Journal of Nishida Philosophy Association
Online ISSN : 2434-2270
Print ISSN : 2188-1995
Volume 7
Showing 1-14 articles out of 14 articles from the selected issue
  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 1-12
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Hajime Tanabe übte in seiner Abhandlung “Ich bitte Herrn Prof. Nishida um seine Lehre”(1930)scharfe Kritik an die Philosophie Kitaro Nishidas, welcher sein Vorgänger an der Universität Kyoto war. Er hatte zu dieser Zeit angefangen, mit der Philosophie Hegels zu ringen und sie im Rückgriff auf die Philosophie Schellings, besonders auf dessen Begriff der “Natur in Gott” zu kritisieren. Er wurde gewahr, dass Nishidas Philosophie unter demselben Gesichtspunkt kritisiert werden könne. Schellings Philosophie wurde bereits am Anfang der Meiji Ära z. B. von Amane Nishi in Japan bekannt gemacht, aber der, wer sich zuerst damit auseinandersetzte, war gerade Nishida. Das Interesse für Schellings Philosophie wurde danach schnell grösser. Bemerkenswert ist, dass die Forschungen der Schüler Nischidas umgekehrt Einfluss auf ihn und Hajime Tanabe ausübten. Nishida warf von der Kritik Tanabes angeregt erneut seinen Blick auf Schelling. Diese Geschichte zeigt, dass die Philosophie Schellings in der Entwicklung der japanischen Philosophie eine entscheidende Rolle spielte.
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  • The Personal World
    [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 13-34
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    After systematizing the so called logic of the place as a self-awakening system comprised of the manifold universals in Ippansha no Jikakuteki Taikei(1930), Nishida Kitaro, in his next book Mu no Jikakuteki Gentei (1932), began to discuss the personal world as the world of self-awakening limitation of the place of absolute nothingness itself, which was of ultimate metaphysical reality. The personal world is, as it were, the actual world seen from the place of absolute nothingness, and it is regarded as the world in which the personal I and Thou mutually interact at their foundation, which is absolute nothingness. With the change of his perspective, Nishida’s concept of self-awakening (jikaku)also changed. Up until this time, self-awakening had been thought as “seeing one in oneself,” but it came to be thought as “seeing oneself in the other” or “seeing the other in oneself.” According to Nishida, I meet Thou in the place of absolute nothingness that is the deepest bottom of oneself. Thus, I do not meet Thou in the outer objective world but in the inter-subjective world leading to absolute nothingness. Therefore, the Thou seen at the bottom of I is essentially nothing but me. I am Thou, and Thou are I. I and Thou are one and the same. By the way, Nishida’s notion of I and Thou reminds us of that of Martin Buber. In fact, there are places in both theories that overlap. Both regard I and Thou as interacting and respecting each other’s personality. But Buber talks of I and Thou confronting each other in dialogue, while Nishida thinks of I and Thou meeting at the bottom of oneself. The eternal Thou spoken by Buber can be said to correspond to Nishida’s absolute nothingness. Both eternal Thou and absolute nothingness underlie I-Thou relationship. But eternal Thou is met through a concrete individual Thou; I and Thou do not meet in the eternal Thou. Rather, eternal Thou is thought to be met through the meeting of the I and Thou. Thus, eternal Thou is seen as the result of the meeting of I and Thou, while according to Nishida I meets Thou in absolute nothingness. So absolute nothingness is I, and at the same time he is also Thou. It is thought that such differences represent the differences in their idea of reality, or, perhaps, reflect the differences in the cultural background on which their thinking is based.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 35-53
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    1943 verfasste Kitaro Nishida seinen Entwurf über Prinzipien für eine neue Weltordnung[sekai shinjitsujo no genri]. Darin schlug er der japanischen Regierung vor, dass ihre künftige Aussenpolitik auf schöpferischen Prinzipien beruhen müsse, damit eine neue geschichtliche Epoche durch Schaffung einer weltpolitischen Neuordnung insbesondere im asiatischen Raum, die China, Japan und Südostasien umfassen sollte, eingeleitet werden könne. Nishida forderte dabei von der damaligen Regierung Tojo(1941-1944)ein weltpolitisches Umdenken durch Abgehen vom bisherigen imperialistischen Grundton der japanischen Aussenpolitik. Er hoffte ernstlich, dass sein Konzept von der Regierung aufgenommen und als Teil des Regierungsprogramms vor dem Parlament offiziell verkündet werde. Doch Nishidas Entwurf hatte letztlich keinerlei politischen Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der japanischen Aussenpolitik ausgeübt. Warum waren Nishidas Bemühungen vergebens ? Dazu kann man drei Gründe anführen: ・Erstens hatte die Kokusaku Kenkyukai,[Forschungsgemeinschaft Staatspolitik], die sich damals aus hohen Beamten, Politikern und Akademikern zusammensetzte, entgegen den Vorstellungen Nishidas nicht einen so grossen Einfluss, als dass sie sich bei der Tojo-Regierung mit seinem Konzept Gehör verschaffen haette können. ・Zweitens hatte die Tojo-Regierung auch gar nicht das philosophische Verlangen nach einer weltpolitischen Wende. ・Drittens konnte-oder wollte - Nishida auch nicht die politischen Realitäten eines totalitären Staates, der in einen Weltkrieg verwickelt war, verstehen. Jedenfalls gelang es Nishida nicht, noch zu Lebzeiten politischen Einfluss zu erlangen. Aber sein Weltordnungskonzept an sich, hat auch noch für die heutige Zeit schöpferisches Potential. Daher ist es von Wert, Nishidas Entwurf nochmals zu analysieren und kritisch zu durchleuchten.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 55-76
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    The idea of the state, in Nishida’s latter thought, cannot be analyzed without viewing the big change in his idea of ethnic people. By this change, Nishida considers the state is the community, which can be possible by denying thoroughly our desire to find substance(substratum)that requires nothing else, nor the action of the other, in order to exist. Nishida says, in the actual world and human Life, all the entities (including past and future entities)exist as far as they interact each other. In the world, every entity requires the action of the other; any substances cannot exist. So in the interaction, they act as themselves one another uniquely and individually(個性的に)in every present. It means that the actual world creates the world itself uniquely and individually in every moment. For Nishida, the state-community will be made when this“individual self-creation of the world”(世界の個性的な自己創造)has realized well in human life. Therefore, each of the states exists, by becoming a focus of the individual self-creation of the world where no substance exists, to have all subjects(i.e., communities)and all individuals(their members)realize the individual self-creation of themselves.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 77-90
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Compared with other contemporary Japanese philosophical ideas, Nishida’s theory of the nation is original in character. This paper will focus on the fundamental qualities of Nishida’s theory of the nation in terms of three points of view: individuality, universality and transcendency. Although Nishida insists that the nation is based on ‘historical species,’ he does not ignore the question of individuality in his theory of the nation. In fact, he argues that the nation is created by individuals. This individuality is also related to the question of universality in that individuals create nations through a kind of universality. The nation is, as such, not something solitary but instead something international in nature. The individuality or specificity of the nation is, morevoer, deeply rooted in what Nishida calls transcendency, or ‘absolute nothingness’. Consequently, the nation, which is created by individuals, has its own transcedental qualities. After discussing these issues, the paper then turns to Nishida’s hypothesis about the role of the nation in the evolution of world history. Nishida insists that all national cultures are metamorphoses of one‘cultural prototype’, suggesting that there are no essential differences of worth or value among different cultures. This position also supports the peaceful coexistence of different nations and peoples through mutual effort. Nishida surmises that Japan has this as its world historical mission, namely, bridging the gap between East and West.
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  • Nishida’s concept of noumenality
    [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 91-103
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    In this paper, I will discuss Nishida’s ideas of “the noumenal self” (eichiteki Jiko 叡 智 的 自 己 )and “the noumenal world”(eichiteki sekai 叡 智的世界)in his writings dating around 1930s. I will analyze these notions using a few concepts,namely, “exteriority,” “openness,” and “contingency.” The notion of “the noumenal world” underlies Nishida’s entire philosophical enterprise, and is both philosophically unique and problematic. The logical structure of this “noumenal world” resembles what Henri Bergson calls “cinematograph” in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. Bergson’s basic logic is that, even though the phenomenal materiality is a continuous flux, our intellects tend to misperceive it as a series of discrete states (“snapshots”), or a succession of static images. Unlike Bergson, however, Nishida considers the nature of time to be precisely cinematographic, and attempts to elucidate the “noumenal” nature of temporality. In this respect, it is possible to regard Nishida’s “noumenal world” as a philosophical analogue of Eisenstein’s montage theory, which defines a montage as a collision of multiple distinct realities. I will investigate how this particular problem of cinematograph complicates Nishida’s philosophical inquires in his middle(and some late) works, namely, his works in the 1930s.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 105-117
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Der Gedanke Nishitanis hat ziemlich viel Ähnlichkeit mit der Philosophie Nishidas. Andererseits gibt es einige Differenzen zwischen den gedanklichen Inhalten der beiden Denker. Eine der Differenzen ist das Verständnis der philosophischen Logik: Nishida fasst die Logik sehr positiv auf, dagegen eher Nishitani negativ. Der Zweck dieses Aufsatzes ist die Klärung des Grundes dieser Differenzen. Nishitani findet in Nishidas Philosophie zwei Probleme: die Unklarheit des Verhältnisses der Logik zum sie Überschreitenden und die Unvollständigkeit der Platzierung der verschiedenen Aspekte philosophischer Logik. Um die verschiedenartigen Spielarten der Logik unter einem System zu platzieren und diesen die eigene Bedeutung zu geben, versucht Nishitani zu klären, wie die Selbstnegation sich in diesen Aspekte der Logik zeigt. Nishitani denkt, dass auch Nishidas Logik Elemente der Selbstnegation aufweist. Nishitani sieht diese Selbstnegation als die Erscheinung der Kraft absoluter Negativität an, die für Nishitani das die Logik Überschreitende ist. Im Unterschied zu Nishida findet Nishitani die Bedeutung aller philosophischen Logik durch diese Selbstnegation oder durch die absolute Negativität. Das ist eben die Einheit aller Logik, die in Nishitanis Denken vorherrscht. Nishitani muss daher die Logik negativ auffassen, und darin besteht auch der Grund der Differenz zwischen den Gedankeinhalten der beiden Denker.
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  • Michel Dalissier
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 119-140
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    This essay represents an attempt to interpret the philosophy of Nishida Kitarô(1870-1945), through the leading concepts of “unification”, “place”, “being”, “non-being” and “nothingness”, especially emphasizing the relation to Western philosophy as well as Contemporary Japanese philosophy. Nothingness shows us some diffuse traces we would like to clear out with the light of being and the shadows of non-being. For the destiny of being is always to return to the scene of presence. However, once logically apprehended and phenomenologically approached, nothingness reveals a remarkable topological structure, that we try to explain by distinguishing the three main categories of “ontology”, “me-ontology” and “neontology”. Understood in this way, Nishida philosophy can be defined as a radical endeavor to put into question the traditional problems of metaphysics and moral, in particular concerning the distinction between space and place, fullness and void and the relation of the one and the many.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 141-144
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 145-148
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 149-152
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
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  • [in Japanese]
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 153-156
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
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  • The Concepts of Time and Space in the Evolution of Nishida’s Philosophy
    Andrea Leonardi
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 183-158
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    The notion of locus(場所)is arguably the most important philosophical concept introduced by Nishida Kitarō. Not only did it have a pivotal role in the development of Nishida’s thought, but also it is his most original contribution to world philosophy, and is at the same time a useful tool for understanding the intellectual tradition of East Asia. As such, locus has been at the center of many interpretations of Nishida’s philosophy. However, its relationship to the concept of space has been neglected in the hermeneutical literature, likely to avoid an oversimplifying interpretation of locus as a sort of empty container. However, the fact that locus is more than a spatial arena containing entities does not diminish the importance of the spatial connotations of the concept for its correct understanding. In this paper, I follow the development of Nishida’s ideas of space and time in relation to the basic features of his thought, showing how the recognition of the ontological relevance of the two categories, in conjunction with an implicit shift from a position centered on the idea of time to a position centered on the idea of space, led Nishida to formulate his notion of locus.
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  • Descriptions and Comparisons
    Ian Christopher Megill
    2010 Volume 7 Pages 203-184
    Published: 2010
    Released: March 23, 2020
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    This paper has for its principal purpose a description of the logical foundations and special characteristics of Nishida’s basho of Absolute Nothingness, as presented in his philosophical essay “Basho.” This is then followed by a similar description of the concept of Emptiness as presented by Nagarjuna in his Mulamadhyamaka-Karika. Finally, some essential elements of these two concepts are compared and contrasted, and it is shown that due to their completely divergent foundations, elaborations and implications, they express the fundamental concepts of two radically different but complementary ontological approaches.
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