The author holds, in opposition to the currently accepted theory, that the connection between the Indo-Europeans and horses is not so old as is generally supposed, that it was not the Indo-Europeans who were the first to tame the horse, but that they learned to domesticate it from other people dwelling over the eastern steppes of Asia, towards the end of the long period when they had a common language. To maintain this view, at least without inconsistency, the author adopts following premises, which, it goes without saying, are based upon some kind of evidence. 1) Of all the 11 known branch-tribes of the Indo-European family, it must have been the later Anatolian group consisting of the Hittites, the Luwians, and others, who left first their Heimat to start the Volkerwanderung, a view which is very near to Sturtevant. 2) They headed first towards the Kuban basin, then, during the third millennium, entered Anatolia through the Caucasian range. 3) In the vanguards of this migration were the Luwians, who, leaving the royal tombs of Maikop and Alaca Hdyuk behind, moved to Arzawa, the south-western part of the peninsula, and pressed on probably as far as the Aegean Sea. 4) The Luwians were followed by the Hittites, who pushed them onward from behind. The Hittites themselves settled ultimately inside the great bend of Halys, or Kizil Irmak. 5) A sun-god in the shape of a deer seems to have been worshipped among these Indo-European peoples of Anatolia (cf. the Luwian god of deer, Runta, Uruwanda). Next comes a linguistic fact. We have, in reality, no positive evidence to prove that the Indo-Euroaean dialects of Anatolia had any word to mean a horse to correspond to the Indo-European *ekwos, of which the Hittite form would have been something like *e-ku-wa. The only attested hieroglyphic Hittite a-i-wa must be, as Kronasser says, a loan-word from the Indo-Aryan dialect of the marijannis who ruled over the Hurrians of the Mitanni state. Based on this fact and supported by other reasoning, one comes to the following conclusion : the Indo-European peoples of Anatolia had not yet known the horse as a domestic animal, when they arrived there from beyond the Caucasian mountains. They learned its domestication from the Indo-Aryans of the Mitanni state only in the second millennium. This first conclusion leads to a second and more important one : sc. when the later Anatolian tribes started on their Wanderung, there was as yet no domesticated horse among those peoples of the Indo-European common language, or of already slightly differentiated dialects. As a matter of course, there was as yet no cult of the horse. Instead they were fostering a cult of the deer. After the emigration of the later Anatolians, sc. in the last period of the common language, there came from the East the knowledge of horse-taming, and thenceforward, the cult of the deer must have gradually been superseded by that of the horse.

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The peculiar use of the chariots in the Iliad is usually explained as being due to Homer's ignorance of their use among the Mycenaeans who must have "fought like the Hittites" (D. Gray). Of course, there are some passages in the Iliad which suggest that the Mycenaeans attempted such chariot fighting (e. g. Nestor's advice to his charioteers, -A 297 ff.), and the Linear B tablets attest the existence of some hundreds of chariots in Knossos and Pylos. In spite of these facts, considering the geographical conditions of Greece, we cannot imagine that such tactics were so effective as to be widely used. So I think the assumption doubtful that Homer had forgotten Mycenaean chariot tactics, and having reexamined the text of the Iliad, I point out some evidence against the assumption. (1) Even among the chief heroes we find some who have no chariot for their own use, to say nothing of chariot troops (e. g. Odysseus, Aias of Salamis, Teukros and Aias of Lokris). As this difference among the heroes must be due to the geographical conditions, it certainly existed in the Mycenaean Age. Moreover, since Odysseus and Aias of Salamis are on equal terms with the other heroes, the possession of chariots must have been of little importance. (2) Among the Achaeans, fifteen persons have epithets relating to horses (or chariots), ten of them being of the former generation (e. g. Pelops, Atreus, Peleus and Nestor), and only five in the prime of life (e. g. Diomedes and Patroklos). This curious ratio shows that, though in earlier times horses (or chariots) had been highly esteemed, their value became lower towards the end of the Mycenaean Age. This change suggests that they were not effective in actual battles. (3) While we find many formulae which depict the scenes of jumping down, falling or making a person fall, from a chariot, there is no set formulae in the Iliad which depict an attack from a chariot. But a few passages show that Homer himself (or his immediate predecessors) aimed to depict attacks from chariots, combining spear-throwing formulae with a falling-from-a-chariot formula (Ε 275-97, Θ116-23). Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not Homer but the stock of the traditional formulae, that is responsible for the treating of the chariots as mere vehicles. We cannot assume that Homer or his immediate predecessors should have left out, if there had been any, fighting-from-chariots formulae, since they sometimes wanted to depict such scenes. Moreover, some parallel cases confirm the possibility that formulae which are inconsistent with each other do co-exist. So it does not seem possible that the fighting-from-chariots formulae arose from the many treatments in chariot fighting in the Mycenaean Epics. One is inclined to conclude that with regard to the use of chariots there was no great difference between the Mycenaean World and the Homeric.

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Sophocles is not only an excellent dramatist but also a profound thinker. No attempt is made to deal with the structure and technique of his plays ; it is primarily an examination of the religious aspect of his thought. In recent yearss there has been published a number of valuable works on Sophocles' religion, in which disagreements of a crucial sort are to be seen. What is Sophocles' conception of the gods ? What is the core of his religious thinking ? These are the questions which I should like ask here. The history of Greek religious thought is chiefly the history of the rationalistic effort to see in the world a divine justice. The trilogies of Aeschylus contain the profound doctrine of theodicy. Sophocles abandons it. His tragedies depict suffering individuals in the face of irrational evil. He does not attempt to rationalize the life. This does not mean that man is nothing before the gods or must conform to their will, however capricious or cruel they seem to be. It is not an attitude of piety which the poet intends to put forward. Nor is his tragic hero an instrument by which the gods' plan are fulfilled. For Sophocles, to know oneself is to know the majesty of suffering human beings. But the revaluation of man does not include the devaluation of the gods and deification of humanity. Sophocles' plays are concerned not only with the greatness of the gods but also with the greatness of man. His heroes are great through their acts of self-destruction.

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This essay attempts to analyze Alcibiades' position in the Symposium. Why did Plato, in his praise of Socrates, only use as a mouthpiece Alcibiades, who, was thought to be one of the most unfavourable witnesses? Concerning this problem we already have Xenophon's apology for Socrates, though this is too conventional to pursuade us. Ought we to think with Brochard that Alcibiades' confession in the Symposium was in the main a reply to Aristophanes' "Clouds" ? No : we would rather think that Plato's concern in his apology is not with the Clouds but with the actual spiritual' intercourse between the teacher and his, unworthy disciple. In this context one can see how well his intention is fulfilled in the Symposium. Plato, while showing clearly Socrates' admirable personality through Alcibiades' eulogy, had not neglected at the same time the essential distance between. Socrates and Alcibiades, which, we think, must be taken as one of the most important points. His praise is indeed nothing else than a bitter confession of finding a fatal distance in his approaches to Socrates. Only by proving this distance as clearly as he could, and in so doing, going against the general supposition. of intimacy, could Plato apologize for his master. Then what sort of "distance"' .might it be ? Taking into account the evidence in Plutarch and Thucydides,. we arrived at the conclusion that it consists in the difference between Alcibiades' "chameleonic character", who always thinks more of the public opinion than of truth, and Socrates, who comparing himself to a "gadfly", is always able to disregard the public opinion, carrying out his mission. Moreover, a consideration of this distance might be at the same time a step into philosophical thought and towards a solution of the ultimate problem of life.

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The starting point in the study of Aristotle' s doctrine of 'self love' should be to determine the exact meaning of the word 'true self' (οπερ εκαοτοζ ειναι δοκει or εαυτου το κυριωτατον) in the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) IX, iv and viii. But there is little direct evidence to establish an exact meaning, mostly because in these chapters Aristotle refers to the 'true self' with various words as το διανοητικον, τουτο ω φρονει, το νουν, νουζ. (On the other hand, in EN X, vii-viii it is obvious. that it is the 'true self' [1178a 2] what is meant by θεωρητικοζ or θειοζ νουζ). Therefore the usages of the words, νουζ (νοειν), διανοια (διανοητικοζ) , φρονησιζ s (φρονιμοζ, φρονειν) in the whole of EN were studied and it was found out that only the term φρονησιζ is (φρονιμοζ, φρονειν) had uniform meaning throughout. So only τουτο ω φρονει can be taken as having a meaning for practice, and as such τουτο ω φρονει represents the specific character of the 'true self' in EN IX, iv and viii. But the relation between the practical 'true self' in EN IX, iv and viii and the theoretical in EN X, vii-viii remains a problem which would be dealt with in a later essay.

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1. The meaning of the title 'Isagoge' Boethius and his many followers, mediaeval and modern, interpreted 'Isagoge' as 'Introductio in Aristotelis Praedicamenta'. This can hardly be right. The Greek commentators' views, on the other hand, seem almost absurd or extravagant and surely irrelevant, though they reveal the difficulty of taking `Isagoge' for a mere introduction to the Categories. The truth is, I suppose, that 'Isagoge' does not mean an 'Introduction to Something', but only 'a book which is written in an introductory manner', that is, an easy hand-book like the so-called 'introductions' (eisagogai) . Porphyry or some one else who undertook the publication of this work, being at a loss for a proper title, put 'eisagoge' as the title, taking up the word from the prooemium. 2. The three problems of the prooemium Porphyry's famous problems were not of his own making. For Alexander of Aphrodisias had treated the same problems already in his Topica, p. 355. From this we might suppose that these problems were fashionable in those days. 3. That specific differences do include genera That the concepts of differentiae do not include those of genera, was assumed, though not stated explicitly, by Porphyry in the Isagoge. This is the overlooking of the advanced inquiry of Aristotle in the Metaphysics Z, which states that specific differences include genera. But Alexander of Aphrodisias, Suarez and the others distinguished differentiae per se from differentiae in the loose sence, and understood that the former did not include genera. This is a petitis principii. For the problem was whether we can have such concepts as specific differences in themselves without the genera, and to this Aristotle gave a negative answer. 4. The unity of the concept of Being Porphyry seems to hesitate to accept Aristotle's theory of analogia entis. Plato taught the unity of Being, though in a sense he also can be said to hold diversity of Being. And this is why Porphyry hesitated to follow Aristotle on this point. 5. The distinction between Being and what exists. One often mistakes, especially in this country, ov for that which exists. But, indeed, ens has been used in two ways : ens in the sense of what exists and ens in the sense of Being. And yet ens as the object of metaphysics, and ens which was divided by Aristotle into ten categories is Being. This Porphyry knew well, and on this Simplicius raised no objection to him in the Categoria, p. 17. It is one of the merits of Brentano and his school that they clearly defined Being as das, was (modo recto) vorgestellt werden kann.

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