In considering the causes of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (I. 23. 4-6) makes a clear distinction among αρχη and αιτιαι και διαφοραι and η αληθετατη προφαι&b.sigmav;. Of these three, the meaning of αρχη is transparent, while the other two, προφαι&b.sigmav; and αιτιαι, have allowed scholars to offer various interpretations. Here I will propose my own interpretation of them. Firstly on Trpocpaots. I believe that we should refer to the whole passage of τηνμεν αληθεστατην προφασιν, αφανεστατην δε λογω in order to get at the proper meaning of the word; that it is wrong to try to deduce it only from the first half of the passage. 'Αφανεστατη προφασι&b.sigmav; is opposite to ε&b.sigmav; το φανερον λεγομενη in its meaning; and, on the other hand, προ-φασι&b.sigmav;, with the meaning of 'pretext' and 'excuse', is naturally expected to be spoken in public. Therefore αφανεστατη προφασι&b.sigmav; is a paradoxical expression, containing contradictory concepts in itself. By this paradoxical expression Thucydides intended to attract his readers' attention to the truth hidden deep in the Trpopaais. Now Thucydides distinguishes two kinds of truth: objective truth, του&b.sigmav; 'Αθηναιου&b.sigmav; μεγαλου&b.sigmav; γιγνομενου&b.sigmav;; and subjective truth, φοβον παρεχοντα&b.sigmav; τοι&b.sigmav; Λακεδαιμονιοι&b.sigmav;, each of them corresponding with two different passages respectively: φοβουμενοι του&b.sigmav; 'Αθηναιου&b.sigmav; (I. 88), and of 'Αθηναιοι…επι μεγα εχωρησαν δυναμεω&b.sigmav;, οι δε Λακεδαιμονιοι αιαθομενοι ουτε εκωλυον…ησυχαζον τε…πριν δη η δυναμι&b.sigmav; των 'Αθηναιων σαφω&b.sigmav; ηρετο και τη&b.sigmav; ξυμμαχια&b.sigmav; αυτων ηπτοντο (I. 118). It is often, but wrongly, said that Thucydides, like Polybius, considered αιτια in history only in terms of psychology. It is true that he paid due attention to psychology and sometimes tried to give psychological explanations of historical events, but he never reduced history to psychology. In the major part of his work, he simply observes and describes τα πραχθεντα και λεχ〓εντα ω&b.sigmav; εκαστα εγενετο, as it is specifically the case with the chapters devoted to description of the Fifty Years' History. Thus, to την μεν αληθεστατην…Thucydides did no more than give a passing attention. It by no means invites us to interpret his History as psychological research of some hidden meaning of the facts. Secondly on αιτιαι και διαφοραι. Through his descriptions of incidents at Kerkyra and at Potidaea, and through those of the debates at the meeting of the Lacedaemonian allies, we know that what mattered then most was λελυσθαι τε τα&b.sigmav; σπονδαζκαι του&b.sigmav; 'Αθηναιου&b.sigmav; αδικειν; that what they claimed as δικαιον was τιμωρια against Athenian αδικια; that δικαιο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; offered them desired προφασι&b.sigmav; for opening war. In this connection scholars may be right who insist that aixiat means grievances and accusations. However, what I want to emphasize here is that no state can open war through δικαιο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; alone. In the Athenian's speech (I. 76. 2) we find a phrase, τα ξυμφεροντα λογιζομενοι τω δικαιω λογω…χρησθε. We should observe, I believe, a shade of anxiety and calculation of their own ουμφερων in the Lacedaemonians' φοβο&b.sigmav; of the Athenians. The truth, which αληθεστατη προφασι&b.sigmav; ought to point to, is no mere emotion, but rather indicative of a historical truth (it will not reveal itself in legal arguments), so far as it reflects historical facts and contains calculations of advantages and disadvantages. In the Mytilenean debates (III. 36-49) Thucydides shows us how δικαιον and συμφερον and οργη can be connected together with one another and how they can differ
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