This is partly because only a small number of its people became rich through the illegal and unfair redistribution of the national wealth in the process of regime transformation, and partly because the majority of the people were reduced to poverty by the bankruptcy of the national economy. As a result, serious poverty has spread widely in small towns and rural areas, especially among unskilled workers, farmers, agricultural employees, pensioners, those with no primary education and the illiterate, households with many children, children and old people. Poverty has caused a sharp decline in fertility and the migration abroad of 600 thousand to one million workers. While their remittances to their families have prevented a worsening of the economic and social situation in Moldova, this labour emigration has given rise to a brain drain and to human trafficking. This in turn contributed to the great victory of the Communist party in the 2001 elections. Whether these issues of social and economic inequality and mass labour migration will be eased by the EU's ‘European Neighbourhood Policy, ’ which is based on a carrot and stick approach, remains to be seen.

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In this article, the author investigates the Croatian problem in Istria during the interwar period, focusing on the minority policy by the Italian government and the situation of the Croatian minority there.
The Slavic inhabitants in Istria, the Croats in particular, were not given a right as minority at all during the interwar period. They were exposed to the Italianization by the forced transformation of the Slavic place names and family names and by the prohibition of the Slavic language in school education and publication activity under the fascist rule.
While the Slavic cultural and political societies were forced to dissolve, the secret societies as the TIGR were organized. They developed resistance movement against the fascists, and they also contributed much to the preservation of the Slavic national identity through their activities.
About 100, 000 of the Slavic inhabitants in Istria emigrated during the interwar period because of the long-term economic difficulty and social discrimination including purge from public service or the land requisition. Most of them immigrated to Yugoslavia and advocated the annexation of Istria with Yugoslavia, but were not able to obtain satisfactory results.
The Croatian problem in Istria could be settled only within a broader framework of international relationship, as this problem had its origin in World War I. However, the significance of persistent resistance by the Istrian people should not be underestimated, especially for the improvement of their status during and after World War II.

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Similar to many other countries after the Cold War, Russia has adopted a concept of “National Security” that has a broader meaning than the concept of “national defense”, and combines diplomacy and economy with national defense in order to ensure the national security.
Organizations for decision making on national security policy in Russia have been legally and systematically established, as shown by the following.
In March 1992 the Security Law was enacted, and in June 1992 the Security Council was established; at the same time provisions were passed for the creation of the Security Council.
The Security Council is a consultative body that helps the President in decision making in the realm of the national security.
Important matters that are discussed and decided in the Security Council are made public as presidential edicts.
The Security Council consists of two kinds of members: permanent members who have authority to make decisions and members who only participate in the deliberatinos. The chairman, a post held by the President, heads up the council. The Secretary of the Security Council is one of the permanent members; he makes preparations for council meetings and puts matters on the agenda. The remaining permanent members are the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of Federal Security Bureau.
Under the Putin Administration, many agenda items have been discussed, such as new concepts of national security, military doctrine, foreign policies, informational national security doctrine, and so on, and been successively promulgated as presidential edicts.
The Security Council has one Secretariat and eight Directorates under the Council Secretariat, which reports to the Secretary of the Security Council. The Council Secretariat and its Directorate are well-formed organizations and have many members with considerable policy planning capabilities.
In order to cope with the broad concepts and missions of “national security”, there are now 11 interadministration committees among government agencies that discuss and coordinate agendas in various fields.
The existence of interadministration committee on military security is relaxing the military's monopoly in this regard. However, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff Office remain as powerful as they were in the Soviet period. For example, the military takes the initiative in drafting military doctrine.

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It is well known that North Korea has been suffering from acute economic crises since the 1990's. Although the country's food shortage was revealed in 1995, North Korea had already been confronted with economic difficulties by then. The difficulties appear to have been chiefly caused by three changes in external trade patterns of North Korea. Firstly, at the beginning of the 1990's, North Korea's imports from Russia largely decreased in comparison with that from the Soviet Union in the 1980's, which had been the most important source of obtaining materials for North Korea. Imports from Russia continued to decrease in the 1990's. Secondly, from 1994 to 1996, the physical volume of cereals annually imported by North Korea from foreign countries was remarkably small, compared with that imported until 1993. Thirdly, in the latter half of the 1990's, North Korea's imports of energy from China, which has been the largest obtainable energy source for North Korea from abroad since the beginning of the 1990's, fell significantly. These changes in turn appear to have seriously damaged the North Korean economy.
North Korea has been expected to carry out economic reforms in order to improve its economic condition. Since July 2002, this country has introduced new economic polices. Although they have market-oriented features, we are not able to regard them as economic reforms. They are only improvement measures taken in the planned economic system. North Korean leaders, including Kim Jong Il, appear not to be able to execute fundamental economic reforms, even if they understand that the reforms are indispensable for improving their economy. This is most likely because having witnessed the experiences of China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1980's, they fear that the execution of economic reforms might enhance the risk of causing a democratic movement in politics and the destruction of the present regime.
Hereafter, it appears North Korea will take one of the following three tacks. First, it might preserve the present“planned-economy divided from the South”, with the accompanying question of how long it can be sustained. The second possibility is that the North Korean economy might gradually transfer to the “market economy divided from the South” as the result of executing economic reforms, though that might be the “market economy unified with the South
” in the long run. Finally, it might be possible that this “unified market economy” is suddenly realized as the result of a military attack by the United States or an inside coup d'état.

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This paper examines Russian enterprise reforms in the context of urban transition.The first part gives an overview of the industrial location structure unique to Russia in comparatively isolated regions, traditionally called “mono-profiling towns” (monoprofil'nye goroda) or “town-building enterprises” (gradoobrazuiushchie predpriiatiia), and depicts the case of Baikal'sk Cellulose and Paper Plant (BCPP) as a typical town-building enterprise. The author documents how the uniqueness of this type of enterprise causes the delay of the restructuring process for both private enterprises and public institutions. Nevertheless, It concludes by suggesting that the relation-ship between enterprise and its community, which were constructed in a symbiotic way, has changed. This is also the case for the “elite cites”, often called closed cities, including academic towns, and secret cities in Russian history. In the last decade, they had lost their stature and many privileges due to financial pressure resulting from changes in economic and social circumstances. It was inevitable for the state in the post-So-viet era to reduce and/or eliminate guaranteed social services.
The second part focuses on the impact of urban infrastructure on enterprise reforms. Due to a lack of investments in Russia, existing fixed capital faces obsoles-cence. Municipalization of enterprise-owned urban infrastructure poses further threat to the situation. Therefore, many Russian enterprises keep some social assets (catering services, housing, medical services, sports and recreational facilities, kindergarten etc.) at hand. Although this may serve to mitigate impacts of economic reforms in some respects, “urban infrastructure hoarding”, the other side of“labor hoarding” characteristic of Russian enterprises, may lead to more serious social problems such as dilapidated housing (which had existed since the mid 90s in Russia and ruined blocks in the U.S. metropolis after the oil-shock) . No investment in urban infrastructure, its “mercy killing”, can be realized as part of enterprise restructuring. In light of all these, it is no doubt enterprises need to do the final decision-making.

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Only few attempts have so far been made at gender approach to the transition economy in Russia. In contrast to the development of sociological gender studies, most of Russian economists simply neglect gender problems and some even deny the existence of the gender gap and inequality of opportunity. This paper critically examines the argument denying the gender gap in Russian labor market.
First of all, the gender disparity in the labor market is reflected not in unemploy-ment rate but in the structure of labor market. Almost 70 percent of workers who had dropped out of employment were women. Many of them seem to have chosen to retire or to stay at home. It is hasty to assume the gender equality in the labor market without considering the reason why these women have left for economically nonactive.
It is an undeniable fact that there exists gender segregation in Russian labor market. The main point of dispute lies how or why gender segregation is generated. Interindustry wage differentials are explained by the fact that average wages in‘feminized’ (women's) industries such as light industry, education or health care are relatively low. Under the condition of gender segregation, the widening of interindustry wage differentials are manifest in the widening of wage differentials by sex. On the other hand, the wage differential is caused by the fact that women take relatively low-wage and low-skilled jobs in the branch. Economists denying the existence of the gender gap explain this situation as a result of ‘normal’ function of market, that is, a result of free choices made by individuals. They argue that women are more tolerant of low-wage jobs because of their position as subsidiary earners in household. How-ever, this explanation already presupposes the dominance of patriarchal ideology, which is one of the typical form of gender discrimination.
In reality, gender segregation is caused by inequalities of opportunity for recruitment and advancement within a company between men and women. Therefore, the differences in job evaluation of workers would not correspond to the differences in real skill level of them.
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that in Russian labor market in 90's there were apparent gender gap in both wage and employment. While withdrawal of women from the workplace was strongly affected by the severe depression resulting from the transition, the important factor that made women main victim of depression would be informal inequalities of opportunity for recruitment and advancement. Fe-male-worker's individual decision which concerns joining the workforce was made within the framework of this inequality.

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This paper aims to compare students in Vladivostok and Moscow, Russia and examine the differences between desirability of occupation and occupational prestige by analyzing answers to questionnaires.
At present, it is very difficult for Russian youths to find employment. After the demise of the Soviet Union, it became difficult for them to acquire even basic skills and gain experience through on-the-job training, the traditional way of acquiring know-how for Soviet workers. Even if they do find jobs, these are often unrelated to their majors and/or specialties in the higher education institutions. It should also be noted that premature death rate of youths has escalated in recent years. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that the social life condition of Russian youths is significantly better than others. It is in this context that this research on occupational evaluations is conducted.
The result of our comparative research demonstrates some differences in occupational evaluations between Vladivostok and Moscow. In terms of desirability of occupation, Vladivostok youths consider job attractiveness, income, school education, knowledge and skills, while Moscow youths are interested in job attractiveness, creativity, and pride. Meanwhile, occupational prestige is characterized in terms of higher income, stable social life, school education, knowledge, skills and social network in Vladivostok, and higher income, stable social life, and influence on society in Moscow. It concludes by suggesting that Vladivostok is a kind of “education-conscious society” where students value diligence, while Moscow is a kind of “authority-oriented society”, where knack and intelligence are more important than Vladivostok.
The research also reveals that students in both cities values job attractiveness most, not easy jobs and long leisure time. As mentioned above, however, there is little chance in reality to find jobs that satisfy them. It is obvious that there is a structural gap in the Russian labor market resulting from inefficient vocational education in the higher education institutions and the so-called “educational inflation”, a situation where even higher degrees will not guarantee these jobs. Taking all things into consideration, we have to analyze the Russian labor market further with respect to various changes taking place in this country.

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Crimes are mirrors of society. This article analyzes the contents of the Russian criminal statistics that began to be released to the public from the end of the Soviet era and examines the changes of the Russian society behind the crimes.
There are three particular periods when crimes in Russia rapidly increased from 1982 to 2002. The first period is 1983, one year after the general secretary Brezhnev died. In 1983, the number of thefts remarkably increased, but the increase rate is not as prominent as the other two periods. The second period is 1989-1992, before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the number of crimes increased because morality and social order collapsed due to the following: introduction and expansion of the market economy, the social maladaptation of the returned soldiers from Afghanistan, and the confusion brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1992, atrocious crimes such as murders, rapes and robberies especially increased. The third period is 1998-1999. The financial crisis in 1998 deprived millions of people of their savings and wages. From 1998 to 1999, the number of robberies, thefts and drug-related crimes increased. After Putin was officially elected as president of Russia in 2000, however, the crime rate increase slowed and, crimes started to reduce in number in 2002.
Today the most serious crimes are crimes related to drugs, psychotropic medicines and deadly poisons. Drugs such as heroin and poppy seeds come to Russia mainly from Afghanistan and Tadzhikistan through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Turkmenistan, and the part of them flows out to Ukraine and Western Europe. Drugs are expanding to smaller cities in Russia, not to mention the large cities. A large number of crimes, including drug-related crimes, are rapidly increasing in Khabarovsk, Tyumen', Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk, and so on. Of late, the number of crimes in Moscow is more than that in Sankt-Peterburk. Behind that, there exist movements of Russian Mafias.
The unemployment rate rose after the collapse of the Soviet Union and became the highest in 1998 (13.2%) . The number of crimes, criminals and prisoners increased in proportion to the unemployment rate. Moreover, the number of crimes caused by the unemployed especially increased. This phenomenon, of course, was related to the economic conditions behind it. Among the young, those who don't go to school and have no job, increased in number and they tend to commit crimes such as robberies and thefts. In 2002, the number of crimes in Russia reduced a little, but the number of murders and drug-related crimes were larger, and the number of thefts were smaller compared to America, Japan, Britain, France and Germany. It seems that a large amount of illegal drugs flows underground in Russia.
Now not only does the Russian government have to reinforce anticrime and anti-Mafia measures, but also have to reinforce the redistribution of wealth for the week, to promote national welfare, to regulate corruption of government officials and to promote tax collection in order to reduce the number of crimes. To do so, first of all, the government must further develop the economy and accumulate wealth.

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Boris Brutzkus is well-known for his pioneering and penetrating criticism against the Socialist economy. However, relatively less known is the fact that he defended the social role of government to protect the interest of the people. The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct and appreciate his vision of economic development underlying such a unique standpoint.
For this purpose Brutzkus's following two important contributions will be investigated: i) his report “Economic Precondition for the Reconstruction of Agriculture” made at the All Russian Congress of Agronomists held in March 1922; ii) his paper “Agrarian Overpopulation and Agrarian Institution” published in the organ of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture in June/July 1922. Both of them include profound insight into the causes of catastrophic destruction of Russian agriculture after the October Revolution as well as several important policy proposals for its restoration.
Brutzkus attributes the root cause of agrarian catastrophe to the “black redistribution” and emphasizes that it is not only the Soviet government but also all of the intellectuals and the people who must free themselves from the illusionary idea that the agrarian problem can be solved by nationwide land redistribution. Fully recognizing the limits of NEP as partial liberalization under the Communist dictatorship, he supports the basic direction of NEP for the reason that it serves the interest of Russian national economy.
In his schema of national economy, the dynamic agro-industrial linkage, especially the smooth flow of labor from agriculture to urban industry constitutes one of the essential factors in the process of economic development. Coupled with slowness of industrialization, Russian land community hindered this flow of population and became the hotbed of agrarian overpopulation. Agrarian policies and agrarian institutions must be favorable for such a flow and at the same time soften the pain attendant on it. From this follows the necessity of guaranteeing peasants the right to dispose of their land freely. Owing to some fundamental differences between agriculture and industry, this right brings not the victory of agrarian capitalism but promotes the growth of peasant economies and their adaptation to the market environment.
For Brutzkus, the national economy is a huge social framework giving its members economic and cultural wealth that they cannot produce alone. Flowering of individual freedom needs development of the national economy. The reason he affirms capitalism and rejects Marxian Socialism is that he firmly believes that the development of national economy in the industrialization era is possible only under capitalism and that individual freedom is inseparable from the private ownership of the means of production. However, as is shown in his argument of the relative advantage of peasant economy in agriculture, dominance of capitalism is neither exclusive nor unconditional even in the market. His vision of the desirable national economy can be characterized by it compositeness and variety created by the mixture both of capitalist institutions playing the leading part and of various kinds of non-capitalist institutions playing secondary but often essential roles.
The above-described Brutzkus's vision is highly suggestive in its rare combination of economic logic and due attention to historical factors. Understanding of this vision will be of considerable help in an in-depth appraisal of his critical analysis on the Soviet economy.

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