Contemporary Russia is considered one of the most multiethnic countries in the world. Consequently, questions such as “how to recognize ethnicity?” can give rise to serious problems. The Russian census is the focus of this discussion. When the first All-Russian Census was conducted in 2002, a number of groups demanded that their ethnicity be recognized. The second All-Russian Census was conducted in October 2010. Similar to the previous one, although on a smaller scale, this census process caused a controversy regarding the recognition of ethnicity. The governments of ethnic republics, especially Tatarstan, widely appealed for the integration of the nations. The director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow, V. Tishkov, emphasized the respect toward self-definition. Moreover, he insisted that a double-ethnic affiliation like “tatar-bashkir” should be recognized as an answer to the census. In this way, he attempted to adhere to every person’s opinion. However, in recent years, Tishkov has been actively arguing the importance of the unification of the “Russian nation [Rossiiskii narod]”. Contrary to Tishkov’s ideas, ethnic intellectuals such as Tatar historian D. Iskhakov have attempted to prove the validity of the unification of the nation. He insists that the integration and formation of the Tatar nation was completed on the basis of high culture, which was developed in the context of the standardization of Tatar language, rising rates of literacy, and activization of transmigration from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. He regarded each group’s movement for independence from the Tatar nation as a process of the nation’s breakdown and a result of the Soviet legacy. In reviewing these ideas, we can see that they both, at first, denied the Soviet ethnic policy. Tishkov criticized it by stating that the Soviet ethnic policy created a fixed ethnic framework and the hierarchies in it. Iskhakov considered the Soviet ethnic policy to be a way for the central government to suppress the ethnic minorities. Later, they actively publicized the European ethnic idea. At the same time, when we consider what they say, we find that the Soviet ethnic idea is reflected in their way of thinking. Iskhakov’s idea is, in principle, based on a fixed understanding of ethnicity. This tendency resembles the Soviet understanding. On the other hand, Tishkov often refers to the 1926 census as the ideal one. Moreover his emphasis on the “Russian nation” brings to mind the idea of a “Soviet people [sovetskii narod]”. When we pay attention to the reactions from ordinary people, we also find the Soviet ethnic policy being reflected. When they are asked about their ethnic affiliation, most of them refer to the name of an ethnic group that was written in the internal passports during the Soviet era. In Russia today, the understanding of the nations is contradictory. Most intellectuals have attempted to overcome the Soviet idea of nations and introduce European thinking. However, on the other hand, we see a continuation of Soviet ideas on the basis of their arguments.
The paper discusses the controversies on the history of non-Russian peoples in the USSR among the Soviet Marxist historians in the 1920s to early 1930s. The development of early Marxist historical science in the USSR was closely related with the policies of the party. The party leaders distinguished the nationalism of the oppressing nations from that of the oppressed nations, and considered “great power chauvinism,” or Russian nationalism, the main danger. Accordingly, the study of all the peoples in the USSR and the improvement of their cultural level became an important task for scholars, including historians. At the first convention of the All-Union Society of Marxist Historians in December 1928 to January 1929, the study of the history of the peoples in the USSR was declared as the main task of Soviet historians. For the first time, the historians faced the problem of how to interpret the history of non-Russian peoples from the Marxist perspective. One main arguing theme was the evaluation of the Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples. Another main problem was the tendency of “the great power chauvinism” of the Russian Marxist historians; this issue was raised by Ukrainian Marxist historians, including M. Iavorskii. They criticized some Russian Marxist historians for underestimating the Ukrainian elements in the history of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and for not acknowledging the independent features of the cultural, social, and economic history of Ukraine. However, M. Pokrovskii, the most authoritative Russian Marxist historian, did not accept the criticism, and thus, the historians never reached a consensus. In contrast, the problems that became serious themes in the Stalin period, such as the evaluation of the Khan who led the rebellion of non-Russian peoples against Russia, or the evaluation of the “Holy war” by the Muslim population against Russian rule, were given less attention by the historians. At the end of 1929, when “the cultural revolution” began, not only did the non-Marxist intellectuals receive criticism, but the debate among the Marxist historians became strained. In Ukraine, the criticism against Ukrainian nationalism caused mass political oppression, and the most famous non-Marxist historian, M. Khlshevskii, and Marxist historian, M. Iavorskii, were both arrested. The class factor was put forward in the historical interpretation and this change was reflected also in the study of non-Russian history. The leaders of rebellions against Russia in nineteenth-century Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus and of the rebellion against Poland in seventeenth-century Ukraine came to be evaluated as repressors of the masses, and their dissatisfaction against the ruling classes was considered to be a driving force of these rebellions. In the Stalin period, historians tried to reevaluate the tradition and the leaders of each people and again faced the problem of the harmonization of the class elements and the national character of each people. This problem remained unsolved from the 1920s. Thus, in the discussion of the early Soviet period, we can see the roots of the fierce discussion among the historians and politicians of the Stalin period.
This study examines the extent of job structure reorganization in Russian enterprises with an emphasis on path dependency on Soviet-type job classification. Human resources is an organizational source of competitive advantage. HRM (human resource management), introduced to Russia by Western countries, is presumed to help Russian enterprises reform their management, but its practical application is difficult for most Russian enterprises that are used to the “Russian Classification of Workers and Employees Occupations and Wage Grades,” regulated by state and inherited from the Soviet era, in their personal management and wage system. Most researchers have focused on cultural diversity in introducing Western HRM to Russian enterprises, but have not paid attention to the job design within these enterprises. We conducted an in-depth interview of a company’s human resources managers to understand the organizational structure of the HRM department and their recent development of HRM practices. We also conducted a large-scale interview survey of executives from more than 430 Russian companies to obtain their view of their HRM practice. The company we visited for the in-depth interview was a former state enterprise with a long history from the Soviet era. The organizational structure designed for the human resources management department lacks the function of conducting job analysis, and thus the main tasks of the department remain the same as those during the Soviet era. They insist that the wage system of this company has changed from the old regime, but these changes concern merely flexibility of wage rates, not job redesign. In addition, using a large-scale interview survey, we examined their dependency on the job classification inherited from the Soviet era, the frequency with which they conduct job analysis, their dependency on the wage system inherited from the Soviet era, and the extent of job enlargement. Our findings indicate that most enterprises still employ the “Russian Classification of Workers and Employees Occupations and Wage Grades” and do not have their own job design. The wage system also heavily depends on the wage grades regulated by the Russian government. They frequently conduct job analyses, but we suggest this has not been conducted for the purpose of job redesign. The executives believe that their jobs have enlarged, but they have enlarged without job redesign. Therefore, we conclude that Russian enterprises have not developed their newly introduced Western HRM in their course of management reform, and most still employ the rigid job classification and wage system inherited from the Soviet regime to manage their employees. But these companies still have survived economic crises and their factory workers have kept working in each job module classified by the state. Human resource management in Russia has not been substituted by western human resource management. It has evolved from the Soviet-type HRM to a Russian HRM with the introduction of some western HRM practices.
The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the nature of Russia’s security issues with China by focusing on two areas. Firstly, the study will see examples from Russia’s bilateral security relationship with China. Secondly, the analysis will subsequently provide an overview of the countries’ wider global interests. Resultantly, the article hopes to show that there exists no governing principle per se in Moscow’s relationship with Beijing but rather a cautious case-by-case approach. Reconciliation over border demarcation, an issue that spilled over into the actual conflict in 1969, has been critical in assuaging security relations between Moscow and Beijing. In their settlements of 1997 and 2004, both China and Russia made significant concessions on this issue despite fierce opposition within each country. This negotiation process was combined with the development of their relationship from reconciliation towards “strategic partnership.” However, Moscow’s efforts were driven by a longstanding desire to remove unstable elements on the border rather than an actual aspiration for greater security cooperation. Furthermore, Russian arms sales to China were a significant factor in their relationship and did reinforce China’s modern military capabilities especially towards the sea. However, arms trade has declined since 2007, largely due to the changing interests of Russian manufacturers and the Chinese equipment program. An export of RD-93 engines to China was suspended following the claim from a military industry executive that such components would be used in the construction of FC-1 fighters, a major export competitor to Russia’s own MiG-29. A dichotomy therefore exists in Russia between those seeking export income and those who wish to keep Chinese military capability below their own. Interestingly, Russian exports to India, a potential rival to China, are not so constrained. The first joint military exercise between China and Russia called “Peace Mission 2005” involved thousands of troops and was partly driven by a desire to show power and solidarity. Yet recent military exercises correspond to each country’s practical needs. In the “Peace Mission 2010” joint exercise, China for example focused on long-range flight capabilities. Russia meanwhile devotes more time and resources to joint exercises with former Soviet partners within the Collective Security Treaty Organization than it does with China. Finally, China and Russia share resistance to Western humanitarian intervention and pressure for democracy yet both countries found it hard to coordinate their opposition efforts in the 1990s due to varying interests. In the late 2000s each of Russia and China increasingly conducted independent foreign policies, confident in their increased international influence. But whilst common interests make both countries take similar approaches, coordination between them remains scant. In conclusion, the progress of each security issue depends on practical situations related to it rather than an overarching concept between Beijing and Moscow, such as that which used to determine relations during the Cold War. Whilst both share common non-interventionist policies, these are more often sought independently rather than cooperatively. In essence, a deeply embedded fear of China makes Russian bilateral policy cautious, eager not to turn China into a security concern.