We first introduce several paradoxical findings in intertemporal choice (i.e., impulsivity and preference reversal over time) and recent findings in the relationship between time-perception and intertemporal choice. Next, we address how a relatively novel temporal discounting function (i.e., the q-exponential function) can parameterize the degree of the impulsivity and deviation from exponential discounting. Based on these considerations and concepts in cultural psychology, it is predicted that Westerners and Easterners may be different in the degrees of impulsivity and decreasing impatience. Future study directions including neurogenetic analysis of the differences in temporal discounting behavior are discussed.
The aims of this study were to identify predictors regarding people’s willingness to be vaccinated against influenza and to determine how to improve the inoculation rate using our original large-scale survey in the USA in 2005. The main results are (a) a model of bounded rationality explains vaccination behavior fairly well, i.e., people evaluate the costs and benefits of vaccination by applying risk aversion and time preference, while the ‘status quo bias’ of those who received vaccinations in the past affect their decision to be vaccinated in the future, (b) it is recommended to increase people’s knowledge regarding flu vaccination, but not regarding influenza illness, (c) reducing the vaccination fee may be ineffective in raising the rate of vaccination.
幸福度を継続的に自己管理するための手法として，カレンダー·マーキング法を開発した．カレンダー·マーキング法は，一日の終わりにその一日を振り返り，主観的な評定を行う手法である．すなわち，評定の結果，その日がよい日であったら「◯」，悪い日であったら「×」，どちらでもない日であったら「△」をカレンダーの日付欄に記録する．心理学部の学部生を対象に，10週間，手法の実施を行った．実施後に測定したThe Satisfaction with life Scale (SWLS）では，手法の実施群と対照群のSWLSに統計的に有意差は見られなかった．SWLSと各被験者の各記号の総数との相関係数は，◯，△，×，それぞれ，0.506，－0.439，－0.237であった．分析の結果，よい日にも悪い日にも△を付ける傾向が見られた．◯を増やし△と×を減らすことによって幸福度を向上させうることが示唆された．また，被験者間，被験者内で各記号の報告には変動性が見られたことから，本手法で得られた結果は，主観的幸福度の測定手法として利用されうることを示した．
This paper presents empirical evidence concerning the tough love model of intergenerational altruism from U.S. and Japanese survey data. Our main finding is that parents' tendencies for tough love behavior depend on different measures of discount factors. We also investigate the hypotheses that parents' tendencies for tough love behavior is affected by their religious affiliations, religiosity, and their worldviews.
本稿では，年金をめぐる個人の認知バイアスを行動経済学の観点から整理する．年金の制度設計は，個人（家計）の長期的な資産形成·消費計画と密接にかかわっている．したがって，今後の年金改革にあたっては，個人の老後の資金計画についての意思決定が含むバイアスを把握することが欠かせない．ここでは特に「終身年金パズル」にまつわるBrown et al. (2008) のアンケート調査に注目した．行動経済学·実験経済学における関連研究にもとづいたそのアンケート実験からは，損失回避や心理会計といったバイアスが終身年金パズルの原因となりうることがわかった．本稿でも同様のアンケートを日本人対象に行い，認知バイアスの存在を確認した．
We investigate experimentally individual random walk perception biases and the existence of decision clustering in a simple interactive prediction task. Our design is quite general and presents a series of sequential choice problems in which the subjects are asked to forecast the subsequent outcome of a discrete binary random process. The data is generated in such a way that observation of other participants' cumulated choices makes it possible to obtain a more precise estimate of the probability distribution governing the outcomes. We are mostly interested in the timing of subjects' decisions, the decision being a binary choice of a single purchase or sale of a security within a finite time sequence based on acquired information. Our data points to some compelling insights into rationality of Bayesian updating. Majority of our subjects display a type of irrational impatience: in tasks where they should optimally learn as much information as possible and wait until the last period to decide, they make their decisions too quickly, incurring excessive decision costs. This happens even when subjects can observe others' choices at no (explicit) cost whatsoever. This finding contrasts with a setting where explicit delay costs are incorporated.
This paper studies a multi-agent moral hazard model in which the agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences developed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The agents' utilities depend not only on the realized outcomes but also on the comparisons of them with the reference outcomes. Due to loss aversion, the agents dislike wage uncertainty, and reducing it by partially compensating their failure may be beneficial for a principal. We show that when the agents are loss-averse, the optimal contract is based on team incentives (joint performance evaluation or relative performance evaluation) in which the agents partly share their wage uncertainty. Our results provide a new insight that team incentives serve as a loss-sharing device among agents.
This presentation is devoted to the study of whether or not a bilateral trading process which is recently proposed by Gintis (2007) can converge to a general equilibrium price as Gintis has asserted in his paper. Gintis assumed to have their private prices initially which are distributed uniformly, and as trading goes on, each agent tries to imitate the private price of some other agent whose utility will be larger than his own utility. His assertion is that according as transactions proceed, the average of distribution of transaction prices tends to approach a general equilibrium price. However, our presentation asserts that his assertion is not necessarily true.