The science of nursing is a practical one. In essence, Nishida’s philosophy could be considered to be the philosophy of religion. Without examination, it does not appear as though there could be a connection between the two. However, end-of-life care in modern nursing science is defined as‘supporting people who are thinking about their inevitable death to enable them to lead the best possible life until they do die’. The basis for this definition is eschatological thought. Furthermore, the final position that Nishida’s philosophy takes is known as‘eschatological thinking Byōjyōtei’. Accordingly, both end-of-life care and Nishida’s philosophy are characterised by eschatological thought. However, their stances on religion are different.
Kitaro Nishida declared that, “The motive of philosophy must be the profound sadness of life, rather than surprise. “Kanashimi”(sadness) in Nishida’s thought is a feeling about the self-contradiction of human existence which shapes the life of a mortal being. We can barely connect with others or gods, when we“kanashimu” (grieve) our “kanashimi” (sadness).
Dans son court écrit de 1936, intitulé «Quelques impressions de la philosophie française», Nishida exprime une sympathie profonde envers «la philosophie du sens intime typiquement française». Malgré la disparité de ses remarques sur ce sujet, la manière dont il s’intéresse à la philosophie française témoigne de ce que sa démarche philosophique «auto-éveillante» partage fondamentalement avec la «philosophie du sentiment» du côté français. Ce qui est particulièrement important est la récurrence des mentions de Nishida sur Maine de Biran, initiateur de la conception originale du «fait primitif du sens intime». Au début des années 1930 où il commence de déplacer l’accent de sa philosophie du néant absolu vers l’idée de corporéité auto-éveillante, Nishida invoque Maine de Biran comme son compagnon de route. Cependant, au dernier moment de cet itinéraire, il se diverge du philosophe français qui tient à l’idée du corps «résistant», idée qui assure la dualité subtile qui s’insère dans le «sentiment de soi» biranien. Comment pourrait-on comprendre la spécificité de la corporéité nishidienne à travers ce processus qui se distingue du biranisme? L’objectif de cette étude consiste à le montrer.
Du moins à ma connaissance, on n’ a jamais mentionné un grand sociologue français Gabriel Tarde(1843‒1904)dans les textes, innombrables d’ailleurs, qu’on a consacrés, jusqu’ à maintenant, à la philosophie de Kitaroh Nishida. Le but de ma communication d’aujourd’hui, consiste, dans une telle situation, à vous montrer l’attention constante que prêtait Nishida à la notion d’“imitation”chez Tarde aussi bien que la profondeur de la compréhension de la part de Nishida à ce sujet.
En France, c’est grâce à Gilles Deleuze(1925‒1995)et à son Différence et Répétiton(1968)que Tarde a été tiré du purgatoire, alors qu’au Japon, on lisait beaucoup Tarde dans les années 20‒30. Parmi les lecteurs ardents japonais de Tarde, on peut trouver de grands philosophes tels que Tetsuroh Watsuji(1889‒1960), Jun Tosaka(1900‒1945). En effet ils ont beaucoup apprécié la genie de Tarde ; et pourtant cela sous réserve que la notion d’“imitation”ne soit pas du tout suffisante pour éclaircir la formation de la société.
Je ne sais pourquoi, on ne peut trouver le nom de Nishida dans le liste des philosophes ou des écrivains japonais qui s’intéressient à Tarde avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. Malgré cette omission, le fait, indéniable d’ailleurs, est que depuis son texte de 1918 jusqu’ à la fin de sa vie Nishida n’a cessé de mentionner Tarde, même si cela de manière si fragmentaire. A cela s’ajoute un autre fait que depuis 1913 Nishida se liait d’une amitié avec un sociologue japonais Shohtaroh Yoneda(1873‒1945)qui avait assisté réellement aux cours de Tarde à Paris
A l’examen des remarques faites par Nishida concernat Tarde, on verra que Nishida a pris la notion d“’ imitation”pour jointure des monades et de la société,et l’acomparée à sa propre notion d“’éveil à soi(”Jikaku).On ne pourrait pas ne pas admirer l’intuition géniale de Nishida. Bref, Nishida était un des philosophes rares ou même le premier dans le monde, qui ait pu s’apercevoir du sens profond de la notion d“’ imitation”chez Tarde
Following the publication in 2011 of the Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (University of Hawaii Press), the field of Japanese Philosophy is seeing a remarkable global burgeoning. Riding this wave of momentum, The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy has just been published in September 2017. The present essay is a continuing reflection of my “Introduction” to this Bloomsbury volume. Therein I originally turned to Nishida’s endeavor as a guide to characterize “Japanese Philosophy.” Nishida’s view of direct experience to be culturally colored led me to unfold my own intercultural reflection on the connection among culture, experience, language, and perception, and I came to realize that the nature of cognition is closely bound up with recognition. I discover that I do not know what I do not hear (especially in reference to things in a different cultural context from my own; a“thing”here is broadly defined, extending from abstract concepts to concrete tangible things). Turning this observation the other way, if I can “hear” a thing in a different culture, I can “know it,” and my knowledge of the thing pushes its existence onto the horizon of my experience. By following Nishida’s philosophical inquiry, I attempted to characterize “Japanese philosophy” with the renewed appreciation of his insight that there is“a logic that is concerned with the workings of the mind, while there is another type of logic that is concerned with the object of consciousness.”
In the works of Kitaro Nishida,“action”had been the most important concept from his earlier period. In his later period he built up the concept of “active intuition”as the fundamental way of existence. From the concepts “theoria”and“poiesis”of Plotinos, he made up the concept of“intuition”and “action”.“Action”and“intuition”coincide in the Self. To act means to see, i.e. to intuit. So he calls it“active intuition”.“Action”and“intuition”arise from the Body of the Self as the expression of Life. Body means instrument for the acting Self. When the Self works on the outside world, the outside world as the environment defines the Self, mutually. The environment means nature and the society, i.e. the world. The Self, expressing itself, acts on the world, and the world defines the Self. Nishida calls this mutual action or definition between the self and the world“dialectic”. The structure of the
world and that of the self is also“dialectic”. Our action as“active intuition” arises from the bottom of the world which defines itself expressively. It is the act of self definition of the historical world. The historical world defines itself by the active intuition.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the building process of D.T. Suzuki(1870‒1966)’s Pure Land thought by dividing the process into three parts, that is, one is a period that Suzuki accepted the fundamental Pure Land literature in 1920’s, another is a period that he tried analysis by psychological method in 1930’s and the other is a period that his Pure Land thought developed into his Buddhist philosophy actually in 1940’s. Another purpose is to verify that Suzuki’s Pure Land thought was based on Ippen’s one. Traditional studies didn’t really focus that, but he accepted Ippen in relatively early time.
Suzuki was a thinker who emphasized common religious experiences between Zen and Pure Land thought. He focused on Ippen’s thought because it was close to his view of religious experiences. He developed his Pure Land thought through understanding Ippen, especially an immediate integration of sentient beings and dharma. After he accepted Ippen by literature for the first time, he inspected that the case of seeing from psychological aspect, the immediate integration is the same experience as enlightenment in Zen. Suzuki passed through the consideration like this, then established his contradictory logic in 1940’s. It became the inclusive logic that contained his all arguments. Finally, he found Myoko-nin who are firm believers on Shin Buddhism. They were the very people that embodied Suzuki’s thought that had been fostered since adaptation of Pure Land thought.
This paper focuses on the relation between sensation and the present in Nishida Kitaro’s Intuition and Reflection in Self-awareness(1917). In 1930s, Nishida deepens his metaphysical consideration of the instant present and Nothingness. In this paper, we try to clarify that the discussion in Intuition and Reflection in Self-awareness provides its basis. With regard to the relation of the present and sensation in Intuition and Reflection in Self-awareness, we take a notice of the influence of Hermann Cohen’s epistemology on Nishida’s theory of sensation. Borrowing some concepts, i.e., Ursprung, Erzeugung from Cohen and transforms them to be empirical, Nishida forms his peculiar discussion on the relation between sensation and the bottomless present. Following discussions, namely the production of the ground in the present that affords possibility of rationalization, sensation as a folding of bottomless experience and the differential character of the present formed by the mutual restriction of x and dx, provides the metaphysical basis of Nishida’s discussion after 1930s. This paper clarifies how the foundation of metaphysic for Nishida is established through the
elaboration of the concept of sensation in 1917.
It is widely known that Nishida examined the problem of action in a concrete historical reality in his later philosophy. However, little research had been done focusing on the problem of intention and action in Nishida’s middle period works. After he arrived at the idea of‘Basho’(場所), Nishida developed a philosophical system of universals. In developing this system, Nishida adopts the terms noesis and noema from Husserl’s theory of intentionality; giving these terms important roles in describing the ordered relations among universals. Nishida, however, criticizes Husserl’s theory of intentionality and argues that the internal determination of intentional action is based on self-awareness by analyzing the temporal nature of expressive activity. He concludes that the ground of intentionality is volitional self-awareness.
Despite critiquing Husserl, Nishida’s practical philosophy in his middle period, which is argued from the standpoint of the development of self-awareness, has a problem in that it does not focus on actions in the real world. In this paper, I will investigate the practical philosophy in Nishida’s middle period and make it clear how it interacts with Nishida’s system of self-aware universals. Through this research, I hope to shed light upon the characteristics of Nishida's practical philosophy and provide a means to compare his middle and later thought.
In the preface of the reprint written in 1936 to An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida confesses that the standpoint of this work is psychologistic. In 1937 he again makes the same point while also insisting that his theory of pure experience is not entirely psychologistic. These statements bring up the question of what part of An Inquiry into the Good is psychologistic and what part is not. This paper is an attempt to clarify this point.
According to Windelband, Rickert and Husserl, psychologism, which is the view that the mental is the ground for general validity, inevitably falls prey to relativism. Takahashi also claims that we cannot distinguish between truth and falsity if the mental is considered to be the ground for general validity.
Nishida asserts in An Inquiry into the Good that the most concrete direct fact is the origin of all truths and that the criteria of truth is the state of our pure experience. In addition, he claims that truth is not independent of the subject. We can say that these assertions are psychologistic. However, Nishida also introduces the idea of a principle(理), which is the power of unification. This principle is defined not only as independent of the physical and the mental, but also as that which allows the physical, the mental and the reality to take place. These assertations allow us a non-psychologistic interpretation of his theory of pure experience.