The International Working Forum on the Regulatory Supervision of Legacy Sites (RSLS) was established in 2010 following the Resolution of the IAEA General Conference in 2009. Its main objective is to strengthen regulatory frameworks and international cooperation regarding legacy sites, which include uranium mining sites, nuclear test sites, facilities contaminated by naturally occurring radioactive materials, and accident-affected regions such as Chernobyl and Fukushima. Such sites often pose complex risks due to ionizing radiation, heavy metals, chemical hazards, or insufficient long-term funding and management. The RSLS promotes information sharing, regulatory capacity building and technical cooperation among Member States. Since its establishment, the RSLS has organized technical meetings at the IAEA headquarters, three Working Groups, and international workshops with site visits in Member States, addressing regulatory frameworks, remediation planning, stakeholder engagement, and so forth. The RSLS has progressed through multiple phases, with Phase 4 launched in 2025, focusing on long-term management, prioritization of remediation sites, regulatory frameworks, and material recycling. With nuclear power expanding worldwide, the prevention of new legacy sites remains a priority. The RSLS continues to function as a practical platform supporting safe, effective remediation and regulatory oversight.

CT-type scanners for airport X-ray security screenings are being deployed in Japan as well in order to ensure advanced security in airport against terrorism. As a result, compared to conventional transmissive types, the amounts of X-ray irradiated have increased. Consequently, passive personal dosimeters are increasingly exposed to X-rays, and there are more cases of inaccurate dosimeter readings. The JHPS task group conducted literature reviews, surveys and field investigations to examine the situations. We summarized the findings in an activity report, which was published on the JHPS website.

Evacuation is one of the protective actions to avoid undue exposures to the public in a nuclear emergency. To achieve this action effectively, information on residents’ behavior is essential. However, there is little data available because nuclear emergencies almost never happen. Therefore, if we try to update continuously information on those behaviors, the experiences from other than nuclear emergencies must be needed. Under this background, this study examined whether evacuation-related information from natural disasters in Japan could be applicable to a nuclear emergency. To explore evacuation-related information from natural disasters, a disaster impact database was constructed. Then, important disasters were selected from the database by using the methods proposed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulation Commission, and evacuation percentage, spontaneous evacuation percentage, and shadow evacuation percentage were evaluated from the important natural disasters. In addition, these evacuation related parameters for a nuclear emergency were also evaluated based on the experience of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident and the results of a social survey which was conducted in municipalities that include Urgent Protective action planning Zone (UPZ) and parts of the Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ). For natural disasters, the evacuation percentage ranged 20–30%, spontaneous evacuation percentage ranged 30–80%, and shadow evacuation percentage was less than 1%. For a nuclear emergency, the evacuation percentage ranged 80–90%, spontaneous evacuation percentage ranged from a few percent to approximately 70%, and shadow evacuation percentage ranged 30–60%. The evacuation related parameters differed between natural disasters and a nuclear emergency, within the scope examined, there was insufficient evidence to justify their direct application to nuclear emergencies.