The aim of the present study was to clarify the factor that might underlie the reflection-impulsivity, as assessed by performance on the Matching Familiar Figures (MFF) test. On the psychodynamic processes which determined the cognitive style dimension of the reflection-impulsivity, Kagan has hypothesized that the fear of making an error was an important determinant of the reflective tendency. However, few studies supporting Kagan's hypothesis were found. In this study it was hypothesized that there were cognitive style differences of inner standard on response accuracy brought to the task together with the motivation to do well. To examine the difference of this standard, a risk-taking task and a perceptual recognition task were administered to 44 reflective and 42 impulsive second-and fifth-graders (second-graders: 24 reflectives, 20 impulsives; fifth-graders: 22 reflectives, 22 impulsives). In addition, the causal attribution task for their failures on the unresolvable maze task was administered to assess the impulsive and reflective children's directions to the causal attribution, and then to infer the cognitive style differences of having high hope of success. On the risk-taking task, the impulsive boys took more risks than the impulsive girls and the reflective children. Secondly, to compare with the impulsive children, the reflective ones showed more delayed responses on a perceptual recognition task. These results suggested that there might be cognitive style differences in the standard of the response accuracy which would be used as cues for selecting the solution strategies. It was considered, therefore, that the impulsive children might underestimate task difficulty due to low criterion for accuracy. The second conclusion which might be drawn from the results of the causal attribution was that the reflective children wanted themselves to be perceived as effortful in the intellectual task situation because they emphasized the intrinsic value of effort. Through the results obtained by the present experiments, the mental model about the higher decision processes, in which solution strategies might be determined under a response uncertainty situation, was presented.
To understand an indirect request (e. g.“I want to know the time.” to ask for the time), the context is very important. The purpose of this study was to investigate how important contextual information was, and to see how it affected understanding indirect requests. First, in order to identify the important contextual information, we asked subjects through a questionaire to make indirect requests in various circumstances. what being reffered to frequently in the indirect requests (e. g. speaker's goal: “I want to know the time.”) suggested the premise for felicitous requests. We considered the information about such premise (e. g. A speaker wants to know the time.) as being the important contextual information. From the results of the questionaire: speaker (S)'s goal, S's condition (unable to achieve the goal), S's expectancy for hearer (H)'s help, H's condition (able to achieve the goal for S), H's attitude (cooperative) were considered to be the premise for (S) requesting H to do some action. Then, the effects of contextual information (information about S's goal, S's condition, H's condition, H's attitude) on understanding the illocutionary force (Exp. 1) and the content (Exp. 2) of indirect requests were investigated. In Exp. 1, a contextual information, an indirect representation of a request, then a direct representation of the request were presented on CRT consequently. The subjects' task was to decide if the illocutionary force of the indirect representation was the same as that of the direct one, considering the contextual information. The response and response time were recorded. In Exp. 2, several contextual informations for a request were consequently presented on CRT. The subjects' task was to suspect the content of the request, taking the information into account one by one. The subjects pressed the key and answered as soon as they confirmed their suspect. The response and response time were recorded. The results showed that to understand the illocutionary force, the information about S's goal and H's attitude were effective; also to understand the content of requests, the information about S's goal had little effect, the information about S's condition and H's condition had a greater effect, while information about H's attitude had the greatest effect.