The establishment of “rule of law” has been recognized as a vital policy issue for the sustainable and equitable development not only in transition countries but also among major East Asian countries suffering from the Economic Crisis during 1997-98. The donor countries and institutions have started “legal technical assistance” in various fields of recipient countries. Law and legal systems, however, are rather complex institutions of knowledge inseparable from cultures and traditions of relevant societies, which is far beyond a target of traditional technical assistance. Probably due to the difficulty to incorporate such a holistic nature of law into the mechanism of technical cooperation, it seems that the concept and method of the legal cooperation has not been defined successfully yet. This paper aims at searching for the answer to this question. For this purpose, first, I discuss the changing paradigm in the field of technical cooperation, which has shifted the emphasis from the hard or technical knowledge to the soft or institutional one. Second, I examine two experiences of legal transplantation; the reception of Western modern law in Meiji Japan and Law and Development Movement (LDM) in the United States during the 1960s-70s. Both of them give us an important lesson that law could not be transplanted without metamorphosing it to new one through adapting it to the cultures and traditions of recipient societies. Third, I survey mechanisms of legal cooperation in three aid organizations; World Bank, USAID and JICA. Finally, I conclude that the legal cooperation is a rather long process of continuing two-ways exchange of knowledge and experiences between donors and recipients, and propose to establish the international institutional mechanism or network, which functions effectively to exchange and accumulate those knowledge in order to research and design the suitable legal systems for relevant countries.

Some lessons and problems for an effective and efficient intellectual contribution have been extracted through the author's three year experience of involving activities in the Research Institute of Development Assistance, a research force of the OECF. Lessons can be summarized as follows;.

^*To scrutinize counter parts of intellectual contribution in a recipient country reflecting the bureaucracy or political situation. Some research on China, Thailand and Myanmar are introduced for this case.

^*To encourage discussion with international agencies such as the World Bank for a better international recognition of the recommendations. Several research on Thailand and ASEAN countries are explained for this case.

^*To utilize an expertise of recipient country's research activities. Some research on East Asia four countries are shown in this session.

^*To expose research findings through mass communication to improve the quality. Some research on Pakistan, China and Vietnam are stated for this case.

^*To use common logic and theory in discussion with recipients and international society. Some research on Central Asia is a sample to explain the importance of this.

However, some problems are also found through the author's activities. Three future challenges to be strengthened in the future are recommended as follows;

^*Intellectual network using Internet should be built with developing countries economists for daily contacts with counter parts.

^*Research to follow a current movement of developing countries should be strengthened for catching up with speedy changes of developing countries.

^*Ph. D. holders should be fostered by the initiative of an organizations for standing equal footing with counter parts who usually got Ph. D.

In this paper I will attempt to provide an examination of the introduction of knowledge management in development aid agencies.

“Knowledge management” has been discussed as a new management method, in which enterprises utilize existing knowledge as a management resource. The creation of a knowledge management system requires: •establishment/management of a network of experts, sharing of knowledge, and encouragement of creativity by the department responsible for knowledge management, •creation of a knowledge base for accumulation and sharing of knowledge, and •establishment of an organizational structure that allows for flexible and quick decision-making and operation in order to make the knowledge useful in the activities of an enterprise.

Development aid agencies are further demanding: •establishment of an open knowledge management system for users both inside and outside an organization, and •clarification of the issues concerning development aid agencies and their priority, determination of the scope of knowledge that should be accumulated, and establishment of criteria for judging the effectiveness of knowledge as well as its evaluation.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has within its organization a large number of people that are involved in a variety of technical cooperation activities. Although these people have a great amount of knowledge, this knowledge is not being managed in a manner that makes it available to everybody, and therefore JICA as a whole cannot utilize it effectively. In this paper, I will discuss some directions JICA may take to create an organized knowledge management system based on the current situation: •clarification of specific development issues, determination of the department responsible for knowledge management, and establishment/management of a network of experts engaged in current projects, •establishment of a knowledge base that is broken down around existing projects, •utilization of the current restructuring of JICA, including the establishment of the regional department, to promote knowledge management, and •sharing of knowledge with universities and research organizations.

The Asian crisis in 1997 makes the old issue of the positive effects of FDI on the intellectual basement in the host country zoomed up again. This paper focuses on the three types of technology transfer by foreign firms. The first is “commercial technology transfer” through the intra-firm trade, which is achieved to realize better profitability than technology export. The second is “unintended” spillover of the technology to the host country through the local employee's job changing and the “demonstration effects” of foreign firms' new technology on local firms. The third is “intended” diffusion of technological and managerial resources by affiliates of Japanese automobile and electric/electronic firms in the host country. Until now the quantitative analysis of the effects of three types on the host country has not yet been achieved although some researches report Japanese firms have succeeded in achieving the first type. However, the third type of transfer is truly important. The reason is that, Japanese firms have to reconstruct their O, L, I advantage in the international production networks and, for that purpose, fostering creative human resources and innovative firms in host countries, which are oriented toward long-term transaction with Japanese firms, is cruciely important.

The author is now planning to implement the empirical work for Japanese and European firms to examine the effects of three types of transfer in the joint research project with UK expert.

Japan has an experience that it had overcome serious industrial pollution during the 1960's and the 1970's. Transfer of the experience would be useful for developing countries currently facing similar pollution problems as Japan had. Japan has been making effort to meet increasing demand of technology transfer from these countries.

However, information on Japan's experience has not been systematically collected. One of the reasons is that local governments, which have been major player at Japan's pollution control, have little incentive for international cooperation, and have not recorded their history for this purpose. Moreover, the experience of pollution includes that of failures causing pollution, and governments do not intend to compile and disclose such information. Experts who experienced polluted Japan a few decades ago became old, and many of them have already retired, while their expertise has not comprehensively recorded. Effort should be made to compile such information before it has gone.

Experience of business is also useful. However, important information such as decision-making process in a company and pollution abatement cost is almost not available at all. Only macroscopic analysis on business' response for pollution is possible due to lack of microscopic data. Further studies are hindered due to pour availability of the data.

Transferability of Japan's experiences has not yet intensively studied. Experience of not only dispatched experts but also of Japanese engineers of private sectors working in developing countries should be collected and analyzed.

These tasks cannot be done by a single organization. Cooperation of government agencies and business is required. Based on the information, experts should be trained because young generations have not experienced “dirty” Japan and have little experience to “improve” polluted environment.

This paper examines the causal mechanisms through which domestic policy knowledge base and the underlying domestic structural/institutional factors facilitate or impede the leadership-taking potential of the Netherlands in climate change-related multilateral diplomacy. The Kyoto Protocol negotiation process is selected for the deep investigation. I look into the way in which advancing knowledge of policies on energy and the environment interact with evolving multilateral agendas and agreement-making processes.

Earlier introduction of an advanced, or even experimental, policy in the issue is proven to be advantageous in the multilateral negotiation process in a sense that it can show an example, either good or bad, and thereby provides a basis for a solid argument against countries that have never introduced comparable policy. Also, it is proven that the rigorous scientific bases of the innovative Dutch proposal for the EU burden sharing negotiation in advance to the Kyoto Protocol negotiation was one of the main factors to persuade the laggard EU member states. While influencing multilateral negotiations depends very much on time- and issue- specific domestic and external conditions and constraints, the sufficient domestic knowledge bases and securing efficient interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors in order to create better knowledge bases may be the key factors to facilitate leadership-taking potential unilaterally. In tackling global issues the effective role of the government may be in function as a link-pin not only between domestic and global policies, but also between the governmental and non-governmental organisations.

This paper highlights disparities between men and women and among women in cocoa production in southern Ghana. Gender disparity is revealed through the analysis of unequal distribution of access to and control over land and labor. It is argued that such disparity is a major cause of uneven power relations between wife and husband, and that labor exchange between the two is an outcome of such inequalities within the household. Differences within the category “women” are also emphasized. Factors affecting such differences are women's marital status, age, degree of labor contribution to husbands' farms, and allocation of land rights within households. More broadly, the paper reemphasizes the important but sometimes neglected fact that “women” are not a homogeneous category. By further disaggregating the data and the analytical category to the level of individual members of the household, the paper tries to overcome the shortcomings of oversimplified gender analysis.