This paper is an attempt to discuss a law cited in pseudo-Demosthenes LIX 16 and to depict a phase of Athenian society in the fourth century B.C. Two opposing views are expressed by scholars as to the interpretation of this law. Some regard the law, which is supposed to have been made in the middle of the fourth century B.C., as the one that forbids aliens the intermarriage with Athenians, but others maintain that it prohibits only the intermarriage on false pretences. The author attempts to examine the whole of the above-mentioned oration and to study the law in its actual application and effect. The following is his conclusion. Though apparently the text of the law interdicts aliens from intermarrying with citizens, it must be admitted that in spite of the law citizens hardly regarded the intermarriage as a matter for prosecution. Whenever someone was actually accused, there was some particular cause or causes, which affected the interests of both parties. In the case of Neaira, the defendant of the oration, it was an abusive lawsuit which her husband Stephanos brought in against Apollodoros, the plaintiff's synegoros. Generally speaking, however, the law must have been applied, when the citizenship of a young man came into question and a judicial dispute arose. The purpose of the law was not to prohibit the intermarriage itself, but to prevent more effectively children of mixed blood from having their names entered in the civic register. As a result of this enactment, perhaps some citizens refrained from attempting to enrol their sons of mixed blood in their own demos or phratria, because such an attempt exposed their foreign-born wives to the danger of prosecution. The legislation suggests that the Athenian state entertained apprehensions of the effectiveness of Periclean citizenship law. According to two Athenian orations of the same period, Demosthenes LVII (§§ 25, 51, 55, 59) and Isaeus XII (§ 2) , the illegal enrolment of aliens seems at that time by no means rare among citizens. Since the end of the fifth century B.C. the self-consciousness of Athenians as members of the polls community was on the wane, and the function of demoi, which controlled the enrolment of citizens, showed a marked decline under these circumstances. The illegal enrolment of children of mixed blood was also on the increase, and so it was necessary for the state to enact the law as a preventive measure. The legislation suggests not only that the foundation of Athenian society was gradually undergoing a transformation in the fourth century B.C., but also that the Athenian state was nevertheless sound enough to face squarely such a crisis.

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That the Histories of Herodotos contains those episodes which are narrated apparently m the historical context, but, in fact, belong to folkliterature or fiction by Hdt., has been pointed out from various points of view. In this paper, the present writer attempts to demonstrate some episodes not to be the historical facts in the light of the comparative study of folkliterature. The episode of III 36 runs as follows: Kambyses, offended at Kroisos' admonition, was about to kill him. But the servants who had been ordered to kill Kroisos sheltered him, calculating that if Kambyses should miss Kroisos, they would produce him for a reward, and that if the king should show no sign of regret, they could kih him thereupon (36, 5). Soon afterwards, when they noticed Kambyses missing Kroisos, they announced that he was still alive. Kambyses rejoiced at Kroisos' existence but executed the men who had saved his life (36, 6). While the first section of this episode is said to be based on the motif of the Story of Ahikar (W. Aly), the second part may be regarded as a fiction by Hdt. for several reasons: 1) Ancient testimonies differ extremely as to Kroisos' career after the fall of Sardis, so that his survival may be doubted. 2) A similar story is told in Sima Qian's Shiji(司馬遷,史記). In this story, however, the man who had been ordered to kill a loyal retainer was in a dilemma and killed himself. As compared with this pathetic story, the Herodotean episode of Kambyses sounds ratherlike the one that aims at displaying the narrator's wit. 3) "While in its original, the Story of Ahikar, the man who hides and preserves the sage is simply praised, Kambyses, in the Herodotean version, was pleased to know that Kroisos was safe, but punished the men who had saved him. The divergence from the archetype was probably due to Hdt.' own device. 4) Kambyses' treatment contradicts the account of I 137, where it is said that Persians never punish a man for a single offence, and that the normal Persian way is to balance faults against services. Indeed, for Dareios, services and offences of Sandoces offset each other (VII 194). 5) Hdt. reports another account containing a similar treatment. Taking a stormy passage over the Aegean, Xerxes was compelled, according to the captain's opinion, to let many passengers jump overboard to lighten the ship. On landing at the Asian coast, Xerxes rewarded the captain with a gold crown for saving the King's life, but beheaded him as being responsible for the death of a number of Persians (VIII 118). In this motif (to rejoice but punish or to praise but punish) , Hdt. imitates himself. 6) Ailianos, too, informs us of an interesting Persian custom, according to which if a man advises the king and proves to be serviceable, he is awarded the gold brick on which he stood advising, but at the same time, is flogged for his hybris (V. H. 12, 62). This account suggests that the Greeks including Hdt. took the Persians for a legally rigorous nation. And perhaps such a presumption caused Hdt. to invent the humorously rigorous treatment of Kambyses. In a more orlesssimilarway examined are I 21f, I 27, II 107, III 85ff, V 12, VI 52, VI 125 and III 31, III 34, III 119, IV 3f. In these cases, thepresentwriter believes, we must see in Hdt. a folklorist who picks up folktales and retells them rather than a historian who collects historical events and interprets them.

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In the paper, I attempt to attain to a fundamental understanding of Plato's Idea of Good. For that purpose we must trace the process which led him to build up his thought of the Idea of Good. The original type of Plato's Idea of Good appears as πρωτον φιλον(=αγαθον) in Lysis, which in Phaedo reappears in the guise of το αγαθον και δεον(99C5). I find the "ου ενεκα"-ness of αγαθον revealed in πρωτον φιλον and the "δεον"-ness of αγαθον in το γαθον και δεον. I believe that the Idea of Good has these two moments of αγαθον, and that this recognition will offer much help to our further inquiry into Plato's Idea of Good.

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In the Categories (1^a20-^b9, 2^a12-^b6, etc.), Aristotle makes a contrast between (1) καθ' υποκειμενου λεγεται (is said of a subject) and (2) εν υποκειμενω εστι (is in a subject). But why does he use λεγεται (is said) in (1), and εστι (is) in (2)? Aristotle is making an inquiry into the field of ordinary language, or rather actual language: while in (1) both τουνομα (the name) and ο λογο&b.sigmav; (the definition) are explicitly presented as the predicate (κατηγορειται) , in (2) neither the name nor the definition is presented as the predicate except some incidental coincidence of word formation (2^a27-34). We may adequately call (1) Predication and (2) Inherence. Later, (1) will develop to be the substantial predicate and (2)to be the accidental predicate; and Inherence ought to be present as predicate in some form in actual language. Making Inherence predicative results from παρωνυμα (the derivation from the name). That is, in (1), the name and the definition of substance are identically related, as being homonymous (ομωνυμα 1^a1-6) or synonymous (συνωνυμα 1^a6-12). On the other hand, the inherential predicate presents itself in actual language as nothing but η κατα τουνομα προσηγορια (addressing on the basis of the name). This name, however, is not set up through abstraction or induction of those addressings, but, from the view point of the actual use of language, must be preceded by the name. This name, being different from that in the case of substance, appearsonly as the classifying language in actual language, its definition showing "what it is" does not turn up in actual language. If one dares to look for that, one is to go beyond the level of actual language.

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The frame enclosing the song of Polyphemos contains a joke. Only after one has. completed the reading of the whole poem, does one realize that Polyphemos is, ultimately, not cured of his love-sickness as the initial gnome suggests, and that the use of the same word 'αειδειν' in two different contexts is deliberately made ambiguous: song as remedy (vv. 17-18) and as symptom of love (vv. 13-14). Theocritos is here not concerned with giving advice to his friend, rather, the point of the whole poem is put in the comic-tragic figure of a Cyclops singing of his love on the shore. The correspondence ingenuously set between v. 19 and v. 75 humorously brings home to the reader the paradoxical and incongruous situation in which Polyphemos finds himself, and he keeps holding his comic self-respect to the end of his song (vv. 77-79). Moreover, the song abounds in jokes both mythological and literary. The former type of jokes is coloured by means of the mythological themes familiar to the reader which drop from Polyphemos' mouth with some effects of tragic irony: he invokes Zeus in his oath (v. 29), being son of the sea-nymph Thoosa, he nevertheless cannot swim (v. 54), he looks forward to the arrival of a stranger (vv. 60-61) etc. Jokes are of literary nature where Polyphemos is less sophisticated and his apparently figurative expressions unexpectedly turn out to be meant. literally: he takes his dream as reality (vv. 22-24) , his song is large-scale paraklausithyron (v. 43) , the fire of love becomes in his mouth real fire (vv. 50-53) etc. His modest promise of gifts (vv. 56-59) and his extravagant complaints of grief (vv. 70-71) disclose in their naivete the absurdity of contemporary love poems' conventionalism. These jokes are meant not merely funny. They at the same time have the effect of emphasizing the genuineness of Polyphemos' feeling. And his figure is depicted so as to conform to the popular notion of melancholic poet meditating in solitude (vv. 14, 17-18). The lightly pathetic figure of Polyphemos is all the more amusing as it is nothing but a caricature of poet.

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