The purpose of the article is to clarify the reasons why Hokkaido agricultural methods did not spread to Japanese peasant immigrants to Manchuria. One of the main roles of these groups was to quickly create the great, modern form of management in Manchuria that became a model for agriculture in East Asia. In order to fulfill this goal, the advanced Hokkaido agricultural methods were introduced to Japanese peasant immigrants after 1938. They made the following demands of the leadership of executives and instructors; 1) the acquisition of farming techniques in Manchuria; 2) the efficient execution of rice farming, dry field farming, and the management of domestic animals using only family labor as opposed to hired labor; 3) the maintenance of a healthy life suitable for the climate of Manchuria. Then the groups included immigrants in a branch village and the detachment of youth pioneering brigades were expected especially. However, the lack of Hokkaido agricultural machinery was one of the major reasons why Hokkaido agricultural methods did not spread. And then, there were also reasons why Japanese peasant immigrants could not introduce Hokkaido agricultural methods into their work. These include 1) a lack of training in Hokkaido agricultural methods; 2) a decline in their physical strength due to the deficiency of their living systems; 3) lack of the study in the Manchurian agricultural experimental stations and research institutes; and 4) lack in quality, quantity both sides of the members of spread. Thus, the Japanese peasant immigrants to Manchuria had no choice but to leave agriculture and were unsuccessful in their attempts to construct the model for agriculture in East Asia.

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The subject on this paper is to discuss how the Japanese Government and the Japanese Micronesia Agency developed islands and their resources and how the Japanese Army build army bases in Micronesia under the wartime (1937-1944), focusing on Okinawan immigrants. The results of the study are as follows. First, the resource development project which formulated under the wartime was carried out while changing the basic policy without showing consistency every time the Japanese Government changed the relation with Southeast Asia. Because Micronesia was only the base to advance into Southeast tropical where resources were abundant for exploitation. Therefore, while the islands and their tropical resources in Micronesia was exploited as necessary until the Japanese Army advanced to Southeast Asia, immediately lost the significance of existence after it occupied there. Secondly, as resource development and fortification were carried out, Japanese immigrants, especially Okinawan rising generation increased and took a variety of jobs in every island. Since early in the Japanese Mandate, Okinawan immigrants were thought highly as sugar cane farmer and bonito fisherman in a tropical climate and employed by Japanese companies. In the wartime, in addition to companies, the Japanese Micronesia Agency began to recruit Okinawan rising generation who can immediately contribute to resource development project. Eventually, they were mobilized for battle on islands by both of the Japanese Army and the American army. Thirdly, aged persons, women and children regarded as encumbrance to the project were sent back to the main islands of Japan. The Japanese army and the Japanese Micronesia Agency intended to decrease population of them, because soldiers in islands increased immediately in 1943-1944 and the problem of food shortages arose. Consequently, Okinawan aged persons, women and children who went back to homeland were involved in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. They were damaged directly by worsening of condition of the war and experienced suffering which is different from that of Okinawan rising generations.

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A purpose of this report is primarily to consider agro-politics in the North China in the Japan-China War period. Second this report considers how the Japanese side occupation authorities held a farm village. Third it is to clarify the characteristic of the North China farm village in this time. The following things became clear in this report. The Japanese occupation authorities recognized that the food increase in production contradicted the raw cotton increase in production mutually. The occupation authorities devised the plan of the provisionment according to the area, they forced that the farmer delivered farm products to side power of Japan. However, it was shown that supplies outflow case of 3 districts each other, that is to say, Japanese occupation district, the Chinese Nationalist Party rule district, and the Chinese Communist Party rule district. Therefore, the delivery plan and the distribution plan of the Japanese side were not necessarily carried out. As a result of agriculture survey by Shangdong farm village, the following things became clear. The farmer of Shangdong needed cash income to include an another job income and purchased food by the money. That is why the most important task of the North China agriculture was increasing of the production and to meet the cash demand of the farmer.

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the characteristics of the Nazi food autarky policy and agricultural resource development in the eastward expansion of the Third Reich. Beginning in 1936, an important plank of the Nazi food autarky policy was developing substitutes for imported crops and making them available within Germany's east imperial sphere. We present the case of the Nazi soybean project, based on research by Joachim Drews. While people endeavored to develop new soybean varieties, IG Farben founded a soybean company in Romania and forced the peasants to grow soybeans under contract, which allowed the short-term export of soybeans to Germany. Additionally, we briefly present research produced by Susane Heim on the "Kok-Saghyz" (rubber dandelion) project, which explains how the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, along with the SS, developed its breeding and growing in German-occupied Soviet areas in order to produce a substitute for imported natural rubber. The Nazi food autarky policy, however, was not confined to the resource development of particular crops, but also extended to the agricultural structure reform policy. First, in the annexed Polish areas, such as Warthegau and Dazig-Westpreussen, ethnic Germans farmers from Eastern Europe resettled in the villages immediately after the native Polish peasants had been deported as a result of the Nazi-enforced migration policy at the beginning of WWII. In the allocation of land and housing, the SS distributed a number of small Polish farms to each German re-settler's family. This policy was intended to make the modern independent German family farm. Second, German-occupied Soviet areas such as Ukraine were not merely forced food requisition regions. The Nazi administration sent many German agricultural officials (Landwirtschaftsfuhrer) to these regions as well. They were responsible for controlling the native peasants, but they also became the agents for agricultural reform in 1942: this took the form of a transformation from the kolkhoz (collective farm) into a new mode of organization, the "cultivation cooperative" (Landbaugenossenschaft). Surprisingly, the Nazis additionally intended to mechanize the Russian agriculture through "Ostackerprogramm" (East agricultural program), a program in which many tractors were sent from the Reich into German-occupied Soviet areas. Both in the Polish and Soviet areas, the Nazis "found" a large surplus rural population; they "solved" this problem by sending these people to the Reich as forced agricultural labors. It should be emphasized that the Nazi food autarky policy was more systematic than is usually understood, and was strongly linked with the racial population ideology and agricultural reform planning.

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This paper aims to show the actual conditions and the factors of the Tempo crisis in the economically advanced area, by a case study of the Kishu Domain. The Tempo crisis is a great number of deaths, so-called mortality crisis occurred in the Tempo famine. There are many researches analyzed the Tempo crisis in East Japan, but the remarkable research analyzed it in West Japan has been stressed as the economically advanced area is the only one investigated it in the Setouchi region of the Hiroshima Domain. This paper analyzed the Tempo crisis in the Koino village and the surrounding villages in the upper Kinokawa river basin, the conclusion is as follows. In this area, the Tempo crisis occurred over two years of 8-9th year of Tempo. The two peaks of deaths were formed in the summer of 8th year of Tempo and the winter of 8-9th year of Tempo, and the mortality risk of adults, especially males was heavy. The main factor of the first peak of deaths was the starvation caused by the lack of food. The lack of food was caused by the export of large amounts of food to the outside of the Kishu Domain (koshimai), and it can be said to be the artificial lack of food. The main factor of the second peak of deaths was the death from the plague. When the nutritional status of people in the area deteriorated because of the jump in food price, the plague was epidemic and not only the poor peasants but also the rich peasants were suffering from the plague. So the number of deaths increased. Comparing this conclusion with the research analyzed the Tempo crisis in the Setouchi region, I emphasize that the characteristics of the Tempo crisis in the Kishu Domain was that it occurred over two years and the two peaks of deaths were formed.

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