In considering the causes of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (I. 23. 4-6) makes a clear distinction among αρχη and αιτιαι και διαφοραι and η αληθετατη προφαι&b.sigmav;. Of these three, the meaning of αρχη is transparent, while the other two, προφαι&b.sigmav; and αιτιαι, have allowed scholars to offer various interpretations. Here I will propose my own interpretation of them. Firstly on Trpocpaots. I believe that we should refer to the whole passage of τηνμεν αληθεστατην προφασιν, αφανεστατην δε λογω in order to get at the proper meaning of the word; that it is wrong to try to deduce it only from the first half of the passage. 'Αφανεστατη προφασι&b.sigmav; is opposite to ε&b.sigmav; το φανερον λεγομενη in its meaning; and, on the other hand, προ-φασι&b.sigmav;, with the meaning of 'pretext' and 'excuse', is naturally expected to be spoken in public. Therefore αφανεστατη προφασι&b.sigmav; is a paradoxical expression, containing contradictory concepts in itself. By this paradoxical expression Thucydides intended to attract his readers' attention to the truth hidden deep in the Trpopaais. Now Thucydides distinguishes two kinds of truth: objective truth, του&b.sigmav; 'Αθηναιου&b.sigmav; μεγαλου&b.sigmav; γιγνομενου&b.sigmav;; and subjective truth, φοβον παρεχοντα&b.sigmav; τοι&b.sigmav; Λακεδαιμονιοι&b.sigmav;, each of them corresponding with two different passages respectively: φοβουμενοι του&b.sigmav; 'Αθηναιου&b.sigmav; (I. 88), and of 'Αθηναιοι…επι μεγα εχωρησαν δυναμεω&b.sigmav;, οι δε Λακεδαιμονιοι αιαθομενοι ουτε εκωλυον…ησυχαζον τε…πριν δη η δυναμι&b.sigmav; των 'Αθηναιων σαφω&b.sigmav; ηρετο και τη&b.sigmav; ξυμμαχια&b.sigmav; αυτων ηπτοντο (I. 118). It is often, but wrongly, said that Thucydides, like Polybius, considered αιτια in history only in terms of psychology. It is true that he paid due attention to psychology and sometimes tried to give psychological explanations of historical events, but he never reduced history to psychology. In the major part of his work, he simply observes and describes τα πραχθεντα και λεχ〓εντα ω&b.sigmav; εκαστα εγενετο, as it is specifically the case with the chapters devoted to description of the Fifty Years' History. Thus, to την μεν αληθεστατην…Thucydides did no more than give a passing attention. It by no means invites us to interpret his History as psychological research of some hidden meaning of the facts. Secondly on αιτιαι και διαφοραι. Through his descriptions of incidents at Kerkyra and at Potidaea, and through those of the debates at the meeting of the Lacedaemonian allies, we know that what mattered then most was λελυσθαι τε τα&b.sigmav; σπονδαζκαι του&b.sigmav; 'Αθηναιου&b.sigmav; αδικειν; that what they claimed as δικαιον was τιμωρια against Athenian αδικια; that δικαιο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; offered them desired προφασι&b.sigmav; for opening war. In this connection scholars may be right who insist that aixiat means grievances and accusations. However, what I want to emphasize here is that no state can open war through δικαιο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; alone. In the Athenian's speech (I. 76. 2) we find a phrase, τα ξυμφεροντα λογιζομενοι τω δικαιω λογω…χρησθε. We should observe, I believe, a shade of anxiety and calculation of their own ουμφερων in the Lacedaemonians' φοβο&b.sigmav; of the Athenians. The truth, which αληθεστατη προφασι&b.sigmav; ought to point to, is no mere emotion, but rather indicative of a historical truth (it will not reveal itself in legal arguments), so far as it reflects historical facts and contains calculations of advantages and disadvantages. In the Mytilenean debates (III. 36-49) Thucydides shows us how δικαιον and συμφερον and οργη can be connected together with one another and how they can differ

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Agamemnon's speech (II. 19. 96 ff) in reply to that of Achilles is apt to be taken for an excuse, but a close scrutiny of the two speeches shows that it is nothing of the kind. It is to be noted that an "apology" is almost meaningless in the Homeric world where one believes only in an attained result without considering about its motive. Such an attitude is typical of a society where people live under "a kind of armed truce" without having the benefit of even "a limited public administration of justice"; it reflects also the Homeric theology which recognizes the divine will in every phase of human activity. Accordingly, if one's honour is hurt a recompense is sought usually not in a mere excuse but in an aquisition of wealth, and Achilles acts no otherwise when on Athene's advice he refrains from resorting to violence against Agamemnon. He seems, however, to have given up this attitude when he rejects flatly Agamemnon's offer of many gifts and Briseis' return. The reason for his conduct, which he never explains clearly, is to be sought in that he rebels against the heroic principle of behaviour according to which an offer of gifts is prerequisite to recompense an injured honour. In other words, he finds the conventional means of compensation meaningless if it were but a mere formality. All the same he is unable to give a logical explanation for his conduct, for his concept of honour differs so much from the traditional one that the epic language has no suitable words to express his disillusionment. Thus the only way left for him, when confronted with the necessity to take part again in the war, is to criticize the heroic practice through his behaviour: he is, or pretends to be, utterly indifferent to Agamemnon's gifts, and this attitude is to be explained as a bitter attack against the wide-spread acceptance of honour in the forms of material gains. But whether he wishes or not, he is given the gifts, and on the face of it he follows the pattern of heroic behaviour as if he renounced his wrath only in exchange for them. In this he is, one might say, typical of an Homeric hero. His rebellion is destined to collapse, because his criticism of the heroic principle, if carried to its logical conclusion, would have to be directed against the Homeric theology as forming the background of the heroic world and also because he has no proper words for his feelings. And since he leaves his criticism incomplete, he is after all allowed to remain within the frame-work of the Homeric narrative.

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In Aeschylus' Oresteia one may notice many elaborate images which have an important association with the motif of the work. In the present article the writer takes up the image of hunting representing two conflicting powers and tries to show how it develops organically. In the Oresteia there appear four hunting-scenes and in each of them the hunter chases the victim. The first hunting-scene. Agamemnon takes revenge on Paris for the rape of Helen and regards his own deed as δικα&b.sigmav; (Ag. 813) . Agamemnon and Troy (with Paris) are symbolized respectively by αιετο&b.sigmav; and the hare with the young. Agamemnon, however, is not only represented as αιετο&b.sigmav;, but also αιγυπιο&b.sigmav; and the lion cub. The second hunting-scene. Clytaemnestra takes vengeance on Agamemnon for the murder of their own daughter with the help of Aegisthus who desires to let him make amends for the death of Thyestes and his children. She talks of her bloody deed boastfully as μα την τελειον τη&b.sigmav; εμη&b.sigmav; παιδο&b.sigmav; Δικην (Ag. 1432), while Aegisthus is unable to conceal his joy, seeing Agamemnon caught τη&b.sigmav; δικη&b.sigmav; εν ερκεσιν (Ag. 1611). The fact that both the hunters (Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus) and the hunted (Agamemnon) are symbolized by the lion makes the family strife seem all the more horrible. The third hunting-scene. The resentment of his father's murder causes Orestes to revenge his own mother. In expectation of his appearance the chorus sing Δικα&b.sigmav; δ' ερειδεται πυθμην (Cho. 646). Orestes, the hunter, is first mentioned as αιετο&b.sigmav;, a chick of the αιετο&b.sigmav;, i. e. Agamemnon who was killed by the coil of εχιδνα (Clytaemnestra), and then compared to δρακων in the dream of Clytaemnestra. The fourth hunting-scene. The Erinyes, represented as the hounds, chase the nimble fawn, Orestes, with a view to make him expiate the matricide with his own blood. But in vain. They regard the pursuit as their duty based on the principle βωμον αιδεσαι δικα&b.sigmav; (Eum. 539). This scene makes a striking contrast with the previous ones in that the hunter fails to capture the intended victim. The failure of the Erinyes is made more apparent by Athene's intervention which may be interpreted as the attack of an Olympian against the chthonian goddesses. A close examination of these scenes shows that every hunter acts according to his δικη, and one may see in the "conflict of the two δικαι" the leading motif of the Oresteia. In each of the scenes the δικη of the hunter struggles with that of the hunted for power and comes off victorious except in the fourth scene. The defeat of the Erinyes' δικη or the victory of Orestes' δικη, on the other hand, means that the Moirai have fallen from their power and that Zeus' δικη represented by Apollon prevails. The process of the submission of the Erinyes to Zeus shows how the once dreaded gods have come to be deprived of their power and-one might say-how a similiar fate awaits also the victorious δκιη of Zeus.

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Since Boeckh pioneered in the study of liturgies in the nineteenth century, many works have been published on this subject. Yet except for incidental references, none of them have dealt thoroughly with the significance of the participation of metics in the liturgies. The liturgies originated in the period of the oligarchy and, in the democratic period, began to be performed not by noble families as in the earlier days but by wealthy citizens as honourable duties. A curious fact is that both citizens and non-citizens performed them in classical Athens where each category of population enjoyed a legal status distinct from the other. Here I want to discuss the problem of the participation of non-citizens in the liturgies and consider the significance of this fact. In the Panathenaic festival, metics performed a few fixed liturgies. Perhaps originally these accorded them honour; but, as the performer was restricted only to the metics who were humble in their social standing, the liturgies assigned to them also came to be looked upon as rather humble ones. Among the encyclic liturgies, we are certain that metics performed the choregia. However, they did so only in the Lenaean festival, which was held in winter, and for this reason they did not thrive. So the supposed honour may not have been held in common by both metics and citizens. Some scholars state that citizens alone performed the trierarchy but they do not enlarge any further upon this problem. However, as Kahrstedt has shown, the role of metics in the trierarchy was important. However, they did not become official trierarchs; there is a case of a metic embarking on behalf of a citizen trierarch. I think this cannot be the solitary example. Considering the original function of the trierarchy as a measure of naval defence substituting the naucracy, the embarkation was its most essential part. Nevertheless, in this case, a citizen trierarch bore only the financial part of his duties and transferred personal service required of him to a non-citizen. This is a parallel to the fact that citizens preferred to accept mercenaries in the army than to arm themselves. Apart from its importance in the scheme of national defence, the trierarchy had a secondary effect to promote its performers in society. The citizens wanted to monopolize the honour of bearing the title of litourgos. Therefore, when they allowed metics to take part in some liturgies, they restricted the latters' participation; when they entrusted metics the essential personal service in the trierarchy, they reserved the title of trierarch by bearing the financial part of his duties. This explains some passages in the writings of contemporaries as Aristotle, Demosthenes, Lysias etc., to the effect that, while the citizens maintained the position of litourgos to be an honourable one, in fact, they did not want to perform the liturgies by themselves, but only desired the position of litourgoi in order to win fame and they discharged the financial part of their duties for fear that they should harm their reputation by failing to perform the liturgies which they had undertaken. By the time of Aristotle, the liturgies had lost their original spirit and had become detached from their original purpose. However, as they were closely related to the democratic structure of Athenian society, they survived to the end of the democratic period.

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It would be very reasonable to expect that the theory of the κοινωια between Forms would clarify the real structure of the whole domain of Forms and would enable us to reconsturct it by means of dialectic. In the Sophist 251-9, however, Forms are divided into two groups, τα μεν κοιννειν, τα δε μη and τα δια παντων τοι&b.sigmav; πασι κεκοινωνηκεναι; and the discussion is chiefly concerned with the κοινωνια of the latter which are sub-divided into το ον, ταυτον and θατερον, and are distinctly marked out by the combined use of δια παντων with the perfect tense. I believe that these three lie on a different level from other ordinary Forms since the φυσι&b.sigmav; of each of the three has taken part in all the Forms. This difference of level is, I think, found in Plato's exemplification of several pairs of opposite Forms, ουκ εστιν…and εστιν…where the five Forms, κινησι&b.sigmav; and στααι&b.sigmav; (which belong to the group of τα μεν and τα δε μη) and the three mentioned above are applied (255 e-259 b). Mr. Ackrill (in his Plato and the Copula) asserts that Plato here analysed and distinguished three uses of εστιν: εστιν meaning existence, εστιν meaning identity, and εστιν as the copula. But his premise that the statement 'το Α μετεχει του Β' is equivalent with the ordinary attributive statement 'Α εστι Β' is hardly convincing, especially in view of the arguments of this part of the Sophist. The κοινωνια such as that of genus with species is a sort of communication between Forms of τα μεν and τα δε μη. What Plato is concerned with at present, however, is the more fundamental one. Θατερον, for example, is prior to εναντια and thus it contributes to the χωρισμο&b.sigmav; between any two Forms in the manner of προ&b.sigmav; ετερον. Ταυτον, on the other hand, contributes to it in the manner of προ&b.sigmav; εαυτον; and together with θατερον ταυτον secures the self-identity of every Form. Lastly, if the χωρισμο&b.sigmav; means το χωρι&b.sigmav; ειναι, then το ον secures the ειναι itself. Therefore, το ον, ταυτον and θατερον, provide the basis of self-identical existence for every Form. By the 'difference of level' I do not mean that there must be some formal concepts like existence or copula whose logical function in a proposition is essentially distinct from other ordinary concepts, but that every Form must acquire sufficient ontological assurance before all the communications of Forms are brought to light and the infallible knowledge of Forms comes into our possession.

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Did Timaeus make use of the Seventh Epistle? A close examination of Nepos and Plutarch leads us to conclude that we have no decisive evidence to confirm it. On the other hand, there remains without any satisfactory explanation a fact in favor of its opposite supposition: the fact of the Ephorus' failure to use this document. For it is permissible to infer that Timaeus, too, ignored it, rejecting its authenticity and its reliability as an historical source. But this inference is valid only on the presupposition that the Seventh Epistle is a public document or an open letter. If it is an actual letter and not intended for the public, it is possible to suppose that Ephorus died without knowing of its existence, whereas Timaeus used it, being of a later generation. In fact it would have taken time for the Academy to get it back and then to publish it. The author attempts to prove its actuality as an epistle and the lack of necessity of taking it as having a public character.

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The present writer published some years ago a part of his research on the important Etruscan magistratures, zilaθ(zilc), maru and purθ; this paper is concerned with some problems presented by the two inscriptions of Vulci, TLE. 324 and TLE. 325, both of which are found on a sarcophagus discovered in the same tomb. 1) There has been much discussion about the relation between the three personal names mentioned in TLE. 324: tute larθ anc farθnaxe tute arnaals haθlials ravnθu. Through comparison with TLE. 321 which has a similarity to our epitaph in syntactic construction, the present writer proposes to take farθnaxe as passive voice. Thus it will be clearly seen that it was Tute Larth who was buried in this sarcophagus and that this (anc) was offered (farθnaxe) by Tute Arnth and Hathlia Raunthu. This will naturally lead to the conclusion that it was Tute Larth who held the offices expressed by the words zilxnu and purtgvana, respectively 7 (or 8) times (cezpz) and once (θunz), and died at the age of 72 (or 82) (lupu avils esals cezpalxals). It seems to me inconvenient to unite zilxnu and purtgvana so as to interpret as one title of magistracy, "zilaθ pur", because each of them must be regarded, I think, as an independent office. That purtgvana indicates a higher position than zilxnu can be deduced from the notice of the inscription too, but I cannot decide if it is identical with purθ or not, nor explain the grammatical difference between purtsvana and purtgvavc-ti. 2) The most discussed problem of TLE. 325 is the interpretation of the phrase zilcti purtgvavcti. I cannot accept the prevailing opinion that this is the locative form of the supposed title "zilaθ purθ", meaning "in the exercise of the highest magistracy", particularly because a person who must have held the supreme office (Tutes Sethre) is believed to have died at the age of 25 (lupu avils maxs zaarums), so far as the equation zaθrum=20 is right. I would rather tend to agree with Stoltenberg that zilcti means "an assistant of Zilc" and puravavcti "an assistant of Purtvavc (?)": Tutes Sethre served as an assistant to his father, Tute Larth, who was actually a magistrate of high rank (TLE. 324). From the point of view of age, it would be impossible to comprehend zilaxnuce as a title of regular magistracy, if one tries to see in it an abbreviated form of zilx cexaneri. The word might rather represent a condition in which Tutes Sethre was not in fact a Zilc.

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