An experimental analysis of voting behavior based on a new matrix game paradigm defined by Takigawa (1983) is reported. Five experimental conditions defined by 2×2 payoff matrices were adopted, where the first row represented the player's vote for the first party and the second row the vote for the second party. The first column corresponded to the winning of the first party and the second column to the winning of the second party. Eight successive elections were performed in the course of an hour. The result showed the effectiveness of the payoff matrices used. The selection distributions converged upon the first party acceleratively, which we called an avalanche phenomenon, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3. Further analysis suggested that there were two stages in decision making in this kind of situation, i. e., the subjects tended to control the outcome of the voting by voting to realize the best score cell initially in each election and shifted their choice by voting for the other party which they predicted would win at the next vote in order to realize some score.
In response to Edney & Harper's (1978) criticism that the static game paradigm that has often been used in the study of social traps is not appropriate to study the dynamic aspect of the problem, a new experimental paradigm for studying social traps is developed, which simulates the basic characteristics of the tragedy of the commons. Since the simulation requires the constant feedback of subjects' actions to the environment, a mini-computer is used to handle the complex processing of information. Each subject seated separately in front of a computer terminal decides how many sheep he/she adds to the common grazing ground that is graphically represented on his/her terminal screen. In a pilot experiment using this experimental format, three subjects in each group (a total of 7 groups was run) were assigned different status, allowing them to add a different number of sheep in one trial. The results of this pilot experiment were used to suggest possible improvements in the format. The results also suggest that equity concerns of the underprivileded members overrides their concern for the group welfare, culminating in repeated catastrophes.
The present study was designed to investigate the effects of help intentionality and harm doing on compensation. Subjects were 40 male students. A pair of dyad, subject and confederate, competed with another pair in the game. The experimenter manipulated the game in such a way that subject's contributions were forty percent of his partner's. All subjects and their partners were told that the winning pair were given a thousand yen as a prize and the losing pair could gain only six hundred yen. Then, in the voluntary condition, the confederate was willing to allocate their rewards equally (intentionally altruistic sharing). In the compulsory condition, the experimenter compelled the confederate to allocate their rewards equally (compulsory altruistic sharing). Data suggested that a feeling of sorrow was stronger among recipients when altruistic sharing was compulsory than when it was voluntary. The results also revealed that subjects who harmed their partner were willing to compensate them.