In this paper, I consider a philosophical interpretation of Hilbert's program put forward by Paul Bernays. The paper consists, roughly, of two parts. In the first part, I briefly describe Bernays's polemic against "immanence philosophy" over the question concerning the epistemological status of theoretical sciences and its relation to the foundational controversy in mathematics in the 1920s. In the second part, I briefly discuss the theory of cognition contained in the transcendental philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries and his twentieth century evangelist, Leonard Nelson, and consider Bernays's view against the background of this intellectual tradition. I conclude the paper by arguing for the importance of attending to Friesian influence in order to achieve a deeper understanding of Bernays's (and Hilbert's) philosophy of mathematics.
This paper deals with C. Wright's strategies to establish Frege's logicism. They essentially depend on Frege's Theorem (FT), i.e. the derivability of Peano-Dedekind axioms from the second-order logic plus Hume's principle (HP). HP says that the number of the concept F is identical with that of G if and only if F is equinumerous with G. By regarding HP as the explanatory principle of the number of a concept, Wright seems to assert that FT has already shown that Frege's logicism has been completely established. On the contrary, Frege regarded HP as unsatisfactory for establishing the foundations of arithmetic. It is powerless to decide whether the number of the concept "not identical with itself" is the same as Julius Caesar. This problem is called Julius Caesar problem (JC). Thus if Wright were right, historical Frege would have been rashly convinced that HP alone would not resolve JC, so that there had been no problem such as JC. I think, however, that JC is a genuine trouble to Frege's logicism and then Wright's strategies do not establish it.
Wittgenstein was intrigued by the idea of experiments where subjects see their own body through mirror or screen, and move their body relying solely on that visual information. But it is not so clear why such experiments are so important and what they are supposed to show. In this paper I argue that such experiments reveal our naive conception of the relation between intention and body, which is based on two specific models; namely, criticize both of them, and draw some alternative pictures.
Is the concept of "person" a substance-concept (i.e. a sortal which determines the primitive mode of being for the entities falling under it), or a phased-sortal (a sortal such that its instance need not fall under it throughout its existence)? Recently some philosophers opposing to the traditional view maintain that we are not always persons and that what determines our identity-criterion fundamentally is the biological concept of "human animal". In this paper I argue that this "Animalist" conception is unsound and that the primitiveness of our animal nature should not exclude the concept of "person" as our substance-concept. I suggest, however, that "person" as a genuine substance-concept requires a fresh understanding, foreign to the traditional definition in terms of a set of certain psychological attributes.
A state function which describes some quantum phenomenon includes two types of information in a mixed form: the information on the probabilistic behavior and also on the physical state of the system. The aim of this paper is to show that it is possible to separate the probability information from the description of a quantum process. This is done by applying the consistent history method by Griffiths, Omnes, GellMann, and Hartle to the path-integral formulation. The remainder should be an elementary physical process, the realization of which presumably obeys the law of probability.
The recent anti-Lockean Animalists hold that the so-called problem of personal identity is a matter of persistence of a living organism and charge the traditional Lockean view with some ontological puzzles as to how we can be a kind of animals. This newcomer proposal, however, makes it difficult to understand the importance of our distinctive psychological nature, and results in analogous puzzles about the relation between an animal and its body. The problem is to bridge the gap between the mental and the biological so as to make an entire picture of ourselves, i.e. persons as a kind of animals essentially endowed with affluent psychology. A promising solution is to abandon the reductionist assumption prevalent in this controversy and to accept our persistence as primitive relative to both the psychological and the biological continuities.
In his posthumous work, The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans persuasively maintained the incoherence of the concept of "quasi-memo-ry", in favor of the famous circularity objection to the Lockean analysis of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity. Evans' argument against quasi-memory illustrates that the so-called "circularity" is an inevitable consequence of the phenomenon of the identification-freedom (or immunity to error through misidentification) of our thoughts. His conception of this phenomenon implies a plausible interpretation of the circularity objection, which is firmly opposed to the prevailing reductionist theories of personal identity and aims at a sort of non-reductionism. However, it does not entail, and indeed is incompatible with, the current "Non-reductionism", i.e. the view that personal identity is a bare fact completely independent from any kind of continuity and that a person is a pure Ego beyond elucidation.