Kagaku tetsugaku

[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 1-19
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_1

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First I will characterize Frege's "logicism" epistemologically. His "logicism" is originated from his epistemological claim of the "analyticity" of arithmetic. In order to confirm this, it needs to show that any arithmetic proposition is derivable from the logical laws with the logical definitions alone. Nevertheless there was no such powerful logic in the 19th century, and so Frege was forced to invent the radically new logic.
Further Frege understands inferences and judgments epistemologically. He construes an inference as justifying a conclusion based on its premises, and both premises and conclusion as assertions/judgments, which Frege takes as holding true, whereas he regards the justified conclusion as recognition of its truth (knowledge).
Frege's "sense" is not only the contribution to the truth-condition, but is also related to the cognitive value of a proposition, to the modes of presentation of the designation, and to various propositional attitudes, as is well known.
Second I expound Fregean semantic explanations of logic, and mention Fregean meta-theoretic proof of independence briefly.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 21-33
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_21

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We study Frege's influence on computer science mainly from the viewpoint of the formal aspect of Frege's Begriffsschrift. We argue that his analysis of a function as an unsaturated entity is related to the notion of higher-order abstract syntax in computer science, and his way of explaining Begriffsschrift should shed light on the future design of a common meta language for various mathematical systems. We also point out the influence of Frege on Martin-Löf's type theories, which led to the revival of the notion of judgment which was once almost forgotten in mathematical logic.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 35-51
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_35

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This paper deals with the question of how one could understand the difference between Frege's notion of thought and Russell's notion of proposition. After briefly discussing how one could make sense of Russell's so-called Gray's elegy argument and its relevance to Frege's notion of indirect sense, I will introduce Kaplan's solution to Russell's argument, and try to explain its significance by appealing to a puzzle raised by Kaplan in connection to his notion of valuated sentence. At the end of the paper, I will claim that the most striking feature of Russell's singular propositions as compared with Frege's thoughts is not that they may contain concrete things, but that they are not meant as representations to begin with.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 53-76
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_53

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Today everyone admits that Frege is one of the founders of modern logic. However, there is a wide divergence of views on whether metatheory was possible for Frege. Some insist that Frege had virtually everything that was needed to consider metasystematic questions (consistency, independence, completeness); others urge that it was impossible for Frege to raise those questions in the first place. Our aim in this paper is to reexamine the place of metatheoretical considerations in Frege's thought. We argue that usual model-theoretic techniques could not be accepted by Frege because of his distinctive "logic of judgement." But this doesn't mean that Frege was precluded from metatheory in toto. On the contrary, he planned a different kind of metatheory, namely "Neues Gebiet" resting on the permutation invariance method. We point out further two problems concerning this new conception of metatheory.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 77-91
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_77

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The practice of risk analysis and its validity have invited heated controversies for many years. In this paper, I approach this issue from the point of view of "an applied philosophy of science". Two common models of risk analysis, i.e. the positivist and the social constructivist models, seem untenable because they reflect positions already refuted in the philosophy of science. Kristine Shrader-Frechette and Deborah Mayo offer alternative post-positivistic models of the risk analysis (scientific proceduralism and a metascientific analysis, respectively). Although I agree with them in many respects, their images of uncertainty in the risk analysis seem to be somewhat coarse-grained. I introduce a Bayesian point of view as a refinement in the post-positivistic model.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 93-107
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_93

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In this paper, I show that David Lewis' theoretical framework is basically sufficient to solve the problem of causal preemption. Causal preemption cases have been regarded as a counterexample to the counterfactual analysis of causation. This view is, however, incorrect. Even under the counterfactual analysis, the problem can be solved by adopting the event theory which defines events as properties of spatio-temporal regions. The source of the problem lies in the assumption that two distinct intuitions should be preserved in causal preemption cases. The appropriate event theory is required in order to sort out the intuitions.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 109-122
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: December 07, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_109

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Quine maintained a version of physicalism, for which he did not argue sufficiently. His position seems to have resulted from his methodological assumption that the maximization of simplicity has the highest priority as epistemic norm. But no argument for this methodological assumption can be given within naturalized epistemology, especially within instrumentalist conception of epistemic norms. Consequently, Quine's physicalism can not be asserted positively.

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[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 123-138
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_123

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The essence of representationalism as a theory concerning phenomenal character of experience is the thesis that there is no phenomenal difference without a difference in representational content. So, the obvious threat to representationalism is a counterexample which shows that there is a phenomenal difference without a difference in representational content. Indeed, in so far as experiences are treated as representations on a par with pictures or letters or even beliefs etc., such counterexamples seem rife. But, in so far as experiences are treated that way, the phenomenal difference in question can't be explained representationalistically nor anti-representationalistically. The aim of this paper is to show why this is so, and then make a proposal about how experiences should be treated ontologically in order to account for the phenomenal difference in question.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 139-143
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_139

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2005 Volume 38 Issue 2 Pages 145-148
Published: December 25, 2005
Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.38.2_145

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