Kagaku tetsugaku

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[in Japanese]

2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 1-14
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_1

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In a famous essay entitled 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', W. V. O. Quine rejected two important doctrines that had been supported by many empiricists. One is the doctrine that a clear distinction can be made between analytic and synthetic statements. The other is the doctrine that every meaningful statement can be reduced to some statement constructed of terms which refer to immediate experience.
In this paper, I intend to rehabilitate analyticity, syntheticity and reductionism. First, analyticity is separated from apriority and necessity, and then the reason is given why I regard holism of 'Two Dogmas' as the verificationist one [1]. Next, I survey the views of H. Putnam and J. J. Katz [2]. In the following section, two viewpoints, dynamic and static points of view, are introduced into the arguments in question [3]. On these considerations, I specify the contexts to which the above three notions are applied, although trivial or narrow in the range.

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[in Japanese]

2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 15-28
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_15

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In "Meaning, Truth and Evidence" (1990), Davidson took issue on Quine's empiricist theory of meaning and knowledge. The point at issue was the concept of 'stimulus meaning' which Quine defined in physiological terms. Davidson argued that physiology should not matter much either in the theory of meaning or in epistemology. This criticism was pertinent to Quine's theory of meaning (Quine eventually abandoned the concept of 'stimulus meaning' itself). But, as I shall argue, it had little effect on Quine's epistemology: though it prompted minor changes on Quine's part, Quine's physiological bent in epistemology was retained, and justifiably, in the face of Davidson's criticism.

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[in Japanese]

2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 29-40
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_29

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This paper deals with the question of why intentional vocabulary is distinctive. The question arises from the comparison of the status of normative discourse in the philosophies of W. Sellars and of W. V. Quine. While Sellars gives a significant role to normative discourse, Quine does not. I call into play Bjφrn Ramberg's attempt to combine insights of R. Rorty and of D. Davidson to herald the emergence of what he calls a post-ontological philosophy of mind. Ramberg makes it clear that Rortian pragmatism has every reason to accept openhandedly Davidson's claim of the distinctiveness of intentional vocabulary. On the basis of Ramberg's achievement, I conclude that Sellars's position is more productive than Quine's.

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[in Japanese]

2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 41-54
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_41

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W.V.O. Quine's relation with nominalism is complicated and controversial. In one context Quine has been attacked for being "nominalistic", while in another context he has been attacked for not being "nominalistic". Furthermore, Quine considered himself to have abandoned his early "nominalistic" views, but those who attack him for being "nominalistic" do not overlook his conversion.
In this paper, I first clear up the misconception about Quine and his association with "nominalism". Then I point out the genuine problems of Quine's nominalism. Finally, I suggest several ways to solve those problems. The solution recommended in this paper is the one suitable for the sailors of Neurath's ship.

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[in Japanese]

2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 55-67
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_55

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Quine characterizes "What is there?" as the ontological question. In this paper, I tried to make clear what Quine asserts by his ontological discussion. In Quine's philosophy, ontology should be closely related to epistemology. This relation between ontology and epistemology is expressed by the reciprocal containment between both, which is followed from his naturalism. The important point of naturalism is the affirmation of a circular argument. In this paper, I considered Quine's ontology as divided into two aspects, that is, his formal considerations about ontology and his own ontological assertions, and then I pointed out that a crucial problem arises in Quine's own ontological assertions. Quine's solution to this problem is an example of how the circular argument takes a central role in his ontology. By this consideration, we can ascertain the relation between ontology and epistemology in Quine's philosophy, and the significance of ontology for the examination of Quine's philosophy.

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2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 69-81
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: December 07, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_69

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The question "How can I be a?" ("a" being a proper name) has been recently referred to as "The Harder Problem of Consciousness", which would remain mysterious even after "The Hard Problem" about how subjective experiences arise is solved. Since both the indexical "I" and an exemplifying name "a" are ambiguous in their references, a formal analysis is required. Then, it turns out that any disambiguated version of "Harder Problem" is logically reduced to "The Hard Problem" or its special case "How can there be a?". There is no "Harder Problem" with its additional philosophical value. This is simply a matter of logic, independent of any ontology on whether metaphysical self exists or not.

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2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 83-94
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_83

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We have the ability to predict and understand behavior of ourselves and others by attributing various mental states. How can this ability, so-called the theory of mind, be explained? At present, we have two explanations, theory-theory and simulation-theory, and cannot decide which is better. However, if we appreciate that the underlying problem is how to describe the psychological mechanism which generates the phenomena describable as the use of theoretical knowledge, we can see that there remains an important alternative explanation which explains the ability as a kind of pattern recognition.

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2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 95-111
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_95

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Against the prevalence of the social construct view that the concept of a person is a social artifact like that of a nation, most notably David Wiggins offers a more naturalist alternative. He compares "person" to a natural kind term as it is elucidated according to the theory of direct reference, and restricts in effect the extent of personality to the animal kingdom. In this paper I shall examine his proposal and argue for an intermediate position; the concept of a person is much closer to a natural kind concept than social construct theorists maintain, but not so close as Wiggins suggests. Indeed, the social constructionism and Wiggins's naturalism are just two consequences of the untenable ontological dichotomy of natural things as real and artifacts as nominal. A better understanding of the concept of a person requires much deeper appreciation of the reality of natural-cum-artifactual kinds of things.

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2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 113-127
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_113

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This paper is an introductory survey of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. We review in this paper especially elementary kinematics of the Vermaas-Dieks and Bub modal interpretations: frameworks of their theories and justificatory arguments for their choices of possessed properties of quantal systems. We conclude this paper with a remark about relationship of their proposals to scientific realism.

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2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 129-135
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_129

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[in Japanese]

2002 Volume 35 Issue 2 Pages 137-145
Published: November 10, 2002
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.35.2_137

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