Learning in perception. “Spirit is in perception already memory” pointed out H. Bergson in his Matter and Memory. One and the same object (stimulus) comes to evoke different phenomenal worlds in perception as it is repeatedly given and becomes familiar to us. The concept of one-to-one correspondence between stimulus and phenomenon in perception was rejected as ‘Konstanzannahme’ by Gestalt theory of perception. Isomorphism, however, has taken no notice of the phenomenal modification (e.g. in visual perception) by learning. The learning theory must deal with the phenomenal modification in perception as well as in behavior. The concepts of stratum, context and attribute. As Koffka has pointed out, the repetition of behavior in learning is not the repetition of ‘accomplishment’; it is the repetition of ‘process’. This ‘process’ which indicates ‘means-end relation’ is the concept of context itself. And the modification of ‘accomplishment’ in the sense of proficiency may be regarded as that of stratum. While context means pattern of molar behavior, attribute indicates unit (or element) of molecular behavior. In the case of perception, Wundt's ‘sensation’ is attribute, Robin's ‘F-G’ articulation (in general, Gestalt) context, and the phenomenal modification in perception (which is as it were, evoked by the proficiency of seeing, that is, perceptional learning of, one and the same stimulus), modification of stratum. Consciousness in status nascendi. An idea (Vorstellung) must be defined as a ‘memory-attitude’ which adjusts us to the coming stimuli. The image-like character of an idea, then, is only one of the phases of this attitude. And this attitude as an idea, being formed by learning conjugately with given stimuli, is always accompanied by a peculiar consciousness (consciousness in status nascendi) which can foresee the coming event. Therefore, this consciousness indicates the completions of the learning of a certain task in a given environment, that is, the learning of a certain context in the highest stratum. Our behavior in everyday life owes to this consciousness, its smoothness and its ‘readiness’ to behave in conformity with the ‘cultural pattern.’ Behavioral structure of perception. The modification of perceptional phenomenon by learning does not imply the modification of context, but of stratum. It seems that even Gestalt psychology has confined its studies on perception to the problems of context; Gestalt is only a ‘model’ concept, which is too abstract to describe concrete perceptions. For every concrete perception is full of ‘meaning.’ And it is the consciousness in status nascendi as ‘conation’ that creates the concrete perception and gives it the ‘meaning.’ The nature of perception does not consist in copying the external world but in adjusting us to the coming stimuli. Therefore, the fact that a concrete perception is full of ‘meaning’ implies that it has some behavioral character which is beyond F-G articulation. While the so-called ‘Einstellung’ determines the context of perception, learning determines its stratum. Two cases of ‘constancy.’ When one and the same stimulus has become familiar to us, and the perceptional learning has been completed, the phenomenal world keeps constancy in its behavioral structure regardless of the shape of retinal image of the stimulus. While the so-called ‘constancy, ’ which is defined as the ‘phenomenal regression to the real object’ by Thouless, is the constancy of a lower stratum, the constancy in behavioral structure may be called that of a higher stratum; while the constancy in a lower stratum means the constancy of context, the constancy in a higher stratum means the
I can not support, in any scientific section, the tendency which is abandoning a theory started from questionaire and ends in a calculator-only runs to data. For to run to data, as to run to the theory, is nothing but the negation of the science itself. What results from sheer collection, measurement and classification of the crude data, however technically exact it may be, is no more than a mere gathering of the descriptive data and from which we can not acquire any scientific cognition. When they are waved into the inclusive meaning-connection as having a apt sense, these data gets a scientific meaning and they can acquire the faculty enriching and correcting the scientific cognition itself. Therefore, it becomes, with positive process, a important factor which determines the correctness and the richness of the function that the science fulfils, whether this inclusive meaning-connection as setting the data in a frame, this systematization of the subjects is properly constructed or not. Indeed, in regard to the problems whether the character of the question and the character of the problems in the science is correctly constructed or not, the already established scientific field is relatively stable and there is only little room to make a new problem in it. But in the social psychological field we can not but face the quite different circumstances from above. For here the subject-character itself is very unstable and is not yet got out of the chaos. Therefore the present circumstances of the social psychology is as following: the social psychologists, who faces the fact of culture, must start at first from defining the question itself, which we threw to the culture, before using the questionair and the calculator usually. For that purpofse, I will define what is a general character of the field-structure of the social psychology, and thereafter research the meaning of the culture as a special subject. I want to characterize the field of the social psychology in the relations between its inside and its outside. As to the inner character of this field in the first place, its characteristic is determined by the boundary position which lies in the balance of the mutually pulling and pushing forces between psychological field proper and the fields of the social and cultural sciences. The psychology, the science of the bio-psychical function and the social and cultural sciences, namely the science of the objective meaning-system of conduct or behavior cannot but face the new subject, that of the human nature, through the fact that they change each other their results and tie up with each other in their boundary field. It is the reason that the bio-psychical human figure which is charged with the both social and cultural meaning constructs inevitably the subject-field of human nature. It is inevitable that the character of the boundary field itself invites the characterized subject of human nature. Therefore the central subject in this field is the general theory of human nature. but so far as we stick to this central part, though a few research workers do so, it will lost the close connection with the adjoining sciences, and also its functions as the boundary science will be unable to be fulfiled. So we should construct the theory of human nature about personality-figures, social and cultural figures considering this general theory of human nature as a kernel in orientation to the adjancy of the regions such as psychology, social and cultural sciences. And we should make the historical figures at the boundary plane between anthropology and history. Further, the standpoints which would limit its field only in ones or a few of such problems as personality, social interaction, crowd, group institution culture, folkways, primitive culture civilized culture etc. and the branched designation basing on it have not their necessity because these boundary fields have a consistent character and moreover their inter-separation of
Perhaps we will all agree that the main trend of present day social psychology is in the direction of elucidating everyday social events and concrete human social behavior. American psychologists who always maintain their pragmatic standpoint, have succeeded in obtaining objective data from their inquiries into all kinds of social phenomena, using their highly developed techniques of survey and measurement. However, most of them are so engrossed in specific phenomena as to neglect, consciously or unconsciously, other no less important tasks of social psychologits, although we admit that they have every good reason to do so. In course of our concentration upon individual specific phenomena we generally are apt to overlook its relation with other phenomena and think less of, if not completely neglect, the effort of systematising them. Public opinion survey as conducted at present may be cited, among others, a pertinent example of the case. For all their highly developed techniques of investigation of public opinion and their extensive application in recent years we can hardly get a satisfactory answer to the questions of where public opinion is based, how it originates, and how it changes. Most students who are interested in it are contented only with noting and describing the distribution of opinion. The utmost they have done is to report how such and such particular change in external conditions has effected such and such particular change in the distribution. Thus we can barely hope for any further progress of the theory of public opinion, so long as the external conditions and a particular opinion are dealt with in their raw state, namely, in terms of common sense. There is no wonder that the public opinion survey has hardly anything to say in the province of theory, and we are obliged to turn to the more or less abstract speculations of the former days for an answer to our afore-said questions. The only way which seems to be open for us to get rid of their difficulty in order to attain a truly scientific elucidation of the phenomena of public opinion is likely to be in substituting dynamic concepts for common-sencial ones, in such a manner as to make us find the dynamic structure underlying the phenomena. Arguing in this way, we are naturally reminded of the experimental psychological researches made by Lewin and his followers which have been directed to the elucidation of group phenomena and especially of the dynamic structure of the group itself. It is true that their researches have yet been confined to their laboratories and so those results, of theirs can not be at once put on the same level with concrete everyday social phenomena, but the theory of “social field” which has been advanced by them must occupy our attention in its principle. It is by the suggestion of this theory that we can reduce our everyday life to the communication between man and man, and man and his environment. Such a reduction will enable us to treat every social phenomenon in terms of dynamic concepts. Applying this to the phenomena of pubic opinion, the so-called external conditions may be reduced to the “potential” acting upon individuals, and the communication between individuals may be described as a “force” acting between them, enabling us in this way to understand and measure the whole phenomenon as a dynamic process conducted in the dynamic field of the group. The level of social psychology being as it is, we must admit that there are many difficulties in substitutiing at once quantitative dynamic concepts for various dimensionally different factors. Some intermediary concept is necessary to be introduced, and we think we can find a suitable one for the purpose in the concept of “attitude.” Attitude means to us an action-tendency of an individual which is formed in social field in the past, an potential which may be discharged as an acting force by communicating with other
“The term symbolism covers a great variety of apparently dissimilar modes of behavior” says E. Sapir and he however, distinguishes two charactertics as emerging constantly amid those various senses in which the word is used i.e. referring to the meaning, there being no natural relation between the meaning and the meant and expressing a condensation of energy its actual significance being out of all proportion to that suggested directly by its mere form. It follows then that we have both referential symbolism and condensation symbolism. In its original sense, the symbolism he thinks is restricted to the former sort. Leslie A. White holds the same concept and he insists upon the great significance of the symbolic process as the striking mark that distinguishes man from animal. E. Cassirer's latest book (“An Essay on Man”) expounds the same idea by applying numerous facts observed by animal psychologists in U.S.A. such as Köhler, Yerkes and speaks emphatically ahout the incapacity of handling words of the anthropoid apes. And he says there is abundant evidence that various other types of sign process than the symbolic are of frequent occurrence and function effectively in the chimpanzee. The logical analysis of human speech always leads us to an element of prime importance which has no parallel in the animal world. And so I think we can say without a big mistake that the principle of symbolism, with its universal validity and general applicability. give access to the specifically human world and to the world of human culture. The birth of the referential symbolism in man the character of which has thus been clarified in comparison cf man and animal, is explained by G. H. Mead as follows. It is through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant. Signification is not confined to the particular situation within which an indindual is given. It requires universal meaing. How does this generalization arise? It mast take place through the individual generalizing himself in his attitude of the other. A child acquires the sense of property through taking what may be called the attitude of the generalized other. These attitudes which all assume in given conditions and over against the same objects become for him attitudes which everyone assumes. So, the generalization is simply the result of the identity of responses. Mead thinks that the basis of symbolism lies in the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself. But is it not correct to explain that to be the other at the same time that he is himself is itself the symbolic functioning? That a child, being a member of a certain group, can have the same behavior as that of all, shows at the same time that he has caught so-called quasi-universality, as far as he is restricted by the field he is in. To catch this quasi-universality and to catch the true universality freed from space and time are not the same, I believe. It is not evident that the former necessarily leads to the latter. To reach the former by way of the latter is itself the operation of the symbolic thought. To relate both to each other is possible only by the mind that can conceive the universal meaning. H. B. Helson too who says that a concrete thinking may happen to lead an abstract thinking and an abstrant thinking may happen to suggest a concrete thinking does not think that there is a causal relation between both. This is clear also from his other words: Our intuition functions on an abstract place and our reasoning has as firm a hold on us on the abstract level as if we were convinced of the truth of a visual perception. Psychological principles valid for the concrete, easily geometrized type of problem are also applicable to thinking about problems in abstract symbolic terms.” Thus symbolic thinking, that makes one thing mean another is deeply in human being. “To make mean” is the kernel
The present paper is a study of the musical ensembles as described in the Tales of Genji or the Genii Monogatari from the psychological point of view. Japanese music developed along a line different from that of European music. How did the Japanese of the past view music? What did they seek for in music? In the effort to obtain answers to these questions, the writer is probing the old Japanese literature of music and the early literary works of Japan which might contain references to music, so that he may be able to attempt a psychological interpretation of the literary materials. The Tales of Genji is a novel written by a court lady named Murasaki Shikibu (died in 1020 or 1021 A.D.) who lived among the courtiers and seems to have been well versed in the court music of the Heian Era. Judging form Lady Murasaki's own descriptions of the music and the expressions used by characters of the novel with reference to the Japanized Tang music which was the favorite court music of the Heian Era, the writer is inclined to conclude that the people of the day were in the habit of enjoying music in the form of ensembles a conclusion contrary to the traditional view, based on the fact that the Japanese music of today is monophonic, that the old Japanese sense of music was originally simple as is the present monophonic music of the people. Also, as a by-product of the present study, the, writer belives he could make out the original function of Shoga or Soga, a kind of solfa method. Shoga has hitherto been considered by the students of Japanese music as a device to memorize the melody of instrumental music. From my study, however, it has become clear that where an orchestra or a chamber music of the day was short of and not harmonized by an instrument of leading melody those present in the chamber used to intergrate the “ensemble” by singing “Shoga.” This reminds of a style of European musicin the 13th or 14th century, but the Japanese people in the Heian Era tried, the writer believs to establish the ensemble by such a method. Thus we might say perhaps that had the old Japanese sense of music as described in the Tales of Genji been kept unchanged in the main until today. Japanese music would have been something quite different from what it is, taking up a styte guite other than the present monophonic one. and might have even assumed a harmonic system, though in a form different from that of European music.
§1. Studies of the so-called ‘constancy’ of visual velocity have originally been made by J. F. Brown (19 8, 1931), and followed by J. Ogasawara (1938) and H. Wallach (1939). Brown performed experiments on this phenomenon on the assumption that if the constancy of velocity was a mere consequence of that of size, velocity ought to be quite as constant as size is. His results however designated that the constancy of speed was more reduced than that of size at the same distance, and he concluded that the former could not be deduced from the latter. Ogasawara, on the other hand, finding from his experimental results that speed constancy was considerably reduced with the decrease of the inhomogeneity of the moving field indicated that as this was the common feature of all other constancy phenomena, speed constancy must rest on the same psychophysical bases as other common constancy phenomena are. As for Wallach he came to the conclusion theoretically that speed constancy could be explained with no reference to the constancy of visual size but by the ‘transposition principles’ (in Brown's sense) alone, if those principles were applied to retinal images and displacements. §2. Let us discuss on the above three theories. Brown's outcome that speed constancy is more reduced than size constancy is inconsistent with Ogasawara's in which the former constancy is either the same as or even larger than the latter. But the assertion of Ogasawara does not seem valid partly because his experimental set-up is incomplete and partly because it conflicts with Brown's results, in which the constancy of speed does not differ when the experiment is conducted in the dark room from when performed in the light room. I tried a series of experiments in order to examine this point. Both experiments on speed constancy and on size constancy were performed under the same conditions (the same objects subjects, distances, etc.) both in the highly articulated and less articulated visual fields. Table I shows the results of three subjects. The figures represent constancy indices computed by Brunswik's logarithmic formula. Table I SIZE CONSTANCY SPEED CONSTANCY (a) under the heterogeneous conditions in the light room. (b) under the less heterogeneous conditions in the light room. It can be stated from the table that size constancy is greatly influenced by the field condition, whereas speed constancy is not, though both experiments were tried under the same situations. I performed further experiments in order to find any relationship between speed constancy, on one hand, and the distance and the visul field on the other hand. The results lead to conclude that (1) even in the case of the completely dark room and of the monocular observation, constancy indices are nearly 1 ranging from .94 to .89, (2) the homogeneity of the moving field, however, reduces speed constancy just a little and (3) constancy indices have no correlation to distance, but visual speed is decreased with distance. This leads me to question the validity of Qgasawara's conclusion. Though quite plausible Wallach's theory is, stating that the phenomena of speed constancy and the ‘transposition’ of visual speed are the same on the retina, how can it explain the fact that while speed constancy is greater in the daylight illumination, the transposition principles are impaired under the same conditions? §3. Suppose the two moving fields A and B are set at 1m and 10m distance respectively in front of the observer in a completely dark room and B is seen, ceteris parlbus, as nearly a tenth of A in size and both are seen on the same frontal parallel plane. This situation is phenomenally nothing but that in which two objects A′ and B′ in the relation of B′=1/10A′ are placed equidistant. Therefore if we assume that the transposition principles work with reference to the phenomenal variables, we must