The author looks at the social control from the side of the individual who is to be controled. First, various types of social controls are evaluated in terms of thier effects on freedom and other interests of the individual. Then the author proceeds to the question of how the individual can control the social control. The author describes three models of society in which the individual differently controls the social control: The individual model where there is no specialized agency of social control, the authoritarian model where a strong social control agency acts as being free from effective control by the controled individual, and the constitutional model where the social control agency is effectively controled by the controled individual. The author admits that the first two models have been popular among Japanese, because they did not like the lack of flexibility of social controls under the constitutional model. He argues, however, that the lack of flexibility is not inherent in the constitutional model of social control. There, flexibility is to be obtained through discourse, to which Japanese have not been much accustomed.

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This paper aims at examining how the Japanese system of criminal justice should be organized and operated, with special regard to the recent discussions about "legalization" and "delegalization". An inter-subjective perspective on legal dynamics emphasizes that citizens should respect each other as autonomous legal subjects who are capable of voluntarily utilizing legal standards and procedures to pursue their own conception of the good. An analysis of several intensive controversies that have developed over criminal justice suggests that a legalistic trend which advocates the purification of criminal procedure or imprisonment seems to be most appropriate to promote this perspective. However, two other instrumentalistic and paternalistic trends are also influential. The former emphasizes the importance of such public interests as crime prevention and protection of society, and the latter attaches great importance to the rehabilitation of the criminal or the protection of the delinquent. The relationships between these three trends are rather complicated: Cooperative on some issues, but antagonistic on others. Although the opinion which demands the effective realization of universalistic legalization has been growing in strength, managerial legalization has also been carried forward by the support of both instrumentalistic and paternalistic trends. Moreover, managerial legalization has begun to be carried out in a softer fashion through the informalistic incorporation of communal law. From the legal point of view, the author supports in principle the legalistic strategy to intensify universalistic legalization, and opposes the paternalistic strategy of delegalization, not to mention anti-legalization. However, the author also feels it necessary to reconsider from a detached viewpoint whether the legalistic strategy can adequately care for the criminal and afford them what they really need.

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This paper tries to demonstrate the power of the front-line workers in public bureaucracy (or 'street-level bureaucrats'), and to clarify and explain their characteristic behaviors, named as 'domination by the goodwill'. The front-line workers (teachers, welfare office workers, policemen and so on) are 'the rank and files' in each organization. But they have wide discretionary powers in their ordinary decisions and actions over their target groups (citizens as 'clients'). Their relative autonomy comes from the common occupational environment of the street-level bureaucracy, which is called as 'the structure of public encounter'. This structure makes the street-level bureaucrats the power holders against their clients. Many case studies suggest that the power of the street-level bureaucrats is exercised in a particularistic way. This behavioral characteristic is not limited to Japan. It is a common feature of the strret-level bureaucracy in advanced societies. I call that characteristic as the domination by the goodwill. It is so named as the street-level bureaucrats intervene into public encounter with paternalistic benevolence, but their benevolence has in effect to promote their bureaucratic and occupational interests. Their subjective altruism is surely true, but is distorted as their positions as managers of situation prevent its actual realization. This distortion is quite clear especially in Japan because our public bureaucracy assume a special role as modernizer and guardian of the nation. This role has two aspects. The one is social control, which imposes some coercion to people, and the other is protection of the people, in which bureaucracy owes the obligation to improve each citizen's substantial 'welfare'. These two tasks must be contradictory, and Japanese bureaucracy has been inclined to depend on their self-image as protector more and more. Consequently it is now adequate to describe their behaviors in view of 'maternalism', rather than pure paternalism. The main problem in maternalism lies not so much in the conflict of tangible interests, but in the intangible conflicts or the invason of the 'mind'.

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In the origins of sociology, the concept of "social control" was a "key that unlocks many doors" (E.A. Ross); that is, it served as a central concept for analyzing total societies. Social control was basically defined as encompassing all those social practices and arrangements that established social order and induced "spontaneous" conformity among members of the society without using any powers or coercion. Social control is, rather, the obverse of coercive control. But the once dominant conception of social control abovementioned has gradually been replaced by the idea that the patterns of social control are contingent on social structures. This paper pays special attention to the social control achieved by informal negotiation which is complementary and simultaneously destructive to the modern legalistic social control.

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1. Aim The purpose of this paper is to study how a kind of comics called "YUUGAI (harmful) comics" became the social problem, and how petitions which ask for the revision of the Tokyo prefectural ordinance were presented to the assemblies. 2. Methods We investigated them by two methods. First, we collected the petitions presented to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly or to the 23 ward assemblies. We analized them: by whom, when, how were they presented? A tatol of 156 petitions were collected. The main groups which represented the petitions were CHOUNAIKAI (neighborhood associations), SEISHOUNEN'IINKAI (juvenile committee), women's groups, PTAs, and volunteer probation officers. Second, we interviewed the representatives of the petitioners. A sample of 32 persons were interviewed. We asked them their knowledge and opinons about "YUUGAI comics," and how they presented their petitions. 3. Findings (1) Only three types of compositions were found among these petitions. These were not written independently but copied from one another. And we suppose the original composition was the notification given by the Liberal Democratic Party. (2) The movements were developed not on their own initiatives. They were asked to petition by the other groups concerned. Most of them were police and the organs concerned. So, we conclude that the "YUUGAI comics" problem was developed through the network of police, neighborhood associations, PTAs, and so on. The petitions for the revision of the ordinance were directed by police and the organs concerned.

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This note describes the background and concept of the Teen Court which is one of the diversion programs in American Juvenile Justice Systems, analyzes its meanings and functions and clarifies some problems of it. In 1983, the first Teen Court was established in Odessa, Texas, with the proposal of Prof. Rothstein. The aim of it is to turn peer pressure and peer power from something that has always had a very negative influence to something very positive. With the success of declining recidivism rates of juveniles who were referred to Teen Courts, the Courts were appraised by many communities and have widespread all over the U.S.A. This note, however, clarifies some problems of Teen Court. First of all, there is disagreement about the estimation of the decline of recidivism rates. Therefore, we can not conclude that Teen Court program is useful. Secondly, Teen Court does not deal with serious delinquents in a meaningful way. We must treat both felony and misdemeanor juveniles similarly in the Juvenile Justice Systems. Finally, teen juries tend to be tougher on juveniles that formal court judges. Juveniles who are referred to Teen Courts are forced to be exposed to tougher sentences than first-time juveniles and adult offenders dealt with in formal courts. We must overcome this problem of inequality.

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