Within the history of public health in Japan, Shibasaburo Kitasato is widely known for introducing bacteriology to Japan in the Meiji. This paper looks into the factors behind the success of the Institute of Infectious Diseases (IID), which Kitasato headed, focusing specifically on Kitasato's strategy, institutional rivalries in the medical world and early development in the field of bacteriology. Kitasato used IID to spread bacteriology through a bacteriology training course and the publication of a professional journal, both modeled on the German system, which Kitasato absorbed during his previous studies in Germany under Robert Koch, who was one of the founders of bacteriological science. At the time, doctors related to the university system and those related to sanitary administration competed for leadership in the medical world in Japan. The latter had pushed for IID to be established, and the outbreak of plague in 1899 gave them the opportunity to successfully lobby the Diet into passing legislation that enlarged enrollment in the bacteriology course and earmarked money specifically to IID. In the late 19th century, the application of knowledge from the nascent field of bacteriology led to major advances in the fight against infectious diseases, which led to rapid accumulation of knowledge about bacteria, in turn. Thus, Kitasato emphasized that bacteriology should be mission-oriented and based in sanitary administrations. Indeed, as sanitary administrations were on the frontline of the battle against infectious diseases and as IID laboratories were connected to the sanitary administrations, IID succeeded in dominating the field of bacteriology.
The principle of least action owes its modern formulation to Lagrange (1736-1813), who also related its "pre-modern" history in his Mechanique analitique (1788): Maupertuis (1698-1759) treated it in an ambiguous manner, while Euler (1707-1783) formulated it more precisely. Recent historical studies have shown, however, the difficulty of maintaining this narrative, for these two scholars departed from different problems and reached at different formulations of the principle. In general agreement with these views, this paper emphasizes a further, crucial distinction between Maupertuis and Euler-their usage of the term "quantity of action." When Maupertuis spoke of "quantity of action," he referred to a product of mass, velocity and distance, and his main concern was with the instanteneous change of two bodies colliding. Euler, on the other hand, investigated various "mechanical curves" under the continuous action of forces, searching for a quantity which was minimum to these curves. He realized then that these minimum quantites could be derived from a single one, which he named "effort." Euler did not accept Maupertuis's definition of the "quantity of action" but identified it with the "effort." Although Euler had acquired the idea of "effort" from Maupertuis's earlier work on the "law of rest," Maupertuis himself did not appraise it so highly. They disagreed over what "quantity of action" meant, and their disagreement was related to the kind of physical problems with which they were concerned; before Lagrange's modern formulation, there were two quite distinct principles of least action.
This thesis studies the Benxi Steel Complex which was constructed at Penshifu (Benxi), Manchuria by a Japanese zaibatsu group named Okura. It focuses on this Complex's development from its beginning in 1906 to 1945, when it was taken over by China following the Japanese defeat in World War 2. There are a few existing studies on the Complex. But these studies do not offer a good analysis of its overall industrial history. This thesis aims to analyze the Complex's whole history and its development with a reference to its manufacturing structure. The Complex was originally a coal mining company. After Okura Group acquired the mining rights of the Miaoergou's iron ore mine, the Complex became a pig iron maker. Penshifu was an ideal place for steel making, because there were in its vicinity all kind of mines including iron ore, coal and limestone. However, because iron ore is magnetite poor ore, the Complex had to acquire specific manufacturing technologies such as magnetic concentration and low phosphorus pig iron manufacturing. The Complex produced low phosphorus pig iron which the Japanese Navy needed. After the Manchurian Incident, the munitions boom occurred, benefitting the company. The Complex then started to expand its manufacturing facilities. After 1937, the Complex executed "The Manchukuo Industry Five Year Program", and constructed a special steel manufacturing division. However, the complex ran into financial difficulties, and failed in the full-scale production of special steel.
Although historical records show that a telescope was first brought about into Japan as early as in 1613, existing telescopes in Japan produced before 1750 are rare and have never been examined in detail. In 2003 and 2005, we had a chance to scrutinize the antique telescope owned by one of feudal warlords, Tokugawa Yoshinao, who was the ninth son of the first Shogun Iyeyasu and inherited a large han (clan) at Owari-Nagoya district. Since Yoshinao died in 1650, it means that his telescope was made in or before that year. Our investigations of the telescope revealed that it is of Schyrlean type, namely, a more advanced one than the Galilean telescope, consisting of four convex lenses. In Europe, the invention of the Schyrlean telescope was publicized in 1645. Optical measurements showed that Yoshinao's telescope gave erect images with a measured magnifying power of 3.9 (+/- 0.2-0.3). The design, fabrication technique of the tube and caps of the telescope, and tube decoration all point to that it is neither a Western product at all nor a pure Japanese make. It is likely that the telescope was produced probably under the guidance of the Jesuit missionary in China or by the native Chinese, near cities of Suzhou or Hangzhou in Zhejiang province of the continental China, or at Nagasaki. Based on the Japanese and Chinese historical literature, we also discuss the possibility that production of the Schyrlean telescope could have begun independently in the Far East, nearly simultaneously with the invention of that type in Europe.
The cyclotron was invented and developed in the 1930s as an experimental device for nuclear physics. The Rockefeller Foundation was deeply involved in the construction and operation of cyclotrons, not only in the United States, where this machine was invented, but also in many other countries. The Foundation's grants, however, were designated not for nuclear physics research but for so-called Experimental Biology, a research program launched by Warren Weaver, then the Rockefeller Foundation's Director for the Natural Sciences. One exception to this policy was the funding granted to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen. In order to justify their new experimental biology program, Weaver and his associates strongly desired the participation of Bohr, a renowned physicist. To accomplish this purpose, they drew Georg Charles von Hevesy, who desired to escape Nazi Germany, to Bohr's laboratory to participate in the experimental biology project in Copenhagen. Their cyclotron was used to produce radioactive isotopes, which were essential to Hevesy's research using isotope tracer techniques. Hence the Foundation made this exception, twice awarding grants to Bohr, who wanted to do nuclear research, for the construction and operation of a cyclotron.