Sanki Tashiro and Dosan Manase are known for their role as founders of the Gosei-ha school in Japan. Observing that Japanese medicine had not been based on a clear theory, they introduced into Japan the satsusho benchi practiced in Chinese medicine during the Jin and Yuan dynasties. The basis of this system was to examine the patient's condition, then determine the treatment accordingly. Dosan Manase in particular employed the satsusho benchi, writing out a new prescription each time treatment was required, without reference to existing prescriptions. In this study, we carried out an investigation into the "Ishin shoden" edited by Dosan Manase, which reveals the process by which Dosan established the new satsusho benchi system of medicine within the framework of traditional Japanese medicine. In the early stages of the process, Dosan prepared prescriptions based on existing iou-tou prescriptions, modifying these by adding or removing medicines. Then, in the middle period, he prepared prescriptions based on toso-tou prescriptions, designed on the basis of the kun shin sa shi or Junchen Zuoshi theory, again modifying these by adding or removing medicines. In the final stage of the process, Dosan ceased this practice of adding or removing medicines from a basic prescription, adopting instead the satsusho benchi system of writing out a new prescription for every treatment. In addition, we consider the reasons why the satsusho benchi system was not employed by Dosan's successors, and discuss the effects of this.
The main factor of the rapid growth of the former-Soviet military industries and their technological transformation is, needless to say, the outbreak of the Cold War. The risky and costly developments of the new weapons such as nuclear bombs, rockets (missiles), atomic submarine boats and others were succeeded in a very short time immediately after World War II in spite of the heavy economic damages. In this sense we also need the economic approach to this issue. What is curious about the activities of the Ministry of Armament in the period is that they took charge of the research and development of rocketry although they had not engaged themselves in this field, and that they started their project with the mere copying of the German rockets in spite of objections from the Soviet engineers. Taking advantages of the former classified documents of this Ministry that the author had found in the Branch of the Russian State Archive of Economy in Moscow and other sources, he tries to make clear the economic factors for their choice. After an examination of the materials, he concludes that the Ministry of Armament in this period failed in the conversion to the peace industries which had been needed for the economic rehabilitation, so they had to discover the new resources for the sake of the maintenance of their raison d'etre and make their idle production capacity operated as soon as they could. It seems that this aspect of the process suggests the economic or business factors of the rapid technological transformation of the Postwar Soviet military industries.