G. Canguilhem posits in his "The Normal and the Pathological" two judgements: (1) the negation of objectivity of the pathology and the physiology because of the necessary interference of the value judgements between the two phases; (2) the importance of the biological normativity, that's to say, the understanding of the health as something essentially related to the norm and value. The health is not a fact, but a norm to which an organism makes an effort to attain by regulating its conducts. After this affirmation of the normativity in the demarcation between the normal and the pathological, I try to link it to the contemporaneous problematic of bioethics. And situating the health as a norm inside of the world of designing, I give a theoretical permission to the selective abortion in condition of a strict limitation, and to a certain positive interference to the genetic information for giving birth to a perfect baby.

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以上の議論から,小論における一応の結論を以下のように示すことができよう.「医学の哲学」は従来から議論されていたが,1960年代から起こったバイオエシックスの議論が,従来の「医学の哲学」を,患者(「非専門家」)の役割を考慮することにより,医療のリアリティーに迫るものに変えた.
医療者と患者により成立する「医療」についての哲学こそ「医学の哲学」すなわち「医療の哲学」なのである.

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本稿で論じた論点において,論者のコミットしたい「医療の哲学」は,医学の方法・概念を対象化し,医療が社会的文化的行為(現象)であることを確認し,人々(患者・layman)の視点・realityを包摂するようなものとして構築される「医療の哲学」である.そのような「医療の哲学」の構築には,医学や哲学だけではなく,社会学・人類学などの様々な領域・方法の共同作業が必要であることは,ここまでの議論で明白であろう.とくに「科学哲学」の参加への要望・期待は非常に大きいものである.なぜなら,医療・医学の分析においての科学哲学のもつ方法の可能性と同時に,本稿で論じた「医療の哲学が検討せねばならない諸問題」は,科学哲学が検討して行かねばならない「問題」と通底していると思われるからでもある.感応する議論が出てくるのを期待したい.

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The main aim of this paper is to argue for the following two theses: (1) so-called qualia are irreducibly non-physical properties of certain brain states, and (2) in spite of (1), qualia can be legitimately accommodated into a broadly physicalistic framework. On behalf of (1), what might be regarded as a variation of F. Jackson's 'knowledge-argument' is put forward and also a refutation of P. M. Churchland's objection that qualia are but physical properties (of certain brain states) as they are introspectively accessed is attempted. On behalf of thesis (2), the idea of qualia's supervening and nomologically depending upon brain states' physical properties is deployed. A radical criticism of some sceptical arguments concerning qualia is also included.

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Shozo Omori's theory of the past, developed during his later years, is examined critically with a focus on its central thesis that the past is that which is recalled. The analysis shows that Omori's argument designed to support the above thesis contains ideas which run counter to that very thesis. Specifically, it turns out that, when contrasting recall and perception as two heterogeneous modes of experience, he tacitly supposes past perception as something other than the recalled, and that this inconsistency threatens the validity of his basic views.

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According to J. R. Searle's account of perception developed in his book Intentionality, perception is "causally self-referential, " in the sense that the representative content of a perceptual experience involves reference to that very experience. This claim is untenable, and it derives from a failure to draw a sharp distinction between the representative contents of Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. An account of Intentional states can accommodate the alleged self-referentiality of perception without commitment to Searle's treatment of it, and given a proper treatment, it can be shown that the representative contents of perceptual experiences are not self-referential in the properly semantical sense.

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This paper deals with van Fraassen's 'no-collapse' interpretation, or 'modal interpretation'. In this interpretation he avoids 'collapse' by supposing that quantum mechanical states, unlike classical states, specify possibilities rather than actualities. But my argument will show that van Fraassen's interpretation is confronted with some difficulties concerning values of observables.

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In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to provide a picture in which our experiences give "rational", rather than merely causal, constraints on our thinking. This was to avoid both Myth of the Given, which can give us only exculpation rather than justification, and unconstrained coherentism, which sounds idealistic. This picture can be understood as a form of "internal realism", and I have a great sympathy with this ambitious project. But I find some tension among his several theses, which in turn brings about two interconnected problems. I will give my own solution to them, in terms of the notion of ignorance. Then I will depict some consequences, both positive and negative, of that modification.

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