Although Aristotle's view in the Protr. on the nature of philosophy may, generally speaking, be called anti-Isocratic and Platonic in character, this paper, by analysing esp. Frr. 5, 12 and 13, traces Aristotle's real intention in his conception of philosophy as the following: (I) There are two distinct provinces of knowledge (επισγημη=ψρονησιζ) , each of which is different from the other in its function and character, viz., (1) Knowledge that deals with 'nature and the rest of reality' (Fr. 5), i. e. ,'philosophy' (Fr. 13), which is 'theoretical' and 'good' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (2) Knowledge that deals with 'the just and the expedient' or 'the virtue of the soul' (Fr. 5), i. e. 'politics' or 'legislation' (Fr. 13), which is practical and 'useful for our human life' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (II) The relation between (1) and (2) is such that knowledge-(2) requires knowledge- (1) as the basis for its work (cf. προσδεονται ιλοσοψιαζ, Fr. 13) ; the task of knowledge- (2) should be performed 'in accordance with' (κατα) knowledge-(1) ; or the norms by reference to which the task of knowledge- (2) is to be performed should be 'taken from' (απο) nature and truth itself which are the proper objects of knowledge- (1) . The contrast, then, between Aristotle's position in the Protr. and those of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle himself in his later treatises may be described as follows: (A) The difference from Isocrates will be obvious to every interpreter since he confines the task of philosophy to the realm of (2) which he thinks can be grasped only as 'doxa' (not as 'knowledge'). (B) While Aristotle in his later years (Eth. Nic. Bks. Z, K, etc.) comes to make a sharp separation of the province of (2) (which alone is called ψρονησιζ and concerned with that which is contingent) from that of (1) (which is called επιστημη and concerned with that which is necessary), he in the Proty. is still making (2) related to (1) (by κατα, απο etc.) and using the term ψρονησιζ to cover both. This must be called a radical difference in the sense that Jaeger once argued. (C) The relationship between the two kinds of knowledge, (meta) physical (1) and ethical (2), may seem to reflect a Platonic character; but in fact it involves an entirely un-Platonic distinction, the distinction, that is, between the good (αγαθον)belonging to theoretical knowledge and the useful (ωψελιμον, χρησιμον) belonging to practical knowledge. And, whereas for Plato Being and Value, knowledge and action, coalesce in the contemplation of the Forms, so that knowledge- (1) is at the same time knowledge- (2), Aristotle in the Protr. is virtually thinking of knowledge- (1) as the proper function of human intellect, of which knowledge- (2) is only secondary and derivative and can in consequence be dispensed with in certain conditions. This difference of thought, which again must surely be considered a radical one, is strikingly shown by comparing two philosophers' descriptions of the state of pure bliss in an ideal life: the life of the gods in 'the place beyond the heavens' (Phaedrus 247 AB) and the life of the inhabitants of 'the Isles of the Blest' (Protr. Fr. 12). In the former passage the Forms of ethical virtue such as 'Justice' and 'Temperance' are mentioned as ones which nourish and prosper the souls of the gods, but in the latter it is said that all the ethical virtues are not present since they are no longer needed and there remains nothing but theoretical knowledge- (1). In submitting these points the present writer departs significantly from the views of I. During, E. de Strycker, S. Mansion, and J. D. Monan as well as W. Jaeger.

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In the second half of the eighth century B. C. the Spartans conquered Messenia and in the course of the next century the Messenians revolted again and again. According to Pausanias, in the first half of the seventh century the Messenians revolted twice: the first being the so-called Second Messenian War, and the second, the conflict ending in 657 B. C. He gives the date of the outbreak of the first exactly viz. 685 B. C., but this date is uncertain. In 669/8 B. C. the Spartans were defeated by the Argives at Hysiai. This gave the Messenians their chance to strike at their Spartan oppressor, and to enter into the anti-Spartan alliance with Argos and Arkadia. G. L. Huxley says "there were at least two distinct campaigns in the seventh century fought by Sparta against her neighbours to the west: one, in which Tyrtaios encouraged the Spartans, from about 669 to about 657, and another against Pylos, ending about 600 B. C." (Early Sparta, p. 59.) He regarded the former as the Second Messenian War, and on this point I share his view. Some maintain that the Second Messenian War is the origin of the Lycurgan Reform, but I do not hold that view. Before the defeat at Hysiai the main constituents of the Spartan army were the so-called mounted hoplites and they were almost all aristocrats. But immediately on the outbreak of the Second Messenian War, many of the wealthy citizens were required to enter the war as hoplites, and on the battlefield they were organized into the phalanx together with the aristocrats. At that time the common people (citizens) were still not qualified to be hoplites. In the course of the second half of the seventh century the aristocrats and the wealthy citizens, by promoting foreign trade, attained great fortune and as a result a great inequality of wealth arose in the Spartan community. Meanwhile the development of phalanx-tactics required an increase in the number of soldiers, and many more citizens had to become hoplites. About 600 B. C. a disturbance broke out in Messenia, and at that time Spartan citizens were reorganized into the homoioi. The qualification to be homoioi might well have been the ownership of land and this presumably would have been accompanied by some reform of the land system. Nevertheless the homoioi's equality was unreal. There may have been no actual paupers among them but there were some who possessed exceptional wealth. Thenceforth the homoioi were permanently mobilized as full-time professional hoplites, while their kleroi were cultivated by the heilotai at all times. This homoioi-heilotai system is called the Lycurgan Regime. Together with the reinforcement of the agoge and the syssition, it was finally established in the first half of the sixth century B. C.

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In the summer of 416 B. C., the Athenians sent an expedition to bring the island of Melos forcibly within the Empire. Thucydides recorded the general course of the negotiation. "The Melian Dialogue" has been discussed from various aspects, but there are two points of view which have been considered self-evident by most critics. (1) The taking of Melos was, in itself, a rash and meaningless incident, which did not have any great influence on the consequence of the war. (2) Thucydides treats the attack on Melos as a glaring example of unjustifiable and scandalous aggression. These two points of view are, however, based on false preconceptions or prejudices which are derived from the ethical interpretation of Dionysius. One must pay attention to the political situation of those days. The occupation of Melos, "for which Nicias had always argued" was both necessary and urgent if the Athenian Empire was to secure command of the sea. After the failure of Alcibiades' Peloponnesian strategy, Nicias aimed at the taking of Melos as one of his brilliant "indirect approaches" to domestic and foreign affairs. Alcibiades, for his part, supported the massacre of the Melians and took advantage of it to promote the Sicily campaign. Thucydides was well aware of the importance of the Melian incident as a demonstration of the nature of imperialism. All the Athenian assertions in the Dialogue are backed up by his tragic vision of human nature, which like the archaic metaphysics of Anaximander contends that all beings exist in the grand circle of becoming and perishing according to the time-order. Thucydides found out in the course of the war what the ancient Hindu would have called "Karma".

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Against the commonly held opinion that the Philebus is one of the dialogues of Plato in which the method of Divison (διαιρεσιζ) is prominent, J. R. Trevaskis argues that what is described in the methodological section of the dialogue is not the method of Division specifically but classification on its more general aspect. This thesis, however, is untenable, since it strips the method of Division of its philosophical consequence. Right from the Phaedrus in which Division first appears clearly with its methodological articulation, the method is alluded to as composing one half of the dialectician's power of thinking and discussion. And it continues to appear as such in the later dialogues such as the Sophist and Statesman where the Division is amply illustrated. In the methodological passages 12 B-20 C of the Philebus, Socrates urges Protarcus, who like an exponent of the Hedonist position adheres to the unity of pleasure, to admit that pleasure can be seen as Many, in spite of its generic unity. The paradox of One and Many becomes an impediment to philosophical discussion if it is not treated properly. Socrates maintains that it is necessary to appeal to a method (of classificatory analysis) "of which he has always been an admirer" so as to secure a dialectic against a contentious discussion, -an indication that the proposed method is nothing but that of classificatory division as a part of dialectic. However, the actual classification of pleasure which Socrates proceeds to offer (31 B-53 C) does not form a cohesive classificatory scheme, unlike that in the Sophist and Statesman, which present a sort of kind-ladder in simpler form. And this may hinder us from seeing the use of the method of Division in the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus. But, if we take, as I think we should, the antithesis of "true" and "false" pleasure as axial among the various "kinds" of pleasure discussed in the dialogue, the analysis will be shown to be more consistent than it first appears. The concept of 'false pleasure', latent in the Republic but not yet formulated as such, requires much careful and minute discussion to establish. Naturally, Plato cannot promptly proceed to divide the genus of pleasure into the species, as he could in the case of the Sophist, but he establishes the antithesis of "false" and "true" pleasure only after having discussed other types of pleasure such as "mixed" and "intense" as variations of the "false" pleasure. Viewed like this, Division as applied to the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus may acquire more of the character of an "end" of a search rather than a "means" to be used to attain something else. But it may not be surprising, if we take into account the fact that for Plato there was no method to be reduced to a mechanical procedure separable from the dialectician's thought. ειδη διαιρεισθαι may not be so much a means as an end of thinking.

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It used to be argued that there were two subjects in the first satire of Horace: μεμψιμοιρια taken up in the opening section (1-22) and avavitia as the real theme of the main part (23-107) ; and various hypotheses were set up concerning the relation of these subjects, before H. Herter and E. Fraenkel proved, using historical materials, that avaritia was the cause of μεμψιμοιρια. The problem of the unity of the subject seemed then conclusively solved. Nevertheless the structural consistency of the poem itself is still regarded as problematical, though the colloquialism peculiar to the genre would justify some slight inconsistency. One finds a split after v. 22, because one immediately makes the connection between μεμψιμοιρια and avavitia. In fact Horace does not use Greek popular philosophy in its original form, but modifies it, as he often does, to this: "Because of avarice men work hard and because of their hard work they are discontented with their life." That is to say, he puts a new term, labor, between μεμψιμοιρια and avaritia, loosening the connection to some extent. Still avaritia is the real, though concealed, cause, labor being only a superficial reason or pretext. Having revealed the reality the poet can now easily connect cause and effect directly in the closing section (108-121). Theoretically then, the opening question must be as follows: "Why do men, without changing their course, continue their laborious life, though they are discontented with their situation and envy another's lot?" But such a long and complicated question would be inappropriate to satire. So the poet divides it into two parts and deals with them separately, as if they were both independent questions : first, man's discontent and envy, and then, the fact that he continues his toilsome work. The first question is followed by no real answer within the opening section, because it is by no means an independent one, and the second (v. 28) is not formed even as a question, because it is only a continuation of the same idea. Moreover the second question is already anticipated in the first section by the story of man's refusal to change his course of life. Thus the split is more apparent than real. When the answer finally comes -"Because they are avaricious" (v. 40) -it is not an answer to the second part of the question only, but to the whole question. So the opening part of the poem (1-40) cannot be divided into two by some rift at v. 22. The whole introduction is of a piece consisting of only one question and its answer.

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