The economic recovery of Russia after the financial crisis in August 1998 has been driven by a large amount of “net export”. The “net export” was produced by low exchange rate of ruble and high price of oil. Using rough estimates of the future trend of the exchange rate and oil price, we can conclude that the Russian economic boom will not suffer a serious setback in the near future. In the longer term, however, Russia will face political and economic difficulties if Russians cannot restructure the oil-gas monoculture, which has been existed at the core of the economic recovery until now.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse factors influencing the policy making in Central Eastern European countries and is to claim that the legacies of the socialist regime have been influencing the current policy of these countries by taking examples of the environmental policy of the Czech Republic and Poland. Main discussions can be summarized as follows: 1) There exists a difference between Polish environmental policy and Czech's environmental policy. While Poland has formulated systematic environmental protection system with advanced mechanisms since the socialist era, Czech's environmental policies, mainly relying on classical command and control tools, have been introduced after the collapse of the socialist regime. 2) This difference cannot be explained by focusing on the political institutions because there exists little difference in political institutions between the two countries. It also cannot be explained by focusing on the party system of these countries, as the environmental issue has not worked as a cleavage for party competition in these countries during the transition period. 3) The need to adapt the national law to the acquis communautaire (or the effect of what is called “Europeanization”) has some influence on the environmental policy of the two countries. However, this does not mean that the environmental policies of these countries have “converged.” 4) It is likely that the institutional and policy legacies of the socialist regimes have influenced the current environmental policies, as the difference of the two countries had already existed during the socialist period. However this point needs further theoretical refinement.
This paper argues that Russian democracy has become a charade, like Potemkin villages, caused by Putin's personality and his method of leadership. We can discern four types of viewpoints about the Russian political system under Putin. The first is the “affirmation/optimism” type, as represented by Anatol Lieven's view. He asserts that Putin is a “convinced reformer, dedicated to modernizing Russia” Scleifer and Treisman make a similar argument, advocating that Russia has become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy and noting that the common flaws of such a democracy are not incompatible with future economic and political progress. Russian analyst Vyacheslav Kostikov takes the same view and points out that Putin promotes “a pragmatic democracy”, which differs from the western style of democracy. The second is the “affirmation/pessimism” type, as represented by Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov. He has a pessimistic outlook for the future, while, to some extent, supporting the current Putin system. The third is the “negation/pessimism” type. American scholar Richard Pipes has a very negative opinion about the present, as well as the future, of the Russian political situation. He asserts that “Russia's democratic institutions have been muzzled” and “its cooperation with the international community far from assured.” Russian sociologist Olga Kyshtanovskaya, known for her elite studies, takes a similar pessimistic position. The fourth type, to which this paper adheres, is “negation/optimism”. Most Rus-sian liberal intellectuals maintain this point of view. Vladimir Ryzhkov, a member of the Lower House, believes that the Putin government is going to take “a modernization model of authoritarianism”: However, he adds that this model cannot overcome such problems as poverty and corruption in Russia. Therefore, in his view, opinions demanding big changes will increase around the time of the government elections, from 2007 to 2008. Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova takes a similar position and expects a growth of grass-roots democracy in Russia. We can verify concretely the deficiencies in Russian democracy by looking at the process of the national election campaign in 2003 and 2004. The OSCE election monitor group concluded that the election process for Parliament, as well as the President, did not reach the international standards of a democracy. Russian political journalist Elena Treguvova confirms that Putin's political outlook and behavior are not suited to politicians in a democratic country. She asserts, first, that Putin has no charisma as a public politician. Second, Putin is an expert who “mimics” the manner of the person to whom he is talking. Third, Putin often takes a strong attitude when someone points out problems in his work. Fourth, Putin used to be extremely faithful to an order from a superior official. Fifth, Putin is bluntly strengthening control over the media. Under such a president, we cannot expect Russian democracy to make progress. Putin's limits are not, however, the Russian nation's limits. It is, therefore, groundless to assume that Russia will never become a democratic country in the future.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States has been increasingly inclined towards unilateral actions in international relations, while Russia, which has declined to the status of a middle class power, has become far more discreet in its foreign policy strategies. This was seen especially during the Boris Yeltsin period, when a mixture of cooperation and conflict in US-Russian relations could be seen. After Vladimir Putin took office in May 2000, Russia has begun to attempt the reorganization of its present international relations strategy into a multipolar system while also assuming the role of a world-class power. In the beginning days of President Putin's administration, conflict, rather than cooperation, defined the relations between the two countries. However, after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, Russia has started to attach greater importance towards cooperation in the international war against terrorism. Russia opted to cooperate with Washington D.C: s plans for Central Asian Countries and the Republic of Georgia, which ultimately resulted in a US military presence in these countries. In March 2003, with the beginning of US attacks against Iraqi without a resolution from the UN Security Council, Russia with France and Germany criticized the US decision as a unilateral military action made with total disregard to international law. However, did the development of the Iraqi war actually damage US-Russian relations? Close analysis of events and policy decisions suggest that, despite severe criticism of the United States' actions, Russia has not changed its basic stance with dealing with America. Cooperation with the US continues to have a vital importance for Russia's national interests as well as its concerns about international terrorism. Will cooperative relations between the US and Russia last in the foreseeable future? Two major challenges exist for both countries. First, the US military presence will continue in post-Soviet regions, especially in Central Asian Countries and the Republic of Georgia regardless of any developments or breakthrough in international terrorism. The political forces in Russia have already assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the US because of this situation. Putin has been repeatedly criticized for allowing an agreement that is of greater advantage to the United States than Russia. Second, with the expansion of NATO in 1999, and again in 2004, with seven Eastern European countries and the three Baltic states joining NATO without considering Russian opinion, revives historic Russian fears about the security of its Western border. If NATO expands into CIS countries, the relationship between Russia and these former satellite states will be thrown in a period of significant crisis. In the event of this taking place, Russia would be forced shift not only its present attitude toward the US but also its entire foreign policy strategy. The result would be a return to growing conflict between the United States and Russia.
This article aims to analyze the responses of the Visegrad Four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to the Iraq War which started on March 20, 2003. Central and East European countries, including these four countries, were considered to be“pro-American, ”particularly as demonstrated by their leaders' signatures to“the Letter of Eight”or“the Declaration of the Vilnius Ten, ”issued at the end of January, and at the beginning of February 2003, respectively. U.S. unilateralism was particularly notable during the period between November 2002, when the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1441, and May 2003, when the US declared an end to major combat in Iraq, and the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483. Specifically during this period responses of the Visegrad Four countries to the crisis in Iraq differed significantly from one another. Poland, for example, sent its special forces unit (GROM) to Iraq at the beginning of the War. The Czech and Slovak Republics deployed their NBC weapon response units in Kuwait, however they did not engage militarily in Iraq. Hungary allowed the U.S. to use an airbase located in its territory as a training ground where Iraqi opposition members were trained by U.S. forces as police officers and interpreters, but it did not send any military units to the Middle East during this period. The military measures taken by the four countries varied in accordance with the different agendas of their respective key parties in parliament. Generally speaking, the main pro-American factions were the Trans-Atlanticists within the center-right parties, who oriented themselves toward mainstream European Christian democrats or liberal democrats. Realism among center-left social democratic parties, especially the parties in power, was another factor which encouraged conciliatory attitudes toward U.S. policy and the crisis in Iraq. At same time, however, a considerable group of social democrats opposed U.S. unilateral military actions in Iraq because of their high regard for maintaining multilateralism in respect to agreements established by international institutions, such as the UN, NATO or the EU. Therefore, center-left parties faced a dilemma in evaluating whether or not to support military action in the Middle East. Extreme leftists, nationalists and Catholic traditionalists were almost universally opposed to dispatching troops to the Middle East. However, most of these were only“protest parties”which did not have the actual ability to influence decision-making in parliament. One of the key factors which inhibited Central and East European participation in the U.S. military's intervention in Iraq was in fact heavy criticism leveled by populist opposition parties. These parties were sensitive to public criticism of U.S. unilateral military activity in Iraq and thus blocked local involvement therein. Thus, the differing responses of each country to the Iraq War can be viewed as a reflection of local political dynamics between the Pro- and Anti-American forces within each country's internal politics.
Zoshchenko, like many other Russian writers during the 1920s, was interested in psychoanalysis. Zoshchenko criticized Freud in his novel, Before Sunrise, when the Soviet government blamed psychoanalysis in Stalinist Russia. Some scholars suspected that his criticism was merely an excuse for pursuing his interest in psychoanalysis and that the novel was condemned specifically because of references to Freud. After the era of “perestroika”, many biographical materials have been documented and published. As a result, now we can discuss Zoshchenko's interest in psychoanalysis more accurately. In Before Sunrise Zoshchenko analyses his dreams in an attempt to recognize his earliest experiences, which he has forgotten. He intends to find stimuli, which cause his melancholy, in his past. This idea is based on the physiological psychology theories of Pavlov, but Zoshchenko's search of trauma in his life and his symbolic interpretation of dreams are more reminiscent of Freudian theory. Zoshchenko's interest in psychoanalysis and physiology is consistent with the literature at that time. His interest shows his belief in reason; which was emphasized in the Stalin era. Such an emphasis on science can be seen in newer literary genres: Science Fiction and Socialist Realism. Psychoanalysis, however, influences the style of Before Sunrise as well as its philosophy: symbolism of psychoanalysis penetrates not only the interpretation of dreams, but also the description of real life. Various biographical materials show that Before Sunrise was condemned not because of references to Freud, but because of its support of individualism and deviations from the canon of the Socialist Realism, both of which were consistent with psychoanalysis.
In Montenegro, there has been a deep divide between those who seek the independence of Montenegro and those who oppose it and seek the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation or the union with Serbia. It is well known that there is a correlation between the ethnic identity and the attitude towards this issue, particularly among ethnic minorities such as Albanians, Muslims (Bosnjaks) and Serbs. While one tends to assume that the ethnic identity is an independent variable that affects the behaviour towards the issue of statehood, I would argue that this assumption does not hold for Serbs. To do so, I firstly examine the correlation between the ethnic identity and the behaviour towards the issue of statehood. Secondly, by examining the census data of 1991 and 2003 in Montenegro, I point out that there seems to have been a significant scale of re-definition of the ethnic identity. In particular, a significant number of those who now regard themselves as “Serb” did not indeed do so only 12 years ago. This suggests that the assumption discussed above is wrong and the causal relations run in the opposite direction: they re-defined themselves as “Serb” because they support the maintenance of the union with Serbia. Thirdly, I briefly examine some factors that might possibly have affected the decisions made by those who regarded themselves as “Montenegrins” in 1991 to support or oppose the independence of Montenegro.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the Russian translation of Murasaki Shikibu's The Tale of Genji, focusing on mono no aware. Mono no aware has been regarded as the key concept of this literary classic, ever since it was first proposed by Motoori Norinaga. N.I. Konrad's Russian translation of the third chapter (Utsusemi) was done in 1924, prior to the English translation by Arthur Waley. However, thereafter Konrad translated only the first, second, and fourth chapters. The complete Russian translation was carried out by T.L. Sokolova-Deliusina, and was published in 1991-1993. It is this complete translation that forms the principal basis for our study. According to Norinaga, aware is originally an exclamation, and as a noun and an adjective verb, it expresses deep, heartfelt emotion, including not only sorrow but also joy and amusement. Moreover, mono no aware is the emotion of aware that is aroused when one intuits “the heart of mono - things”: Ohnishi Yoshinori defined aware as the aesthetic category that was formed under the influence of thoughts about the evanescence of life. Ivan Morris noted, “Aware is one of the many untranslatable words that are used to define Japanese aesthetics”: Mono no aware is known in English as “the pathos of things” (translated by Ivan Morris), or as “pity of things” (translated by Royall Tyler) . With regard to Russian translations of the story, Konrad, in his paper titled Murasaki Shikibu's novel, translated mono no aware as “chary veshchei” (lure of things) . He further explained that it was the Japanese aesthetic principle of the need to comprehend the “ocharovanie” (charm) that is inherent in various things. In the preface of the complete Russian translation of Genji, Sokolova-Deliusina translated the concept as “pechal'noe ocharovanie veshchei” (sorrowful charm of things), and wrote that it connected the attractive beauty of the material world with thoughts about its transience and fragility. It is commonly understood by both the Russian and English translators that mono no aware comprises elements of sadness, sorrow, and thoughts on evanescence. However, it could be said that Russian translators regard this concept as involving the element of “charm”. This was supplemented by Sokolova-Deliusina in her explanation that by sensing aware, the essence of things can be comprehended. Therefore, mono no aware is aspiration of the soul to attain the eternal sources of things, and its desire to capture their elusive meaning. For certain sections of the story, Sokolova-Deliusina translated aware or mono no aware as “sorrowful charm”, and “to comprehend the heart of things, their secret meanings”, all based on her above explanation of this concept. It is also worth taking into account that for the very same sections, none of the English translators of The Tale of Genji interpreted aware or mono no aware in the same manner as that of Sokolova-Deliusina. A book review of Sokolova-Deliusina's Russian translation of The Tale of Genji describes it as “unique in aesthetic value”. As we have examined, due to her profound understanding of mono no aware, such an evaluation is well deserved.
This paper aims to examine the standpoints of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in the field of Justice and Home Affaires; especially the field of police cooperation in the context of European Enlargement today. This paper, mainly, focuses on the European Union's assistance policies of Justice and Home Affaires for Candidate countries. These EU assistance policies are divided into two broad categories. One category is policy as the part of pre-accession assistance called PHARE. And the other category is called specific assistance policies including GROTIUS, STOP, OCTOPUS, OISIN, ODYSSEUS, and FALCONE. The purpose of the former policy is to make candidate countries join the EU successfully with the twinning approach (training programs for assistance) . On the other hand, the purpose of the latter policies are implementing the ability of law enforcement of assisted countries in each specific field such as combating human trafficking, Criminal Justice and so on. Before 5th EU enlargement, CEECs as candidate countries, received assistance policies of both categories from the EU and EU member countries. However, on the way to achieving full membership in the EU, CEECs standpoints were changing gradually from their candidate positions. After finishing 5th EU enlargement successfully, EUROPOL (European Police office: Main institution for police cooperation at the European level) has launched “EUROPOL Enlargement Project” for coordinating the accession process of CEECs on behalf of EUROPOL successfully. In this context, the standpoint of CEECs is a likely candidate country assisted by EU and former member states of EU. But at the same time, CEECs start to assist new candidate countries of the EU (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey) with their political and administrative experience and successful accession process to the EU through By-and Multi- lateral cooperation with these candidate countries. For instance, in 2002, the Hungarian Government offered to assist the Croatian government reform the government institutions of Croatia for joining the EU. It is specifically mentioned that this offer is earlier than the European Commission's proposal for applying the experience of new member states. These two aspects show that CEECs have been partially assisted countries, at least in the field of EUROPOL cooperation, but at the same time, have tried to make the best use of their experience of accession as the assistance tool for new candidate countries. In other words from the context of European integration (Deepening and Enlargement of the EU), CEECs have kept a nearly assisted position in the deepening phase while trying to achieve an assisting position in the phase of enlargement. The result of the examination is that CEECs are now on their way to changing their standpoint from assisted countries to mediation countries between the EU and new candidate countries in the field of police cooperation.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the reforms of local public finance in Russia that have been carried out during the first term of the Putin administration from 2000 to 2003. The building processes for home rule and local pubic finance institutions in Russia started during the 1990s, although it was after 2000 that a comprehensive fiscal reforms focusing on municipalities ensued. Therefore, after a brief survey of the problems during the 1990s that caused reforms to be necessary, this work attempts to examine a“Program for the Development of Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation in the Period until 2005”that was introduced in 2001 and gave an orientation for reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relationship. The program tried to strengthen federal control over local public finances, by introducing uniform rule at federal level for the delegation of expenditure authority, revenue distribution, and intergovernmental transfers, that have to be applied to all levels of government. It also aimed at improving the efficiency of local public finances by strengthening the fiscal independence of the municipalities. As a result of the reforms, local government retained less taxable revenue source, causing them to depend more heavily on fiscal transfers from federal and regional government. This change imposed certain constraints on the expenditure patterns of local governments, and caused changes in the local public service systems; subsidies for housing and public utilities were reduced, while social assistance to residents was increased. However, the actual reform process did not necessarily embody the ideals of the program in the sense that did not strengthen the fiscal independence of the municipalities. It can be said that distinguishing feature of fiscal reforms under the Putin administration is an attempt to concentrate more fiscal resources within the federal budget while simultaneously strengthening political control over municipalities. And thus federal government tried to restructure the lax management of local public finances through reforms from above.