Everyone believes and no one doubts that Socrates was a philosopher But when and how did he practise his philosophy ? We know that in conversation with Athenian people every day, he examined their opinions about moral virtues, asking a series of questions which would reveal that their opinions contained self-contradiction, and thus compelling people into the state of aporia or difficulty We know that in practising such refutation Socrates taught people their ignorance However, was this practice Socrates' own practice of philosophy ? To be a philosopher is to be a student of philosophy Did Socrates study philosophy in his refutation of other people? We must say "Yes" In Plato's Apology of Socrates, Socrates declares that the greatest good for a human being is to converse with people and discuss virtue every day (38A) and that in his conversation with people, he examined both himself and others (ibid) In the Charmides Socrates says that he refuted his interlocutors for no other purpose than to examine what he, Socrates himself, was saying (166C-D) and inquired the meaning of the answers of other people just for his own sake (ibid) According to these words, Socrates must have been examining himself and refuting himself at the same time as he refuted other people, and he must have found his own ignorance each time he taught his interlocutors their ignorance But how is such practice possible? And in what way could such practice be called philosophy ? We would understand this if we would note the fact that Socrates and his interlocutors cooperated in their inquiry, that they collaborated in making an answer to their question, and that, at the end of the inquiry, both Socrates and his interlocutors shared in responsibility for their aporia This is just what we find in the Laches, for example In this dialogue Socrates asks Laches what courage is Laches answers that it is 'some endurance of the soul' But Socrates protests about the answer and proposes to change it to 'wise endurance' And Laches accepts this as his second answer It is obvious here for us to see that the new answer is a production of the collaboration between Laches and Socrates The new element in this second answer is the adjective 'wise,' and it was Socrates who proposed adding this element (we should notice Socrates' intellectualism here) In this way Socrates participates in the inquiry and in making an answer, and, consequently, he has to share responsibility for the failure of that answer Why, then, did Socrates not practise philosophy by himself, but needed to converse with Athenian people and cooperate with them ? Our answer will be that it is because philosophy is an inquiry into reality by means of words, the usage of which cannot be decided by one person In other words, philosophy is the practice of improving the usage of words in the community in which the philosopher lives In this practice Socrates shared aporia with his fellow citizens

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In this paper, I would like to examine the change of the soul (psyche) in fr 36 and reconsider the significance of Heraclitus explaining the soul in the physical process In fr 36, Heraclitus says that the soul becomes the water, the water becomes the earth and vice versa There is little agreement as to what the changes of the soul should be It is a disputable question whether the reciprocal changes in fr 36 are in macrocosm (that is, the extinction or production of the soul from its relation to the sea and the earth cf fr 30 and 31) or in microcosm (that is, the physiological process of the soul from its relation to the blood and the flesh) Many commentators have interpreted it as being in macrocosm However, I do not share this interpretation First, I will examine the two typical interpretations in which the soul in macrocosm is supposed (Kirk and Kahn) According to Kirk, the soul is equated with cosmic fire and 'the death of the soul' means the death of individuals in an eschatological context However, this interpretation is unsound when Kirk must suppose the relation of two fires, between 'a fiery soul' of individuals and the 'cosmic fire' Although Herachtus indicated 'the soul out of water', Kirk discounted this point and supposed falsely the soul out of cosmic fire through respiration On the other hand, Kahn intended that the soul is equated with the air Inasmuch as Heraclitus described the soul as 'dry' or 'wet', so Kahn considered that 'fire' is not suitable as a substitute for the soul from the expressive viewpoint in the fragments Although Kahn's interpretation is a correct one in view of his insistence that the soul is not fire, he overcomplicated the relation between the 'airy soul' of individuals and (cosmic) fire or water The soul as the fire or the air, which is also macrocosmic, is not suitable for the explanation of 'the death of the soul' The important point is the relationship between life and death We must recognize that, for Helaclitus, the psyche has the fundamental meaning of 'life force' and that his 'life and death' is a unity of opposites Heraclitus did not uncritically accede to antecedent ideas of the soul The traditional problem of immortality is reconsidered by Heraclitus in fr 36 The 'death of the soul' is not the biological death of the individual Rather, his use of the soul enables him to combine these aspects of the life and death of individual I would like to emphasize this point and elucidate that the soul includes death and is incessantly renewed as life by death Heraclitus refused the traditional idea that the soul of individuals continues separate from the body after death For him, the soul is not a transcendental substance separate from the body, but constantly maintains the material aspects of the bodily force So for Heraclitus the soul is not like an airy or fiery element or a cosmic soul, but the constitutive principle of the life force That is the meaning of the physiological process This suggests that the soul in fr 36 is a principle for physiological activity as the subject of the life force Finally, I wish to conclude by referring briefly to two connected contents of the soul, as a subject of this physiological activity and of the cognitive activity in other fragments.

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In Rhetoric 1 2 Aristotle says that artistic modes of persuasion are of three sorts, which he calls ethos, pathos, and logos, and he recommends all three modes However, among them pathos consists in arousing emotions, and in Rhetoric 1 1 he prohibits arousing emotions because it is not right to corrupt judgement This inconsistency between the first and second chapter of his treatise has been much discussed In this paper, I examine one prevailing explanation of the inconsistency, which one can find in E M Cope's Commentary, and with which other scholars, e g A Hellwig and J Sprute, agree According to this explanation Aristotle's statements in 1 1 concern only an ideal rhetoric, which can function only if an ideal system of laws exists which prohibits the litigants from speaking outside the subject, just like in the Areopagus, and he does not claim that under real circumstances of public life arousing emotions must be prohibited Therefore, it is not inconsistent that he prohibits arousing emotions on the one hand and recommends it on the other He regards it, so to speak, as a necessary evil under real circumstances, to be used for morally irreproachable ends But this explanation is not persuasive in that arousing emotions is regarded as corrupting the hearers' judgements, and yet allowable only if it is used, as a necessary evil, for morally right ends I argue that Aristotle regards arousing emotions not only as corrupting the hearers' judgements, but also as playing an important role in the hearers' recognition of the truth Then, in order to make clear the difference between the corrupting one and the other which enables hearers to recognize the truth, I reconsider what Aristotle means by saying in 1 1 that it is right to prohibit "speaking outside the subject" According to the above explanation, which supposes "speaking outside the subject" is identical with arousing emotions, Aristotle means that arousing emotions in itself must be prohibited But, in my view, that is not right "Speaking outside the subject" here is identical with, not arousing emotions m itself, but a corrupting kind of arousing emotions, namely, arousing emotions by means of speaking about things totally extraneous to the issue Aristotle means here that only arousing emotions in such a way must be prohibited According to this view, we can suppose, there is another kind of arousing emotions, which Aristotle does not prohibit, namely, arousing emotions by means of speaking about things which are related to the issue and so enable hearers to recognize the truth To conclude, I propose that the primary function of pathos which Aristotle recommends in 1 2 consists rather in making hearers recognize the truth than in corrupting their judgement Indeed it is undeniable that pathos in 1 2 can function also as a necessary evil, as the prevailing view has it, but I claim that it is rather a subsidiary function of pathos

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In the thought of Plotinus one of the main concerns is construction of the intelligible world, and there are many relevent descriptions throughout his works From these we can discover two types of order of the so called triad in that world according to the interpretation of Plato's Timaeus One of them sets being first, living thing second, and intellect last(Enn III-9(13)), and while another orders being, intellect, living thing (Enn VI-6(34)) In this paper I try to explain not only the reason for the latter order, but also the concept he uses in this treatise (Enn VI-6(34)) Plotinus deals mainly with the problem of the status of number in the intelligible world That problem immediately leads to another problem of the generation that of numbers, containing further difficulties, how to get the principle of plural number from one as being in spite of there being no plural things prior to that number, and how to produce multiplicity of beings from a being alone with no guidance In order to solve the problems and the difficulties Plotinus finds out the concept of a power of number with two phases One of these represents number in potential which lies in one being, and another represents number in act which comes to exist as numbers and causes one being to divide into as many beings as exist in the intelligible world That number in activity which acts like an agent to produce beings is called intellect in act According to number's changing its phases from potentiality to activity, Plotinus thinks that being in potential changes to intellect in act This is the cause for the order where intellect follows being When Plotinus refers to productive numbers as the first numbers, we notice that he clearly uses the concept of Aristotle's number theory which appears in Physics This is a very important point in appreciation of this treatise For in order to interpret Plato's Timaeus he adopts the Aristotelian theory of number without using so called Ideal Number theory which appears in Metaphysics reported by Aristotle who ascribes that theory to Plato himself and his successors On the other hand, when the order between being and intellect is fixed in such a way, the term 'complete living thing' represents all the beings which are led by the power of number in act as Intellect Because of its totality living being takes the last position in the order That fact that Plotinus sees that order to be the representation of the various phases of the intelligible world from potentiality to activity adopting Arisototelian concept of number means that this treatise should be understood only as an interpretation of the realm of existence, never as an interpretation of the transcendental absolute, the One

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The long silence about Antigone in the last part of Sophokles' Antigone has attracted the attention of many critics, and it has been a common view to find glory on her side in the catastrophe of Kreon described at the end But is it right to find her glorified at her death ? The curtness of the report of her suicide seems significant in the reverse sense if we remember that in the beginning she was confident that she could attain a kalos thanatos, in the hope of which she attempted to bury her brother knowing that she would be punished with death (72, 97) What is the meaning of her actual death in this play, then? One answer can be found if we ask whether she eventually attained a kalos thanatos Kalos was a special word, if used in a description of death, to glorify a soldier's death in battle In applying this idea to her own death as the penalty for her action of burial, she is comparing her expected death to that of a soldier She is manifesting her intention to give up her own life for that action and not to abandon that life till she is killed She asks Kreon to kill her, expecting that her life will be consumed as the price for her action So, if she had been stoned to death as the original edict had declared, her death would undoubtedly have been estimated as a kalos thanatos But Kreon changes the mode of the punishment into imprisonment, by allowing her a certain amount of food As a result, she loses the chance of a prompt death There still remains a possibility that, if she starves to death, that death will make a kalos thanatos Faced with this possibility, however, she kills herself before starvation As this death is not what was prescribed for her as a penalty and nothing but the throwing away of her own life, her death can hardly be estimated as kalos thanatos Her failure to attain a kalos thanatos, however, does not necessarily come from her suicide, but rather from the nature of her imprisonment, the essence of which is only to postpone death, as well as from the fact that, having no intention of fighting like a man, she had no chance of being killed on the spot before being arrested That is, when she was arrested, it depended upon Kreon's discretion when and how she would die unless she would kill herself In short, she had been fatally deprived of the chance of a kalos thanatos already when she began her action having no intention of fighting with a weapon as was natural for a woman, -irrespective of the meritorious act which she had performed by truly devoting her life to a righteous cause The painfulness of the failure of her resolute and confident attempt to attain a kalos thanatos is suggested by the blunt description of her death at the end of the play

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The debate in the first episode employs the opposition between the hoplite and the archer While Lycus disparages archers and exalts hoplites' bravery, Amphitryon points out a weakness of hoplites and applauds archers' cleverness It has recently been argued that the unusual portrayal of Heracles solely as an archer in the drama has the function of showing how independent he is from the others What each says about the hoplite, however, has not received the attention it deserves, in spite of the recognized prominence and importance of hoplite warfare in the classical period The present essay reexamines Amphitryon's lines on the hoplite (190-194) After this, the final scenes are discussed based on the preceding analysis First, Wilamowitz' widely accepted transposition of 191-2 after 193-4 is unfortunate since it conceals the point of Amphitryon's argument It should be noted, first of all, that the statement made in 190 is highly ambiguous "The weapons" (190) could refer to the other hoplites' arms as much as to that of the individual hoplite 191-4 provides the required amplification 190-4 as a whole centers on the hoplites' inherent defect of interdependence Breaking his spear (193-4) becomes crucial only after his companions break ranks(191-2), for the hoplites rely on each other for protection The broken spear represents a detail related to his death caused by 'the cowardice of those near him'(191), a human failure which seems to be the most significant point of the passage Second, Amphitryon's argument has a wider range of reference to Lycus and the civil strife in Thebes Lycus is reproached as 'coward' repeatedly and represented as a 'coward' hoplite He and his companions who have caused the civil strife in Thebes are censured for hurting 'those near them' so that their negative role in their polis corresponds to that of the 'coward' hophtes in the phalanx described by Amphitryon The chorus who are unable to fight now but once fought for Thebes as hoplites contrast sharply with Lycus and his companions The ideal, brave hophte of Lycus' speech is undermined In this way, Amphitryon's argument presents questions about how one should behave as 'a hoplite' or in a community, and on what foundation a community should stand Putting in question the framework of a existing community is an important theme in the drama In the final scenes, that Heracles' earlier isolation is transformed into a dependence on other human beings is signaled by military metaphor, which recalls the characteristics of the hoplite established earlier in the drama His transformation is obvious in his physically leaning on Theseus, which could be considered as a 'phalanx' relationship In consideration of the questions about the univocal understanding of 'hophte', what their 'phalanx' represents seems to be the potentiality of a new community In addition, their 'phalanx' relationship should not be identified completely with Heracles' new dependence on Athens, for the question still remains of how amicably the city can accept him, a problem man The reexamination of Amphitryon's argument about the hoplite, thus, allows us to interpret the drama from the point of view of exploring what a community should be

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Among various associations formed by the population of the Roman Empire, were ones with funeral activities as their primary purpose Th Mommsen m the mid 19th century maintained that such associations (collegia funeraticia) were made by the poor and recognized by a senatorial decree en bloc His theory is based on interpretation of a passage of Marcianus (in the early 3rd century) which reports that tenuiores were permitted to contribute monthly dues to collegia(Dig 47 22 1), and of a senatorial decree cited in an inscription of an association of cultores Dianae et Antinoi found in Lanuvium(CIL xiv 2112, AD 136) Mommsen's theory was accepted by most scholars until in 1982 it was criticized thoroughly by Ausbuttel He maintained that tenuiores in the passage of Marcianus are to be taken as common (die einfache) not necessarily poor people, and that the senatorial decree in CIL xiv 2112 recognized that collegium of cultores specifically, not all collegia funeraticia generally Moreover he denied the very category of collegia funeraticia The author examines the sources and concludes as follows Ausbuttel's interpretations of tenuiores is right, and there existed no legal category of collegia tenuiorum In the sole example of this term in Roman legal sources (Dig 47 22 3 2), it means merely "associations of common people" Ausbuttel's integration of the Lanuvium inscription, based on its revision by Gordon, cannot be accepted without reservations, but his conclusion itself is right the collegia funeraticia did not exist as a legal category We can, however, use this term to characterize a group of collegia whose main activity was care for their members' burials Members of these collegia were not so needy, if not wealthy, judging from the charges enumerated in the Lanuvium inscription (admission fee, dues, and burden for banquets) When a member died, the collegia provided the cost of funeral and burial from their funds, and other members attended the ceremonies A decent funeral was no doubt one of the strongest motives for entering these collegia However other activities, such as the cult and festivals of their guardian gods, and social banquets were no less important The construction and activities of funeral clubs, as we have seen, cannot be clearly distinguished from those of religious and professional associations Many professional associations were concerned with funeral activities in some way, and had their guardian gods maintaining temples or altars, and religious associations were evidently similar Furthermore banquets seem to have been important events to most Roman associations Collegia in the Roman Empire were voluntary associations centered around religious activities (including funerals) and sociability It would aid our understanding of contemporary social organization if we could better understand the social ties of their members

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From the second half of the 2nd century to the first half of the 3rd century, many petitionary inscriptions, which complain of the arrogance by soldiers and officials to the emperor or provincial governors, appeared mainly in Asia Minor These inscriptions may enable us to give an answer to the question how the change on the administration in the 3rd century, the process called the militarization of administration, was recognized by provincial society In this paper, we investigate first the process in which soldiers penetrate into provincial administration This process was not necessarily made by soldiers' arrogance, but was based on the officia of soldiers which were formed under the governor after the second half of the 2nd century Since the most of petitionary inscriptions originates in Asia which was a public province, we should pay attention to the process in such a province While in the imperial provinces the governor's officia which were formed with legionary soldiers played an important role in provincial administration, in the public provinces it does not appear that such ordinary officia existed under proconsul In my view, the officiates in a public province were formed under the procurator, which means that the process of the penetration of the officiates into the administration of the province corresponded with that of the procurator According to G P Burton, even in a public province, the procurator even not only managed emperor's property but also encroached on the field considered as a domain of proconsul so far In its background, since the proconsul could not fill the various administrative demands from provincial society, the society also asked the procurator for many further When the procurator who was the senior official of officiates expanded his authority in response to the administrative demand of provincial society, it may mean that the demand from provincial society was an important factor in the process in which officiales exercised great influence over the provincial administration This aspect should appear in the petitionary inscriptions which we use second as historical records When officiates appear as an assailant in some of the petitionary inscriptions in Asia Minor (Table 1), we can recognize that they were not a mere rowdy, but carrying out some administrative duty Execution of this administrative duty might have caused friction with provincial society The research which is aimed to understand soldiers' administrative position from petitionary inscriptions has been hardly made until now However, the overlooked point in the relation between soldiers and society becomes clear by setting up the framework that the soldiers penetrated into provincial administration as the staff of the procurator These inscriptions show that the soldiers who were working as officiales of procurator might have been needed by the provincial society because of their compulsive power derived from their senior official Individuals and communities were forced a still severer struggle for their own existence in a violent social situation of those days In order to gain advantage for themselves, various members of provincial society tried to use the compulsive power which officiates had Therefore, we can recognize the soldiers who appear in petitionary inscriptions as existence with "duality" Because of their compulsive power, provincial society might have occasionally asked them for help, and might have occasionally avoided them on the contrary

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